Rule analysis and social analysis by Hazell, Laurence Paul
Durham E-Theses
Rule analysis and social analysis
Hazell, Laurence Paul
How to cite:
Hazell, Laurence Paul (1986) Rule analysis and social analysis, Durham theses, Durham University.
Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6883/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
ABSTRACT 
RULE ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
by 
Laurence Paul Hazell 
This thesis investigates the use of rules in the analysis of language 
mastery and human action, which are both viewed as social phenomena. The 
investigation is conducted through an examination of two analyses of the 
use of language in everyday social life and documents how each formulates 
a different understanding of rule-following in explaining linguistic and 
social action. The analyses in question are 'Speech Act Theory' and 
'Ethnomethodology'. 
The principal idea of speech act theory is that social action is 
rule-governed, and the theory attempts to explain the possibility of 
meaningful social interaction on that basis. The rigidities imposed by the 
notion of rule-governance frustrate that aim. The thesis then turns to an 
examination of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis and contrasts the 
notion of rule-orientation developed by that perspective. From that 
examination it becomes clear that what is on offer is not just a greater 
flexibility in the use of rules, but a restructuring of the concept of 
analysis itself. 
It is argued that re-structuring amounts to a reflexive conception of 
analysis. Its meaning and implications are enlarged upon through a close 
scrutiny of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, particularly his concern 
with the nature of rule-following in his 'Philosophical Investigations'. The 
thesis argues that his concern with rules was motivated by his insight that 
their use as 'explanations' of action said as much about the formulater of 
the rule as the activities the rules were held to formulate. 
The thesis concludes by outlining the meaning of this analytic 
reflexivity for social scientific findings. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates the use of rules in the analysis of 
language mastery and human action. Both language mastery and human action 
are viewed AS social phenomena, and moreover, as inseparably related to 
one another. The investigation is conducted through an examination of 
two analyses of the use of language in ordinary, everyday social life. 
Each analysis employs the concept of rule in explaining the practice of 
language-mastery and social interaction, but each views the idea of 
following a rule in a different way. By a close examination of that 
difference this thesis sheds some light on the variety of ways that the 
idea of rule-following can be understood, and suggests why that variety 
should not be reduced by analysts to a single, 'preferred' version of 
what it is to follow a rule. 
The fundamental reason for this pluralist outlook is that the work of 
the analyst, in assembling an account of language mastery and social 
interaction, is itself an instance of the phenomena of investigation . 
• Consequently, it is argued that the relationship between an analys~and 
its subject matter is itself characteristic of the linguistic and social 
relationships which form the topic of inquiry. The thesis claims that just 
as these relationships cannot be reduced to or derive from a single form 
of relationship, so too, no single form of rule analysis or body of rules 
can adequately describe or explain the diversity of practices that 
constitute linguistic and social life. That claim is made out by examining 
the actual consequences of theorizing linguistic and social life as 
governed by a single body of rules. 
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So the central claim of this thesis is that understanding the nature 
of social analysis is itself crucially important to a proper understanding 
of the nature of language mastery and social life. It is argued that 
social analysis has to be underslooJ ds d reflexive achievement of 
competent language masters and members of society. This understanding is 
not only of relevance for those who construct the analysis, but also for 
those who employ it to make the social world accountable, since their 
endeavours as readers or users of the analysis is an instance of that same 
membership as well. Thus a reflexive understanding of analysis is 
contrasted with what can be termed a 'depletive' idea of analysis, where 
the rules are viewed as the determinants of the linguistic and social 
phenomena from which they are extracted. 
The idea of rule-following developed in the body of the thesis is 
used to account for and justify the variety of perspectives that 
characterize the discipline of sociology. However this is not intended 
to stifle the criticism of one sociological approach as compared to 
another, because that work of criticism is seen as essential to the task 
of understanding society. Rather, the pluralist standpoint developed 
here is directed at countering a tendency to view the task of social 
analysis as susceptible of one, single mode of execution. My argument, 
detailed by an examination of the concept of rule, is that such a view 
is an illusion generated by the very work of analysing phenomena. But 
this is not meant to undermine say systematic or causal ~unts of social 
processes, much less contrast them unfavourably with interpretive 
perspectives. 'l'he pluralistic standpoint adopted in this thesis is not 
selective, even though the insights upon which it is based originate in 
one particular kind of social analysis. The thesis simply argues that, 
whatever the mode of analysis, analysts must pay proper attention to the 
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sociological features of their own research practices: to remember that 
they too, like their subjects, make artful use of rules. 
Chapter One examines the analysis of speech and social action 
proposed by John Searle in his book Speech Acts, 
publications that have elaborated and modified the ideas it contains. 
Searle's analysis is a good starting point because it provides the 
philosophi.cal footings for viewing language use as an .instance of human 
action and for analysing both as a social phenomenon. Searle's principal 
argument is that speech is rule governed. To demonstrate this his theory 
requires the postulate of literalness in order to provide a determinate 
tie between the governance of rules and the meaning of a speech act. 
However, this postulate creates rigidities about the meanings actors can 
communicate which contrasts unfavourably with the actual flexibilities of 
language use in ordinary spoken interaction. The chapter examines an 
important modification which he has made to the original theory in the 
light of this problem, but concludes that this is really more in the way 
of a response to the theory's internal difficulties than an explanation 
of how speech and social action make sense in the social world. In 
consequence the thesis looks to an alternative source for an understanding 
of the difficulties of speech act theory. 
Chapter Two argues t.hat this alternative is to be found in the work 
of Harold Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks and the writings of other ethnomethodologists 
and conversation analysts. Their recognition of the pervasive indexicality 
of language is contrasted with Searle's notion of literalness and this in 
turn provides the basis for indicating the salient differences between 
their concept of rule orientation and his notion of rule governance. The 
view that meaning and sense depend upon an indefinite set of interactional 
and situational considerations is elaborated by examining the type of 
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analysis th:Ls perspective undertakes. This shows that not only is the 
purpose of their inquiry the same as Searle's (viz. to provide an 
account of the phenomena of language mastery) , but also that it is to 
be ~rticulated through an analysis which possesses the same degree of 
systematicity and generality. Given that the prosecution of a general 
and systematic analysis is the underlying reason for many of the problems 
in speech act. theory, the question is posed as to why ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis do not merely replicate its problems in an 
alternative terminology. The answer suggested is that Garfinkel and 
Sacks' recognition that analysis itself partakes of the same features 
of rule-following as the language use it investigates, restructures the 
concept of analysis. 
The philosophical implications of this reflexivity of rule analysis 
are examined in Chapter Three by looking at three different approaches to 
its meaning and implications. The first is the work of Blum and others 
who have collaborated in putting forward a conception of reflexivity 
which is fundamentally incompatible with any form of systematic inquiry. 
In consequence the differences between speech act theory and 
ethnomethodology/conversation analysis elaborated in Chapters One and 
Two, are merely regarded as different expressions of positivism which 
conceal the real resources of language mastery in the technology of their 
respective forms of inquiry. The second approach argues that the notion 
of indexicality is fundamentally incompatible with the concept of rule, 
and accordingly that there cannot really be a reflexive rule analysis 
where the notion is employed. Instead there is an irreparable vagueness 
of meaning generated by using the concept of indexicality which contradicts 
the fact that meanings are stable, available across situations and through 
time. It is claimed that there are in fact rule-governed devices but thar 
no postulate of literalness is required (cf. Searle), because speakers' 
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employment of these devices need not be as univocal or determined as 
speech act theory requires. The variety of ways these devices can be 
used is claimed to properly describe what is meant by the reflexivity 
of :cule:s ill urdinary communication and analysis. 
This idea that the reflexivity of rule use is best conceived of in 
terms of an elasticity of usage anchored in a core of determinate rules 
is claimed to be compatible with, if not an expression of, Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy. The third approach comprises an assessment of this 
claim by looking to see what understanding of the reflexivity of rules 
is present in Wittgenstein's work. The result of this examination is 
to see his writings as compatible with the indexical conception of 
language and rule. However, in order for this claim to be properly 
substantiated, a way has to be found to reconcile the profound unsystemacity 
of his investigations with the systematic empirical inquiries of 
ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts. It is argued that 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, unlike Blum's, is not hostile to examining 
language either systematically or empirically. Rather, one important 
purpose of Wittgenstein's investigation of rule-following is to alert his 
readers to the face that such tasks construct a picture of languages 
rather than delineate its essentials. The latter task is criticized as 
an illusion generated by the concreteness of our everyday language and 
moreover reliant for its portrayal and intelligibility on unexplicated 
resources of extant language mastery. But the former task can serve the 
purpose of illuminating the salient features of language mastery so long 
as it is remembered, and can be analytically documented, that this former 
task represents an instance of what it describes. The spelling out of 
this 'reminder' discloses Wittgenstein's understanding of the reflexivity 
of rule analysis, which is compatible with and fnrt-her illuminated by, 
vii 




LANGUAGE AS RULE GOVEH.NED SOCIAL ACTION. THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 
I. Philosophical Preliminaries 
The concept of rule is central to John Searle's analysis in Speech 
( 1) 
Acts He says: 
The hypothesis of this work is that speaking a language 
in engaging in a rule governed form of behaviour. To 
put it more briskly, talking is performing acts 
according to rules. The procedure which I shall follow 
is to state a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the performance of particular kinds of speech acts 
and then extract from these conditions sets of semantic 
rules for the use of the linguistic devices which mark 
the utterances~ speech acts of those kinds. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 22) 
However, before elaborating this analytical scheme, Searle discusses 
some rather specialized philosophical issues. The reason for his 
discussion is twofold. Firstly, the philosophical assumptions and 
methods he attacks have exercized a considerable influence on the 
analysis of linguistic competence and Searle is thus making plain where 
speech act theory stands on these matters. Secondly, he is serving 
notice that Speech Acts is intended as a contribution to the philosophy 
of language (as the sub-title of the book announces) and is therefore 
not confined to what some members of the philosophical community might 
see as the subsidiary interests of psychology or socio-linguistics. 
In viewing language as a rule-governed social phenomenon, Searle 
sees himself as redrawing the map of the relationship between philosophy 
and the linguistic and social sciences. This re-orientation also 
necessitates some remarks about the relation between language and 
philosophy. He draws a distinction between linguistic philosophy on 
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the one hand and the philosophy of language on the other. The former, 
we are told, is concerned with solving particular philosophical 
problems by examining the ordinary use of particular words. It is 
primarily Lhe IJciiilt> uf a method. By contrast, the philosophy of 
language is the name of a subject and its concern is to give 
philosophically illuminating descriptions of general features of 
language like reference, meaning and truth. 
Although I shall sometimes employ the methods of 
linguistic philosophy, this book is an essay in 
the philosophy of language, not in linguistic 
philosophy. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 4) 
According to Searle, the methods of linguistic philosophy principally 
comprise data for the philosophy of language. The conclusions of the 
latter form of inquiry should hold for any possible language. 
This indicates that the analysis of language mastery in Speech Acts 
is neither going to be a matter of a-priori speculation about its 
nature, nor straightforward empirical scrutiny of its use. The method 
of investigation will rather consist in isolating the fundamental unit 
of linguistic intercourse (the speech act) , analysing its ruled 
constituents, and through this process of analysis determine how 
communication is actually accomplished. In fact, Searle is critical of 
analyses that presume a clear and categorical demarcation between the 
a-priori and empirical elements of language. An initial indication of 
trouble about the distinction is that different approaches assume very 
different positions on what they take to be 'abundantly clear' about 
ordinary language use. As we shall see shortly, Searle regards them 
as prone to substituting dubious metaphysical theories for the analysis 
of actual speech practice. For him this is most clearly visible with 
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regard to construals of the concept of meaning. On the one hand, it 
is presented as an intuitive faculty with its seat 'in the mind'. 
On the other, it is taken to be something purely extensional with a 
minimum of behaviuuLal operat1ons to 1nternalize and manifest it. 
It is all a question of inner mentation or external determination, 
with the consequence that both options deny meaning any analytically 
significant relation to the intentional and conventional aspects of 
language use. So Searle's task is to present an analysis in terms 
of the linguistic construction of reality, in opposition to 
conceptions which view language as shaped by its external environment, 
or linguistic action as merely the countersign of thought. 
A major criticism of the extensionalist view of meaning, according 
to Searle, is that there can be no concession to the fact that language 
has no one particular standard of exactness to which all words and 
statements must conform. In opposition to extensional theorists of 
meaning like Quine, to whom Searle devotes a considerable degree of 
critical attention in the opening pages of Speech Acts, Searle quotes 
W't . ' l . ( 2 ) h t l . . d f d' . f 1 tgenste1n s c a1m t a anguage 1s compr1se o a 1vers1ty o 
different usages by speakers. Searle says that this means not only 
the absence of one standard for all word usage, but also that our use 
of words may have varying degrees of exactness according to the context 
or purpose for which those words are employed. In other words, 
satisfactory linguistic communication takes place quite independently 
of any criterion of 'exactness' or 'semantic adequacy' that some 
philosophers propose. Moreover, the absence of such criteria indicates 
to Searle that our use of terms is 'projective' In fact, even a 
philosophical concept like analyticity: 
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does not denote a closed class of statements; it is 
not an abbreviation for a list, but has the 
possibility of projection. We know how to apply it 
in neY.' cases. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 8) 
This capacity to 'project' exemplifies for Searle the ruled character 
of language. Novel circumstances do not defeat users of language. 
The rules of the language provide users with the resources to make 
sense of and respond to them. So, in critically considering other 
philosophies of language, Searle is pointed in the direction of his 
central hypothesis. 
These criticisms alert Searle to the need for speech act theory to 
be visibly consistent with the competence manifest in actual speech 
practice. Searle is well aware that a 'Quinian' would look upon that 
requirement with suspicion because conformity with it seems to amount 
to nothing more than paraphrasing linguistic utterances in terms of 
social actions and institutions: 
It might be objected to this approach that such a study 
deals only with the point of intersection of a theory of 
language and a theory of action. But my reply to that 
would be that if my conception of language is correct, 
a theory of language is part of a theory of action, simply 
because speaking is a rule-governed form of behaviour. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 17) 
Clearly the charge is one of circularity, which Searle announces himself 
when he tells us that the 'tacit ideology behind these objections is 
that non-extensional explications are not explications at all' (ibid. 
p. iO). He responds by saying that a simple paraphrase, for example 
that a 'Hello' is a greeting is hardly the terminus of 'explication' 
that he is proposing. That would be no advance on the presupposed 
understandings of the concepts which, he says, in fact mark Quine's 
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analysis. The problem is given careful consideration in Speech Acts 
because Searle recognises that he has to tread a thin line between 
on the one hand dissecting a speech act into its necessary and 
suff_i_cient condiL.ic,rros, ctnd on the other malntain.ing a simultaneous 
reliance upon the intuitions of the native speaker. The first activity 
is a step in the direction of Quine's approach, while reliance raises 
difficulties about 'llhen an adequate degree of explanation of linguistic 
competence has actually been achieved. Therefore, to say of the speech 
act 'Hello' that it is a greeting, is to make a classificatory not 
analytic move. 
In the characterization of the example, I used the 
word "greeting", which is the name of an illocutionary 
act, and so the example would be circular if it were 
presented by itself as an analysis of meaning, since 
the notion of greeting already involves the notion of 
meaning. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 49) 
However, an analysis in terms of rule will, we are told, avoid this 
problem because it makes no 'explicit use in the analysis of any term 
that involves "means" as part of its own meaning' (ibid). 
In this discussion, Searle locates a substantial problem for any 
programme of linguistic analysis. It is that analyzers, as language 
masters, have to work from within the competencies they are trying to 
explain. His criticisms of Quine's arguments are specifically directed 
to showing that even logicized and highly technical accounts of language 
are reliant upon extant mastery in the very respects they question. 
What is needed is an alternative to either radically dismembering our 
linguistic intuitions, or a wholesale and unexplicated use of them. 
Searle's argument is that working up an analysis in terms of rules may 
resolve these difficulties because it can exhibit how the topic of 
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analysis is at one and the same time the resource for its expression. 
This relationship is important because a theory of speech competence 
must be able to say that: 
... since the linguistic ch~r~cterizations ... are 
themselves utterances in accordance with the rules, 
such characterizations are manifestations of that 
mastery. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 12) 
The claim then is that this circle of understanding is a condition of 
inquiry, not a problem which it must overcome. However, Searle is 
aware that this approach is open to legitimate and serious objections 
which must be answered if he is to achieve the balance he desires 
between the explanation of language mastery as a possibility, and our 
extant capac~ties as language masters. 
The heart of the matter is visible in the quotation which opened 
this chapter when he says 'the hypothesis of this work is that 
talking is performing acts according to rules'. The question is to 
what extent this hypothesis can in reality actually be 'a hypothesis'? 
That is, would it not be better characterized as a presupposition or 
even a definition of what speaking a language is? Later in the book 
Searle says: 
I want now to explain further . . . the hypothesis 
... that speaking a language is a matter of 
performing speech acts according to systems of 
constitutive rules. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 38) 
That sentence clearly ralses the presumption that his hypothesis has 
to be proved. Yet, later on the same page, when discussing the relation 
between certain illocutionary acts and language per se, we are told: 
But we fact that one can perform some illocutionary 
acts while standing outside a natural language, or 
any system of constitutive rules ... 
( 3) (ib:Ld. emphasis mine) 
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Now that seems to assume precisely what has to be demonstrated 
inasmuch as in the space of half a page what appeared as yet to be 
settled about language, transpires to be what language .is. Searle .is 
.~live tc) this problem ~n.d sets out his L·c=ctsuning as follows: 
I did not attempt to prove that hypothesis, rather I 
offered it by way of an explanation of the fact that 
the sort of knowledge expressed in linguistic 
characterizations of the kind exemplified is possible 
There is nothing circular in this procedure, for 
I am using the hypothesis of language as rule governed 
intentional behaviour to explain the possibility of, 
not provide evidence for, linguistic characterizations. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 16) 
This is a claim that the notion of proof has to be understood in 
a special way when considering a phenomenon with which the analyst 
and audience are not only intimately acquainted, but which is the 
very means for the expression of their knowledge about it. Here, a 
hypothesis about language is itself a linguistj.c characterization as 
Searle has defined it; a characterization of the conditions that make 
speaking a language possible. To characterize is at least in part to 
define. Nevertheless the 'proof' of an analysis of language mastery 
lies in measuring it against our ordinary use of language. Thus, if 
speaking a language is a rule governed form of behaviour, and analysis 
supplies the rules for successful performance of the speech acts of 
language, then the warrant for the validity of the rules can only lie 
in our recognition that the rules do underlie the speech acts we 
produce. In other words, the substance of proof is a theoretical 
re-production of the phenomena of talk which we recognise (or fail to 
recognise) as our linguistic capac~ties. This could never satisfy 
formal methodological criteria for adequacy of explanation. However, 
to abide by such criteria when trying to understand language mastery 
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is merely a gloss for the same 'recognition' that Searle announces 
to be the 'test' for his theory. 
So in our e1:a of extremely soph:i.sticated methodolog:i.es, 
the methodology of this book must seem naively simple. 
I am a native speaker of a language. I wish to offer 
certain characterizations and explanations of my use of 
elements of that language 
This method places a heavy reliance of the intuitions of 
the native speaker. But everything I have ever read in 
the philosophy of language, even work by the most 
behaviouristic and empirical of authors, relies similarly 
on the intuitions of the speaker. Indeed, it is hard to 
see how it could be otherwise since a serious demand that 
I justify my intuition that 'bachelor' means unmarried man, 
if consistent, would also involve the demand that I 
justify my intuition that a given occurrence of 'bachelor' 
means the same as another occurrence of 'bachelor'. Such 
intuitions can indeed be justified, but only by falling 
back on other inh.<i~ir~ I"'.S" 
(Searle, 1969, p. 15) 
This relationship between intuition and explanation can be 
compared to the provision of a grammar. That can be contrasted with 
mere paraphrase which might be likened to a vocabulary. Of course, 
the knowledge provided by a vocabulary can be useful and explanatory, 
even as regards something as simple and obvious as a 'Hello' being a 
greeting. For example, there would be sense of relief rather than 
redundancy if a phrase book informed you that an otherwise angry 
sounding Italian had with the word 'Pronto', simply greeted you. 
However, in such a case as this, linguistic ignorance is resolved by 
indicating the meaning of this utterance. The question Searle must 
answer with his theory is how a speech act such as 'Hello' is 
understood as a greeting. In other words, the capacity to mean must 
be accounted for by the analysis. Yet that analysis always stands 
within the competencies it is explaining, and this is why the 
comparison with the idea of a qrarnmar may be seen to be apposite 
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because the account must elaborate the linguistic properties which 
enable a competent speaker to learn and use speech acts, without 
presupposing the (eo::ul ts of that learning and use. While knowing 
hov; to speak .Ls a nPr.Pss.::try condition of 2nal~/sing language, • Llle 
grammar', the results of that analysis, are in the nature of a 
discovery all the same. Once again, Searle feels constrained to 
comment upon the nature of this concept in givi.ng an explanation of 
language. 
It bothers some people that I claim there are rules 
of language we discover even though, I claim, we have 
been following them all along. But ... in order to 
explain adequately a piece of human behaviour we have 
to suppose that it was done in accordance with a rule, 
even though the agent may not be able to state the 
rule and may not even be conscious of the fact that he 
is acting in accordance with the rule. 
(Searle, 1969, pp. 41-2) 
II Communicative Competence and Performance 
If talking 'is performing acts according to rules', Searle also 
considers language to have a point, and this is the transmission of 
information between a speaker and a hearer. This may seem so obvious 
as to be hardly worthy of comment, yet Searle considers that many 
theories of language have failed to give proper emphasis to what he 
sees as the prime function of language, namely communication between 
speaker/hearers. As we shall see, the relationship between speaker 
and hearer as a social fact is of considerable analytic importance 
because it enters in to the formulation of rules for the speech acts. 
Without this dimension of interaction in the explanation, many ordinary, 
everyday utterances between people would be quite unintelligible. 
Emphasis on the social facticity of language, on the reciprocal 
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recogni.tion and 11se of rul cs for speaking, _is an important consideration 
in Searle's views on the demonstrability and validity criteria for 
his theory. The 'hypothesis' and J_ts 'proof' LiP in mutual recoqnition 
that the rules underliP thP speech acts we produce. It net a 
question of formal deduction from an axiomatic system, because 
language is a mutual recognition of sense and meaning by people 
engaged in communicating. Given that the aim of the theory is to 
elaborate how communication is possible, it is vital to avoid 
occluding the practicalities of speech practice when analysing the 
rule structure that 'underlies' those activities. Searle makes the 
point like this: 
Now, being rule governed, it (language) has formal 
features which admit of independent study. But a 
study purely of those formal features, without a 
study of their role in speech acts would be like a 
formal study of the currency and credit systems of 
economies without a study of the role of currency 
and credit in economic transactions. A great deal 
can be said in the study of language without 
studying speech acts, but any such purely formal 
theory is necessarily incomplete. It would be as 
if baseball were studied only as a formal system 
of rules and not as a game. 
(Searle, 1969, p.17) 
This is worth bearing in mind because the extraction of the ruled 
conditions for a speech act in fact transpires to be quite a technical 
business. However, although what follows does evidence Searle's 
intellectual debts to formal philosophy and structural linguistics, 
the appearance of the theory should not serve to obscure his 
commitment Lo ct social and interactive conception of language mastery. 
According to Searle, rules operat~ on at least three levels in 
the performance of most speech acts. Firstly, there are rules which 
govern the utterance or production of a well-formed sentence. Then 
there are a set of rule formulable statements which define the 
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conditions for successful reference and predication, so ensuring that 
an utterance actually expresses a proposition. Thirdly, there are 
rules determining the conditions for the actualization of a 
p~rticul~r illocutionctLY furce wich wh1ch Che utterance and the 
expressed proposi~ional content are delivered. To illustrate these 
distinctions, Searle takes some simple sentences. 
1. Sam smokes habitually. 
2. Does Sam smoke habitually? 
3. Sam, smoke habitually. 
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 22) 
In characterizing these utterances, one can begin by saying that the 
speaker has uttered a sentence in the English language. Secondly, 
in each utterance the speaker refers to an object 'Sam' and predicates 
of that object the expression 'smoke(s/d) habitually' Then we can 
mark illocutionary distinctions by noting that in 1. the speaker is 
making an assertion, in 2. asking a question, in 3. giving an order, 
and in 4., somewhat archaically expressing a wish or desire. So, in 
using any of these sentences, the speaker is performing at least 
three distinct acts. He is performing utterance acts which include 
both the use of morphemic elements and the utterance of the complete 
sentence; then he is performing propositional acts which mark the 
referential and predicative elements of a sentence; and finally he 
is performing illocutionary acts such as 'stating', 'questioning' 
'commanding' and 'promising'. 
It is crucial not to regard these distinctions between different 
kinds of act as denoting individual events in speaking that speakers 
have, say for reasons of efficiency, elected tn do in the one 
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utterance. In other words, they are not: 
things that speakers do, as it happens, simultaneously, 
as one might smoke. read, an~ scratch one's head 
simultaneously, but rather that in performing an 
illocutionary act one characteristically performs 
prnpnsitional acts and utterance acts. Nor shoulU iL 
be thought from this that utterance acts and 
propositional acts stand to illocut1onary acts in the 
way buying a ticket and getting on a train stand to 
taking a railroad trip. They are not means to an end; 
rather utterance acts stand to propositional acts in 
the way in which e.g. making an 'X' on a ballot paper 
stands to voting. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 24) 
However, whilst the differences between them do not actually correspond 
to separable elements of speech acts, they are, nevertheless, vital 
components of competent speech. For example, if it was not the case 
that speaker/hearers could detach the referential and predicative 
elements in a sentence and hold them constant across different 
illocutionary acts, difficulties would be encountered if they were 
first warned and then threatened about something they were doing. 
And if utterance acts were identical to propositional acts, 
speaker/hearers would find it difficult to carry out the familiar 
manoeuvre of saying the same thing in a different way (taking the 
earlier example; 5. Mr Samuel Martin is a regular smoker of tobacco., 
which would be the same propositional act as the other four examples, 
the same illocutionary act as 1., but a different utterance act 
altogether) . So, although the distinctions are in one sense purely 
technical, they are clearly of great practical importance as well. 
This _LS perhaps most plain to see at a general level in the support 
they lend to the idea that utterances can say different things . 
... the performance of the same utterance act by two 
different speakers, or by the same speaker on different 
occasions, (need not) be a performance of the same 
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propositional and illocutionary acts: the same sentence 
may, e.g. be used to make two different statements. 
(Searle, l'lb'J, i;'· 24) 
This commitment to the flexibility of speech act meaning is 
intimately related in Searle's vi~w to the constitutive nature of 
the rules that underlie their performance. As the concept of 
constitutive rule has an important place in Searle's analysis, it 
merits some explanation. It is best explained by contrasting it with 
the notion of regulative rules. Regulative rules regulate antecedently 
or independently existing forms of behaviour. Constitutive rules 
constitute (and regulate) an activity the existence of which is 
logically dependent upon the rules. Examples of regulative rules are 
readily faun~; etiquette demands 'that the knife is to be held in the 
right hand' (for right-handed people, anyway); an army manual states 
that 'Officers must wear ties at dinner'. Searle says that generally 
they may be paraphrased as imperatives, most of them having the form 
'Do X', or 'If y do X'. By contrast, constitutive rules have the 
form 'X counts as y', or 'X counts as yin context C'. The rules of 
games provide an ample source of examples. The rules of football do 
not 'regulate' football but define it, a ball between the posts is a 
goal because the rule book says so. The physical acts of a ball 
passing between posts, or an arrangement of wood figures on a 
chequered board, have meaning as 'a goal' or 'checkmate' by virtue 
of the rules. Thus, when Searle emphasizes that the components of 
the complete speech act are not 'means to ends', but stand in relation 
to one another like the way in which 'making an "X" on a ballot paper 
stands to voting', the constitutive formulation is made abundantly 
clear. 
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What th:Ls ulti_mately points to is the centraLity in the theory 
of speaker/hearer's actions in issuing and recognising the intended 
quality of whctt js said, together wil~h seeing how its setting and 
clrcumscances lto whom it is said, in what wav and so forth) will 
affect its meaning. I!' other words, t~he point of thi;-,; emphasis has 
less to do with some narrowly technical issue concerning the modality 
of the rules to be us~d in linguistic explanation, than with finding 
an analytical device that will reflect the centrality of human 
interaction to the phenomenon of language. Although Speech Acts is 
a technical work, 'technique' follows in the footsteps of Searle's 
conception of language. All the same, Searle recognises that an 
emphasis on the active, practical and indexical qualities of language 
can bring with it other varieties of analytic blindness. He illustrates 
this blindness with examples which also serve to elaborate his own 
perspective. 
We have seen that Searle suggests that each complete speech act 
may contain at least three subsidiary acts. He adds to the tripartite 
distinction between utterance, propositional and illocutionary acts 
a fourth; the perlocutionary act which is the consequence or effect of 
the utterance on hearers. For example, by arguing a speaker may 
persuade or convince, and in asserting may get the 
something. This is obviously an important component of speech competence 
as Austin realized, but nevertheless, one that Searle believes has been 
latterly awarded too much weight. . (4) Grice's account of perlocut~on 
Searle finds problematic because it operates as an external rather 
than integral feature of a speech act. His basic problem according 
to Searle is that he attempts to give an analysis of meaning in terms 
of perlocution. For Grice, to say thLlt a speaker Iuco<:mt something by 
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an utterance 111 to say that the speaker intended the utterance to 
produce an effect 1n the hearer by means of the recognition of this 
intention. 'rhough correct in Searle's view for stressing the 
ifll!_.JUL Lar1ct: ore t:ht-~ .L1nk between meaning and .intention, it does not 
explain how the meaning is conveyed. In other words, although the 
act of communication involves recognition on ·the part of the hean'-'r 
of the intention to communicate by the speaker, the 'by means of' 
i.e. language, remains unanalysed. Added to this a strictly 
perlocutionary account of meaning has bizarre consequences, for 
example, that eavesdropping on others' conversation, or another's 
soliloquy, ought to be unintelligible. Consequently, Searle sees 
Grice's account of meaning in terms of perlocutionary effect to be 
'randomly related' (Searle, 1969, p. 45) to the meaning of words in 
the language. The notion is properly understood as something conveyed 
in addition to the meaning of the utterance, thereby allowing for the 
fact that not all speech acts are perlocutions. 
When I say 'Hello' and mean it, I do not necessarily 
intend to produce or elicit any state or action in 
my hearer other than the knowledge that he is being 
greeted. But that knowledge is simply his understanding 
what I said, it is not an additional response or effect. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 46) 
Searle's criticisms of Grice can be given an even sharper focus if 
one relates them to the issues he takes up with Quine. Searle, as we 
have seen, considers Quine's indeterminacy thesis to presuppose the 
very criteria he argues are problematic. We h~vP also seen Searle is 
aware of a mirror inversion of Quine's arguments where an 'analysis' 
of an act only succeeds in paraphrasing it into other terms. To argue 
that 'Hello' is analysed by saying that it is a greeting, would involve 
using the latter concept explicatively when its own meaning is what 
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makes sense of the explanation. Analogously, even if it were conceded 
that each and every speech act possessed an associated perlocutionary 
effect, this would still tell us nothing about meaning. Even if we 
'.'ler:t sc f.::tr as to dei:irrc: urHJerstancilng as the perlocutionary effect 
of an utterance, therebv bestowing on it a relevant degree of 
conceptual purchase for an analysis of meaning, we would on have 
sh1fted the problem of perlocutionary meaning to the concept of 
understanding. 
The characteristic intended effect of meaning is 
understanding but understanding is not ... a 
perlocutionary effect. Nor can we amend Grice's 
account so that meaning is analysed in terms of 
understanding. That would be too circular, for 
one feels that meaning and understanding are too 
closely tied for the latter to be the basis for 
an analysis of the former. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 47) 
What is missing in his view is an account of the rules that constitute 
the meaning of the speech acts in virtue of which rules those speech 
acts are understood. It is the existence of these rules which allow 
communication between speaker and hearer to take place and whose 
analytic extraction provides an account of how a speaker means and how 
a hearer understands. Searle expresses this as two simple propositions. 
1) Understanding a sentence is knowing its meaning. 
2) The meaning of a sentence is determined by rules, 
and those rules specify both conditions of utterance 
of the sentence and also what the utterance counts as. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 48) 
Grice's perlocutionary effect is replace by Searle's notion of the 
illocutionary effect of an utterance interms of hearer's recognition 0F 
speaker's intention to produce that effect by virtue of the rules for 
the use of the expression. So, in the case of the simple speech act 
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'Hello', the analysis would determine the rules which specify the 
speech act's conditions of utterance and those rules will manifest 
the intenti.on to greet hearer on the part of speaker. 
Speech Acts also establishes a clear distinction between a 
proposition and the expression of a proposition. On this issue Searle, 
although clearly indebted to the work of Austin, finds him wanting. 
He is concerned to distinguish them because whilst asserting and 
stating are acts, propositions are not. The importance of this issue 
lies in the differentiation of the truth (or falsity) of a 
proposition from the illocutionary act which contains it. Of course, 
the expression of a proposition is a propositional act but you, 
... cannot just express a proposition while doing 
nothing else and ... thereby perform a complete 
speech act. One grammatical correlate of this point 
is that clauses beginning with 'that' ... which are 
a characteristic form for explicitly isolating 
propositions are not complete sentences ... Notice 
that I do not say that the sentence expresses a 
proposition; I do not know how sentences could perform 
acts of that (or any other kind) ... in the utterance 
of a sentence the speaker expresses a proposition. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 29) 
This claim that it is speakers, not sentences, which express 
propositions indicates once again how Searle's rule governed theory 
of meaning is essentially interactive and institutional. This claim 
also separates Searle's theory from those which consider meaning and 
communication to be the product of combinatory operations (whether 
syntactic or psychological) which function through truth assertion by 
d . h d d f f . ( S) correspon ence Wlt some in epen ent state o a falrs. 
However, Searle's rejection of correspondence theories of meaning 
does not entail a collapse of the distinction between the assertion of 
a truth and the truth of an assertion_ Speech act theory is a 
rejection of the view that meaning can be analysed in terms of truth 
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conditions, but at the same time it is calculated to avoid a serious 
error about truth and meaning which Searle locates in Austin's 
account. 
(6) 
The rationale for Searle's criticism is that while he is 
in large agreement with Austin's perform~tivist analy~i~ of 
communication (after all he acknowledges it as a major inspiration) , 
( 7) 
its weak link is the theory of truth Austin promulgated. That 
weak link is something emphasized by correspondence theorists •.vho 
use it to indicate the conceptual inadequacies of perforrnativisrn 
generally; a sort of guilt by association. Searle wants to remedy 
this and, as we shall see, succeeds in turning his critique of Austin 
back upon them. 
For Austin the sentence 'I am going to do it', has one meaning 
(it is one locution) and a potential for different illocutionary forces; 
it could for example be a statement, a threat or a warning. For Searle, 
it expresses one proposition but is capable of possessing a number of 
meanings, each of them the performance of different illocutionary 
acts. Searle regards Austin's locutionary/illocutionary distinction 
as unwarrantable because the: 
... description of the act as a happily performed 
locutionary act, since it involves the meaning of 
the sentence, is already a description of the 
illocutionary act, since a particular illocutionary 
act is determined by that meaning. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 407) 
In Searle's view, the abstraction of locutionary meaning from 
illocutionary force means that, on the one hand the performance of 
an act is disconnected from the meaning of that act, whilst on the 
other it conflates the distinction between the content of a 
proposition and the locution in which it is embedded. This, says 
Searle, commits Austin to the erroneous view that the ac~, for example, 
of telling the truth can be either true or false. 
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Once again the speech act 'Hello' will serve to exemplify Searle's 
position in contrast to a truth conditional analysis and Austin's 
performativist account of meaning. An analysis in terms of truth 
condition::; runs into irnrnedlate difficulties as far as referential 
correspondence is concerned because there is no independent state of 
affairs for 'Hello' to correspond to. The alternative approach where 
'Hello' corresponds with 'HELLO' in meta-language ~, is, according to 
Searle, a definitional accomplishment completely reliant for its sense 
. (8) 
on the already understood meanlng of the analysandum. Austin, we 
are told, would fare little better with his analysis of this simple 
speech act. 'Hello' is a one word sentence and therefore does not 
possess the usual verb formulation and referring expression (e.g. I 
am pleased/to meet you) , which Searle thinks must have provided much 
of the motivation for the illocutionary/locutionary distinction. 
Consequently, 'Hello' can either be analysed as a locution with a 
particular meaning, or as an illocution with a certain force, but a 
practical demonstration of the distinction in the present case would 
hardly make sense. Austin's attempt to abstract locutionary meaning 
from illocutionary force is about as sensible as trying to extract 
unmarried men from bachelors. His insight that asserting a proposition 
is as much an act as the making of a promise, when combined with the 
divorce of meaning from illocution, is what leads him to equate 
propositions with the act of asserting them. Thus, the mistaken idea 
that meaning can be understood in terms of truth conditions is 
compounded by the view that an act of assertion can be either true 
or false. Ultimately either would entail that rules are true or false, 
an outcome that would have the effect of dismissing Searle's central 
idea that speaking is rule governed i'l.ct ion, In any event, the notion 
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that rules are true or false is a category mistake: rules are 
(9) followed or abrogated. For Searle there are acts of truth telling 
and acts of promising, but truth is not an act and the performance 
and illocutionary force of an assertion or a promise, etc., is not 
something distinct from its meaning. The analysis of meaning in 
terms of truth conditions reduces acts to truth. Austin's theory 
conflates acts with truth. Both views distort something of fundamental 
importance for Searle, that 
... an assertion is a (very special kind of) 
commitment to the truth of a proposition. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 29) 
In this way, the idea that speaking is an activity which involves 
commitments can be combined with the fact that a truth which is 
asserted is not true by virtue of its assertion. Meaning analysed in 
terms of truth conditions cannot cope with the first intellection, 
while Austin's performativism commits him to the second. 
III The 'Full Dress' Analysis of a Speech Act 
Searle's discussion of the relationship between truth and meaning 
makes it evident that his theory has implications that go beyond the 
immediate project of accounting for how language mastery is possible. 
Yet it is equally clear that these epistemological issues are integral 
to the theory. The relationship between truth and meaning has been 
intimately bound up with ascertaining the nature of communication in 
the history (particularly the recent history) of philosophy, even if 
that relationship has been overemphasised or wrongly explicated in 
Searle's opinion by his philosophical forbears. By contrast, speech 
act theory places no less emphasis on the psychological domain of 
intentionality and the sociological domain of interaction to account 
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for the mastery of language. We have already seen the way in which 
rule use and uptake are crucially dependent on intention in the 
analysis of the illocutionary effect of an utterance. As we turn 
to what Searle terms thP full dress analysis of a speech QCt, some 
elements of the role of interaction in the constitution of meaning 
will also become evident (although the importance of interactional 
features of communication will not be fully realized until we come 
to look at his analysis of the indirect speech act) . 
Searle gives a detailed analysis of the speech act of promising 
which, he argues, involves the satisfaction of nine conditions if a 
. ( 10) 
sincere and non-defective promise is to obta~n. The FIRST 
condition requires that both speaker and hearer (hereafter S and H) 
are both competent speakers of the language, that they can make and 
understand utterances and that they suffer no physical impediments 
to that end. This condition also excludes what Searle terms parasitic 
discourse, for example story-telling and play-acting in which promissory 
utterances may be made but not literally meantas the issuance and 
acceptance of a promise by S and H. The SECOND condition isolates 
the propositional content from the rest of the speech act, formally, 
'S expresses the proposition that p in the utterance of the sentence 
T. ', and thereby allows the analysis to concentrate on the 
illocutionary force of promising. However, this is not to say that 
the proposition is unaffected by its illocutionary mode because the 
THIRD condition requires that the proposition predicates a future 
act of S. Searle says: 
I cannot promise to have done something, and I cannot 
promise that someone else will do something (although 
I can promise to see that he will do it). 
(Searle, 1969, p. 57) 
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Of course, it is quite common to promise to another that we have done 
something in everyday talk. Searle does not discuss this issue 
directly but it seems likely on the basis of the above quotation 
that '.·.rhat \•.re promise is the 'vrcracity of our ussertion, not the act 
to which the propositional content of the assertion refers. This 
view is backed up by the FOURTH condition which individuates promises 
from other acts which may be uttered with the same sequence of words. 
A promise, we are told, is a pledge to do something for you, not to 
you, so an utterance of 'I promise I'll beat you up' is properly 
understood as a warning or a threat. Utterances like these are cast 
in promissory form according to Searle because the locution 'I 
promise' is amongst the strongest illocutionary force indicating 
devices provided for commitment in the English language and so is 
quite often used for that purpose alone. The point of condition four 
is that the thing promised must be something that H wants (or would 
like), and that S must know or believe it to be the case. The FIFTH 
condition states that it must not be obvious to S and H that S will 
do the thing promised in the normal course of events. This ensures 
that the promissory act has a point. For example, if I promise to 
do something which I am going to do anyway, the promise will either 
be puzzling or defective. Searle has an apt example. Consider a 
happily married man who promises his wife that he will not leave her 
in the next week; although doubtless true, it would hardly be 
reassuring. The SIXTH condition states that S must intend to do 
the act A, and Searle calls this the sincerity condition. However, 
he regards insincere promises as promises nontheless. The difference 
is that the speaker has no intention to execute the promised act, 
but only purports to. S takes responsibility for the intention and 
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so the illocutionary act remains an expression of intention though 
not sincerely held. One could not sensibly say: 'I promise but I 
do not intend to do A'. This is closely related to the SEVENTH 
condition, that s lntends the utterance of the words 'I promise', to 
place him/her under an obligation to do A. Searle calls this the 
essential condition because it: 
distinguishes promises (and other members of the 
same family such as vows) from other kinds of 
illocutionary acts. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 60) 
However, although the seventh condition is essential to promising, 
from a communicative point of view it only establishes that S's 
intention is articulated by the utterance of T, and it is left to 
condition EIGHT to stipulate how that utterance makes S's intention 
manifest to H. This establishes the uptake of S's intention by H, 
in virtue of the meaning of the item which S utters which conventionally 
associates it with the establishment of the knowledge that a promise 
has been made (this is Searle's amended Gricean analysis in terms of 
illocutionary effect). Therefore, S intends to produce in H the 
knowledge that the utterance places S under an obligation and 
recognition of this consists of H's realization of S's intention by 
virtue of: 
the semantic rules (which determine the meaning) of 
the expressions uttered ... such that the utterance 
counts as the undertaking of an obligation. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 61) 
The achievement of communication described in condition eight is 
stipulated in condition NINE to the effect that the semantical rules 
of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and 
sincerely uttered if and nnly if all the previous conditions obtain. 
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This last condition seems a little odd in its apparent desire 
to confirm or stipulate that T will only be correctly and sincerely 
uttered if all the previous conditions are adhered to. Looked at 
uncharit_nhly, it might appear an attempt to guaru.ntee the validity 
of the analyst's endeavour by making his theory into a prerequisite 
of language. That is not the view taken here. But it is worth 
dwelling on this condition for a moment because what it is meant to 
guard against is something that becomes significant later in the 
chapter. The point of the condition is to eliminate the kind of 
counter examples one might provide by showing that uptake on H's part 
was accomplished independently of the semantic means referred to in 
condition eight. Searle gives an example of what he means. He takes 
the case of an American soldier in the Second World War who attempts 
to deceive his Italian captors in thinking he is a German agent working 
behind American lines, by uttering to them the words, 'Kennst du das 
Land wo die Zitronen bluhen?', the only words of German he knows, 
remembered from a poem at school. The soldier is relying upon the 
Italian's ignorance of the German language to convince them of his 
authenticity because he wishes them to hear the words 'Knowest thou 
where the lemon trees bloom' as 'I am a German agent, release me'. 
If he is successful in this ploy, we have an example of where meaning 
will be realized in terms other than those of the semantical rules of 
the language. It is worth noting that Grice's perlocutionary effect 
is not rehabilitated by such an example, becase, as Searle points out, 
the success will not consist in the uptake of the agent's intention 
but on the soldiers' assumption that the German words mean what they 
take them (and he hopes they will take them) to mean. Indeed, in 
this example were his primary intention to be made manifest, his 
capture would be assured. 
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An accomplishment such as this Searle argues to be parasitic on 
the achievement of communication described by the conditions. The 
continuing inadequacy of Grice's analysis in a situation which looks 
fnvonrnhle to its concept of mea!ling is used by Searle to highlight 
his argument. However, whilst this particular example looks 
entirely consistent with Searle's theory since the success of the 
agent's ploy depends upon the expectation of his adversaries that he 
is abiding by the semantical rules of his language (i.e. German), when 
Searle turns his attention to utterances within a language that do not 
happen to conform to the conditions formulated as rules, the theory 
begins to look distinctly unwieldy. As we shall see, the problem 
arises in part from the degree of determinacy in the theory, which 
for Searle is the mark of explanatory adequacy, an approach to 
understanding meaning clearly evident in his commentary on the ninth 
condition in that: 
it guarantees that H understands the utterance, that 
it ... it entails that the illocutionary effect K is 
produced in H by means of H's recognition of S's 
intention to produce it, which recognition is achieved 
in virtue of H's knowledge of the meaning ofT. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 61) 
What this means is that the meaning of an utterance is entirely 
determined by the rules which are extracted from the conditions. 
Not all the conditions are directly relevant to the speech act of 
promising since some apply to utterances generally (conditions one, 
eight and nine). Thus, the FIRST rule of the speech act is derived 
from condition~ two and three, and states that a promise is to be 
uttered only in the context of a sentence of some larger stretch of 
discourse. Searle calls this the propositional content rule. Rule 
TWO formulates condition four, and states that the promise is to be 
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uttered only if H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing it, and 
that S believes this to be so. The THIRD rule is derived from 
condition five and states that the promise is to be uttered only if 
it is not obvious to ho~h S and H that S will not do the act in the 
normal course of events. Searle calls these two the preparatory 
rules. Rule FOUR formulates the sincerity condition (six) and states 
that the promise is to be uttered only if S intends to do the act, 
whilst rule FIVE states that the utterance of the promise counts as 
the undertaking of an obligation. This is derived from condition 
seven and therefore comprises the essential rule. 
These rules have an ordered character. Rules two to five only 
apply if rule one is satisfied, and the essential rule only if rules 
two and three are satisfied as well. Another important feature is 
that rule five is constitutive in form (x counts as yin context C), 
whereas the other rules are regulative, taking the form of quasi-
imperatives (utter a promise only if certain other specified states 
obtain). Accordi~ly, this means that the essential rule determines 
the others insofar as it establishes what illocutionary force marks 
( 11) 
the utterance. Searle considers that the analogy between 
excavating the rules of games such as chess and his own analysis: 
is holding up remarkably well. If we ask ourselves 
under what conditions a player could be saidto move a 
knight correctly, we would find preparatory conditions 
such as that it must be his turn to move, as well as 
the essential condition stating the actual positions 
the knight can move to. There are even sincerity 
conditions for competitive games, such as one does not 
cheat or attempt to 'throw' the game ... There are 
usually no propositional content rules for games because 
games do not in general represent states of affairs. 
(Searle, 1969, pp. 63-4) 
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It will be helpful to briefly consider the analysis of another 
speech act in order to compare its rules with those of 'promising'. 
Take the simple speech act 'Hello' which has already been met in 
other connections. This act has neither propositional rontPnt nor 
sincerity conditions and rules. Its preparatory condition rules to 
the effect that S has just encountered H, whilst the essential rule 
states that the sentence 'Hello' counts as a courteous greeting of 
H by S. It is a simple speech act, certainly 'simpler' than 
promising, a fact which the analysis mirrors and this together with 
other examples of the same co-variance indicate to Searle that the 
theory must be working along the right lines. However, in the next 
section we shall meet an example of saying 'Hello' which requires a 
degree of complexity (not to say ingenuity) from the theory which makes 
the idea of explanatory simplicity look well nigh redundant. 
IV. The Problem of Indirect Speech Acts 
In the first section of this chapter, the philosophical footing 
of speech act theory has been elaborated, and in the second and third 
how a speech act is analysed by the theory. In this section these 
two directions of investigation are united in examining firstly, 
how Searle has developed his theory to cope with what he terms 
indirect speech acts, and, secondly, why the presuppositions of the 
theory require this development. Put bluntly, the theory faces a 
problem. On the one hand the analysis in terms of conditions for 
speech act meaning requires a concept of literalness which will 
ensure a determinate relation between the act of utterance and the 
rules which govern its issuance and uptake on the part of S and H. 
On the other hawl, we have seen that :::>earle is well aware of the 
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contextual properties of language use in actual communication. The 
achievement of explanatory closure requires that a speech act has a 
fixed unvarying meaning if the rules Searle enunciates are to account 
for linguistic competence, whilst the act-_un l practices of that 
competence by members in the linguistic community proceed in what 
looks like complete indifference to that requirement. Faced with 
this situation, Searle has only one option if he is to maintain the 
coherence of the theory and a commitment to analysing actual speech 
practice, not some philosophically reduced version of it, which after 
all is a professional manoeuvre we have seen he clearly rejects. That 
option is to argue that there are a class of paridigmatic direct speech 
acts which provide the foundations upon which the flexible meanings 
of everyday (indirect) speech are erected. In this way, the basic 
conditions and rules of a speech act are preserved being, so to 
speak, laminated by a different kind of analysis that can still 
ultimately explain any speech act in terms of the rules. As we shall 
discover, one major problem is that the class of paradigmatic acts, 
in order to preserve their analytic status, become so hedged about 
with restrictions that they are effectively alienated from anything 
recognisable as ordinary talk. In other words, the analysis of 
indirect speech requires a concept of direct speech so univocal in 
meaning that it comes to look suspiciously like a gloss for a theory 
which is seriously out of step with Searle's acknowledged criterion 
for valid explanation, viz. the intuitions of the native speaker. Of 
course, it must always be borne in mind U1at in accounting for how 
language mastery is possible, we seldom deal with theories that fail 
to work, but rather with theories that cannot convincingly explain 
how they work. That is extant competence becomes, as mentioned in 
the first section of this chapter, a resource for explanations, not 
the topic of explanation. Or, as Searle puts it: 
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the general difficulty in correctly formulating 
knowledge that one has prior to and independent 
of any formulation; of converting knowing how 
into knowing that. 
(Searle, 1969, P.14) 
An example of indirection in speech can be given by elaborating 
the 'Pronto' example discussed above in relation to the theory's 
explanatory task. There it was mentioned that a phrase book knowledge, 
whilst not the terminus of explanation for speech act theory, could 
nevertheless be useful and explanatory on occasion. A situation was 
envisaged where an angry-sounding Italian barks the word 'Pronto' 
at you. No-one, I suggested, would disagree that it was both useful 
and explanatory to know that with this utterance the person had 
merely greeted you. But for Searle, this is not an explanation in 
the sense he desires because it merely resolves a particular linguistic 
ignorance by indicating the meaning of the utterance in H's native 
language. Explanation in Searle's sense is achieved by showing how 
meaning is the upshot of underlying rules (the rationale of the 
theory) , and enumerating the rules which determine how the speech act 
is meant and understood by S and H (what one might term the product 
of the theory) . Now though, envisage the situation in the following 
way. H, not speaking Italian, is led by the general demeanour of S 
to believe that S intends him some harm which the utterance announces. 
Nimble with the phrase book he is relieved to find that the word only 
means 'Hello'. But the relief is short-lived, because in this part 
of Italy the word in fact means 'Empty your pockets'; in this area 
'greeting' a stranger carries with it a demand that you unburden 
yourself of wallet or purse. Note in this case that the issue of S 
and H speaking different languages is not truly relevant to the 
example. Somebody might say 'Hello in a London street and mean exactly 
the same thing. Searle puts the matter this way: 
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There are ... cases in which the speaker may utter a 
sentence and mean what he says and also mean another 
illocution with a different propositional content ... 
The problem posed by indirect speech acts is the problem 
of how it is possible for the speaker to say one thing 
and mean that but also mean something else. And since 
meaning consists in port in the intention to produce 
understanding in the hearer, a large part of that 
problem is that of how it is possible for the hearer 
to understand the indirect speech act when the sentence 
he hears and understands means something else. 
(Searle, 1969, pp. 59-60) 
In Speech Acts the cases of indirection which are examined are 
principally examples where one illocutionary force (e.g. that of a 
promise) carries another (e.g. a threat or a warning). Although 
significant, this does not strain the original theory overmuch, as 
the other elements of the speech act remain constant. But in the 
'Pronto' example above, a propositional content is introduced into 
a speech act which, according to its analysis, possesses none at all. 
However, in that work readers are given a pretty clear indication of 
how Searle's analysis will develop when we are told with regard to 
the speech act of 'promising' that the author will ignore: 
marginal, fringe, and partially defective promises. 
This approach has the consequence that counter 
examples can be produced of ordinary uses of the 
word 'promise' which do not fit the analysis. 
Their existence does not 'refute' the analysis, 
rather they require an explanation of why and how 
they depart from the paradigm case of promise 
making. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 55) 
Whilst Searle would hardly be prepared to argue that indirect speech 
acts form a 'marginal' class of utterances, it is evident nevertheless 
that what the analysis must achieve is something akin to a 
'rehabilitation' of these deviant utterances by explaining how their 
departure from the rules, which the theory stipulates as governing 
meaning, is possible. 
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Given his critique of theorists like Quine, Searle is well aware 
of the pitfalls of pursuing analytical developments simply in order 
t.o save his theorv. His strategy comprises a comb:Lnation of 
criticizin0 philosophical work thJt might be seen as re~uGlating 
his explanatory aims; fleshing out the idea that language mastery 
comprises a basic set of acts in order to strengthen the principal 
thesis that rules determine meaning; and lastly, constructing an 
analysis which involves the use of practical reasoning to purchase 
the kind of flexibility of meaning which an account of indirect 
speech will have to possess whilst leaving the rules unaffected by it. 
Thus, with regard to the 'criticism', we are tol~:i 
There are not, as Wittgenstein (on one possible 
interpretation) and many others have claimed, an 
infinite or indefinite number of language games or 
uses of language ... there are rather limited 
limited number of basic things we do with language. 
(Searle, 1976, pp. 22-3) 
The idea of a boundless plethora of language games would deny the role 
for rules in determining the meaning of utterances which the theory 
gives them. Instead of forming a structure capable of rigorous 
specification, one would have to make an appeal to rules which had 
a flexibility of application to an utterance equivalent to the 
multitude of uses to which an utterance, as Searle acknowledges, can 
in fact be put. For Searle, this would not be explanation at all, 
because explaining how $omething is possible is, at bottom, a 
reductivist enterprise. The success of an explanation of language 
mastery ultimately depends: 
on whether we can reduce all illocutionary acts 
to some very small number of illocutionary types. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 64) 
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Thus, the metaphysics of explanation itself exhibits how 
language actually works. The analysis of a speech act is not an 
abstract theoretical picture, it is meant to actually delineate the 
mechanisms that maJ.ce pr_)ssible ordinary talk. The acquisition uf 
basic rules which the original theory specifies, furnish the neophyte 
communicator with the wherewithal to build and understand the more 
complex utterances of everyday interaction. So the apparent rigidity 
of the paradigm utterances when compared with actual speech practice 
are, in fact, to be seen as a token of their fundamental character. 
The theory's explanation and language learning, although very 
different enterprises, are really like grasping two ends of the same 
piece of string. This approach to the problem of indirection is looked 
upon by Searle as far more plausible and convincing than, for example, 
an analytic manoeuvre like separating illocutionary force from 
propositional content, which would have provided a resolution to the 
'Pronto' example even if only in theoretical terms. But, then, that 
would have had to stand as an exception to Searle's view that 
illocutionary force can modify propositional content (see p.21 above) 
and run counter to the criticisms he made of Austin's locutionary/ 
illocutionary division. Instead, a whole new level of analysis is 
presented for the phenomenon of indirect speech, which employs 
practical reasoning about social conventions to explain it on the 
basis of the rules already excavated by the theory. 
V. The Analysis of Indirect Speech 
Searle takes the following conversational exchange as an 
exemplification of 'the general phenomenon of indirection'. 
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( 1) St.udent X: Let's go to the movies tonight. 
(2) Student Y: I have to study for an exam. 
According to Lhe theory, the first utterance constitutes a 
proposal in virtue of its meaning, it is in o~her words a direct 
speech act. The utterance of (2) in that context would normally 
consitute a rejection of the proposal, but not, says Searle, in virtue 
of its meaning. It. j_s simply a statement about Y, about what he or 
she has to do. He continues: 
Statements of this form do not, in general, 
constitute rejections of proposals, even in cases 
in which they are made in response to a proposal. 
Thus, if Y had said: 
(5) I have to eat popcorn tonight. 
or: 
(6) I have to tie my shoe. 
in a normal context, neither of these utterances 
would have been a rejection of the proposal. 
(Searle, 1976, b p.62) 
So the rejection in (2) is literally a statement about what Y has to 
do, even though its conventional meaning in that context is a 
rejection of the proposal in (1). And, of course, 'context' refers 
to something wider than a prior utterance in 'direct' form to set up 
the meaning to be taken from the indirect speech act. For example, 
the utterance 'Can you reach the salt?' need not be dependent on any 
prior utterance for its meaning, but rather on a setting or 
circumstances to transfer its form from that of a question into a 
request to pass the salt. This example also indicates that the 
issue of an utterance's 'literal' form need not necessarily be of any 
great significance when considering the question of meaning. As 
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Searle concedes, it takes some ingenuity to imagine a situation 
where the utterance would not count as a request. 
The next step :Ls to introduce some term:Lnology. With regard to 
(2), Searle says that the primary illocution i~ th~ rejection, and th~ 
secondary illocution is the statement to the effect that Y has to 
study for an exam. ( 13) Given that the theory will provide an analysi!:i 
of the secondary act, the question is how is the primary illocutionary 
effect achieved? In general terms Searle describes it thus: 
In indirect speech the speaker communicates to the 
hearer more than he actually says by way of relying 
on their mutually shared background information, 
both linguistic and non-linguistic, together with 
the general powers of rationality and inference on 
the part of the hearer. 
(Searle, c~"~ 19 7 _) 1 pp. 60- i) 
What this amounts to specifically is a further set of conditions, in 
addition to those which, as rules, govern the uptake of the secondary 
illocution. However, as the general description indicates, these 
conditions arein fact inferential steps in a reasoning process for 
deriving the primary illocutionary effect from the secondary 
illocutionary act. What Searle rather artlessly terms 'a brief 
reconstruction' is set out as follows: 
Step J I have made a proposal to Y, and in response he 
has made a statement to the effect that he has to study 
for an exam. 
Step 2 I assume that Y is cooperating in the conversation 
and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant. 
Step 3 A relevant response must be one of acceptance, 
rejection, counter-proposal, further discussion, etc. 
Step 4 But his literal utterance was not one of these, 
and so was not a relevant response (inference from steps 
1 and 2) . 
Step 5 Therefore, he probably means more than he says. 
Assuming that his remark is relevant, his primary 
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illocutionary point must differ from his literal one 
(inference from steps 2 and 4) . 
This step is crucial. Unless a hearer has some 
inferential strategy for finding out when primary 
illocutionary points differ from literal 
illocutionary points, he has no way of understanding 
indirect illocutionary acts. 
Step 6 I know that studying for an exam normally takes 
a large amount of time relative to a single evening, 
and I know that going to the mows normally takes a 
large amount of time relative to a single evening. 
Step 7 Therefore, he probably cannot both go to the 
movies and study for an exam in one evening (inference 
from step 6) . 
Step 8 A preparatory condition on the acceptance of a 
proposal, or any other co~ssive, is the ability to 
perform the act predicated in the propositional content 
conclition. 
Step 9 Therefore, I know that he has said something 
that has the consequence that he probably cannot 
consistently accept the proposal (inference from steps 
1, 7 and 8) . 
Step 10 
probably 
and 9) . 
Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is 
to reject the proposal (inference from steps 5 
(Searle, 1975, p. 63) 
Searle does acknowledge that all of this may appear somewhat 
pedantic but insists, if anything, that the inferential process is 
still underdescribed. For example, the role of sincerity is not 
discussed, or the ceteris paribus conditions that would need to be 
attached to various of the steps. Something else he notes is that 
the outcome of the inferential process is 'probabilistic', since Y's 
utterance need not necessarily constitute a rejection. Y might have 
gone on to say, 'I have to study for an exam, but let's go the 
movies anyhow'. 
The concept of 'illocutionary point' is also new terminology 
introduced by this theoretical development, but Searle does not 
- 35 -
explain it in this particular article. However, in a later 
publication, he says: 
Illocutionary point is part of, but not the same as 
illocutionary force. Thus e.g. the point of requests 
is the same as that of commands: both are attempts to 
get the hearers to do something. But the illocutionary 
forces are clearly different. In general one can say 
that the notion of illocutionary force is the 
resultant of several elements of which illocutionary 
point is only one, though, I believe the most important 
one. 
(Searle, 1976, p. 3) 
This is yet another indication that the analytic importance of 
classifying speech acts is given greater weight in explaining indirect 
speech, in fact, to the extent that it seems to erode the distinction 
between the classification and the analysis of utterances made in the 
original theory. But against this view must be borne in mind Searle's 
comment in Speech Acts that the explanation of language mastery would 
ultimately depend on whether illocutionary acts could be reduced to 
'some very small number of illocutionary types' (Searle, 1969, p.64) 
In other words, this move is foreshadowed in the original theory in 
spite of the distinction between analysis and classification which it 
contains. 
However, what cannot escape notice is that as Searle faces the 
problem of explaining how a plethora of meanings can attach themselves 
to a direct speech act, the analytical framework develops what might 
be termed a compensating tendency by categorizing speech acts into 
fewer and larger classes. It also seems likely that this pull in 
opposite directions is what leads to the effective bifurcation of a 
concept like illocutionary force, plainly evident in the above 
quotation, a concept which was of central significance in Speech Acts. 
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In other words, what Searle wants us to see as a 'development' of 
the theory might rather be seen as evidence of theoretical stress; 
stress encountered in trying to simultaneously maintain the thesis 
that all spPPch ~c~s ~re realizations of underlying rules, ilnd face 
the fact that ordinary talk seems to be undertaken in spite of that 
theoretical requirement. 
It is no contradiction to what has just been said to concede 
that the theory will always be able to explain the facts of linguistic 
usage, if by 'explain' one means provide an analysis of the utterance 
using the theory. As we shall see shortly, the theory in conjunction 
with the reasoning steps can secure an analysis of sufficient 
flexibility to cope with the meaning of a speech act that in 
particular circumstances negates the rules of its direct form. So 
to that extent the explanation will always be able to formulate 
what the native speaker already knows as a language master. And 
the notion of explanation, as an account of the particular 
(utterance) by means of the general (nature of utterances manifest 
in the paradigmatic speech acts), is preserved. But when the analysis 
makes explicit the use that is to be made of 'relying on mutually 
shared background information' and 'general powers of rationality 
and inference' (Searle, 1975, pp. 62-3), perhaps the intuitions of 
the native speaker might be better understood as unacknowledged 
resources for explanation rather than just criteria for assessing 
the 'rightness' of the explanation. In other words, Searle's 
philosophical insight that analy~is always stands within the 
competencies it is explaining, is obscured by his desire to provide 
a rule governed analysis of language-use. This is particularly 
apparent in the difficulties he encounters when trying to ascertain 
the precise role of the reasoning steps in his analysis of indirect 
speech acts. 
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IV. Implicit Reasoning in Indirect Speech Analysis 
Searle makes the same point about the reasoning steps of the 
indirect speech analysis as he does about the rules which underLie 
direct spPPr:h a.cts: Do-one v.rould consciously make such inr~~r.euces 
in actual communication. People do, of course, infer things in the 
course of ordinary communication, but obviously Searle does not want 
to claim his analysis is a mirror of those activities any more than 
claim that speakers run through the conditions and rules of direct 
speech acts when making an utterance. However, the comparison 
between the rules and the steps on the question of the speaker/heare~ 
awareness of them also serves to point out where they differ. To 
bring this out fully, it is worth repeating the basic claim of the 
theory in the context of the extension made by the indirect analysis. 
Searle says that we follow rules in communicating even though we may 
not be aware of them in the activity of speaking or, on reflection, 
be able to formulate them. Leaving aside whatever philosophical 
difficulties there may be about following something without being 
conscious of it, he nevertheless clearly demonstrates the capability 
of rule formulations to constitute semantic relationships and regulate 
their use. 
What this capability is meant to demonstrate is that despite a 
speaker's lack of awareness of the rules, or ability to formulate 
them, the explanation cannot be represented as some mere theoretical 
analogue of the wherewithal of linguistic communication. The 
conditions fonuulated as rules, together with the reasoning steps 
for indirectives are meant to be the actual constituents of language 
mastery. This is what Searle is saying when he claims a speech act 
to be a 'realization' of its underlying rules. However, if a speech 
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act is a matter of 'realizing' underlying rules, it is not obvious 
in terms of the theory how the reasoning steps can either be 
compared to or operate alongside the rules at all. 
To u<=yirt with the steps are not based on anything like the 
conditions of a literal speech act from which its rules are extracted. 
They are better characterized as based upon ~~xims about the nature 
and appropriateness of things and activities in certain circumstances. 
With regard to the main example above, one might be: 'do not go to 
the cinema when you have to study for an exam'; another, this time 
more abstract and general: 'replies must be relevant to the utterance 
to which they are a response'. Whereas conditions are formulated as 
rules, the steps depend on the maxims. That is a very different kind 
of relationship. Added to this is the difference in 'outcome' between 
the application of the rules and the steps. Rules, we are told, have 
a determinate relationship to the meaning of the utterance, the steps, 
as we have just seen, a probabilistic one. 
Of course, Searle introduced the analysis of indirect speech in 
order to give flexibility to a theory which had achieved the required 
degree of explanatory explicitness, but as a result was troubled by a 
rigidity and restrictiveness with regard to the form and meaning of 
expressions when compared with actual speech. Consequently, there 
are bound to be differences between the rules and the steps, which 
are in themselves unproblematic as long as one adheres to the idea 
that communication comprises a basic structure of direct speech acts 
upon which is erected a superstructure of indirect ones. Given that 
conception, the differences between the nature of the rules and the 
steps are explicable in terms of their structural position, and 
this, in essence, is how Searle manages to say that the rules and 
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steps are functionally identical and yet analytically different. 
However, what the analysis still does not make clear if that if 
meaning is a matter of realizing underlying rules of the direct 
speech act, how do speaker/hearers ct~~reciate thac che meaning ot 
the utterance sometimes requires the engagement of the indirect 
reasoning steps? 
Answering that question from the viewpoint of a native speaker 
is easy enough. I know and presume that 'everyone' knows that the 
reply 'I have to study for an exam', to the suggestion, 'Let's go to 
the moVEs', is most probably a rejection of that proposal. 
Furthermore, I can construe further senses into these utterances 
which I presume others would recognise; for example that the reply 
was directed to extracting sympathy or commiseration from X (the 
decision as to whether to go to the mo~s having yet to be taken) 
or take the reply as an invitation to cajole Y into going with 
reasons like 'it's good to relax just before an exam'; or perhaps 
Y's response may be a way of ascertaining the true intent of X, 
e.g. 'If she/he's wanting to go with me, she/he'll not take "no" for 
an answer'; or it might be that Y's response contains an unvoiced 
counter-proposal such as 'I have to study for an exam and so do you!' 
Presumably this list of possible meanings would end sometime, but 
the boundary does not appear to be at all definite, one reason being 
that each alternative sense invokes further possibilities of what 
the sentences may mean. Furthermore, if we are to take seriously 
the idea of ;mutually shared background information' cueing 
speaker/hearers into these alterantive meanings, it seems quite 
conceivable that all of them could be recognised by the speakers in 
the one exchange. 
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In terms of the theory, understanding the meaning of an 
indirect speech act relies 'crucially' on the fifth step as Searle 
makes clear. This allows the hearer to detect that the speaker 
'probably means more than he says'. What is noticeable, though, is 
that step 5 makes no reference to any rule governed element whatsoever, 
which is to say that the meaning of the utterance is understood in 
terms other than those of rule realization. Of course, Searle would 
see no substance to this point as a criticism, since the direct 
speech act and its 'governing' rules provide the foundation for the 
inference involved in step five. But what is significant here is 
that apart from the supposition that speech acts are governed by rules, 
the rules of the 'direct' speech act contribute nothing to the 
meaning of the 'indirect' act. In the example it is our knowledge 
about exam revision, going to the cinema and the potential conflict 
between the two which really provides the basis for understanding 
that the utterance 'I have to study for an exam' probably counts as 
a rejection of the proposal to go to the movies. From this 
perspective, the analysis of indirect speech looks like something 
that is principally concerned with saving the original theory from 
a plethora of counter-examples. It is the supposition that 'I have 
to study for an exam' must be a self-referential statement and not 
the rejection of a proposal, that requires the detailed analysis 
to transform it into what speaker/hearers would ordinarily take it 
to mean in such a situation. In other words, for the theory the 
speaker must 'mean more than he says', rather than just then and 
there that 'I can't go'. 
There are also other problems. Given that it takes Searle ten 
steps to derive one 'primary' (indirec~) illocution from one 
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'secondary' (direct) speech act, presumably the analysis that could 
represent some or all of the possible meanings (noted in the previous 
paragraph but one) as a cohort in the one utterance would be 
correspondingly· lengthieL anu more complicated. As tJ1e analys.i.s is 
regarded by Searle as an account of the wherewithal of our actual 
linguistic competence, such complexity becomes increasingly difficult 
to reconcile with Searle's criterion of the linguistic intuitions of 
the native speaker as the litmus test for a theory's adequacy. 
The analysis that could provide for the statement to be a 
rejection of the proposal, also perhaps an invitation to cajole and 
possibly a reminder as well that the inviter, like the invitee, had 
to study for an exam, would presumably take many pages of reasoning 
steps if the extraction of one 'indirect' meaning is anything to go 
by. No doubt it could be said that all this pointed to was the 
inadequacy of the concept of linguistic intuition as a criterion for 
theorising the possibility of language. After all, the physiological 
requirements of the muscles in my hand for typing this sentence would 
no doubt take many pages to describe fully, yet the sentence itself 
takes only a few lines. But it is Searle himself who rejects the 
rationale for that kind of argument when he argues for the philosophical 
propriety of relying on our intuitions as native speakers. 
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the true extent of 
the semantic flexibility which Searle's analysis of indirect speech 
acts gives to the theory. Unless this is recognised, the critique 
of Searle's work can take the form of trying to find utterances that 
the theory is incapable of analysing, instead of seeing the deeper 
problems that lie in Searle's approach to understanding language 
mastery. As noted earlier, theories of language mastery seldom fail 
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to work, our native competence ensures that they do as a rule. 
The real issue is properly explaining how they work, for such an 
explanation will show what language mastery is, since the 
theorization is itself ~n instance of that mastery. 
VII Indirect Speech: A Misguided Critique 
The failure to come to terms with these deeper problems is 
manifest in the criticisms made of Searle by Jurgen Streeck (1980) 
This has the consequence that the proposals he advances for analysing 
ordinary speech competence really fail to mark any advance on the 
problems inherent in speech act theory. Streeck does acknowledge 
that Searle's work signals a significant departure from traditional 
linguistics insofar as it maintains: 
that there can be no absolute distinction between 
the semantic description of linguistic forms and 
the analysis of language use in human communication. 
(Streeck, 1980, p. 134) 
Nonetheless, he regards Searle's importation of a sociological 
dimension into the analysis of language mastery to be insufficient, 
principally because the importance which the context of utterances 
can have upon thei.r meaning, is not accorded proper analytic weight. 
He calls this 'the principle of context as given', which we are told: 
relates to Searle's method of defining categories 
of speech acts by listing the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their performance. 
(ibid., p. 138) 
Now, this criticism looks precisely like the one that I have just 
made concerning the supposition that the utterance 'I have to study 
for an exam' must be a self-referential statement, even if it 
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functions as a 'rejection' in a particular context. In other words, 
streeck is also criticizing Searle's view that there is an inherent 
meaning to that utterance which is somehow logically primitive to 
what it means in the ~ctual circumsLctnces of its use. 
However, as soon as the detail of Streek's argument is 
considered, significant differences between his reasons for the 
shortcomings in Searle's theory and those presented here begin to 
appear. He sets about illustrating the deficiencies of speech act 
theory in this regard by presenting a very simple conversational 
exchange which he regards the theory incapable of analysing. 
a speech act which has already served various purposes in this 
chapter: 
5 5.1 Hi! (smiling) 
5.2 H . I l. (smiling) 
(ibid.' p. 145) 
It is 
Its very simplicity is the thing which Streeck says creates problems 
for a speech actanalysis of the utterances. The context of these 
utterances is that they are a communication between two adults who 
have just made love. As we have seen, these utterances would in 
virtue of the rules which realise their meaning constitute speech 
acts from the illocutionary class 'Greetings'. The rule formulated 
preparatory condition for this class is that 'the speaker must have 
just encountered the hearer' (Searle, 1969, p. 64). But, as Streek 
points out, in this particular situation that can hardly be said to 
be lbe case. Consequently, the rules which Searle maintains must 
govern the uptake of the meaning of 'Hi' are abrogated, and so it 
appears in terms of the theory the communication of a greeting would 
' be said to have failed. Yet, as Stree,k says, 'A and B do signal to 
r\ 
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one another that they are just encountering each other' (Streeck, 
1980, p. 145). 
This incompatibility between what t.he theory says and what we 
can recognise as a greeting, grounds Streeck's criticism that 
interdependence between language mastery and social interaction is 
not actually represented in Searle's analysis. Streeck proposes 
that what these utterances formulate is a transformation of realities, 
a concept borrowed from the writings of the phenomenologist Alfred 
Schutz (see especially Schutz, 1945). Lovemaking ove~ the couple 
make themselves available for ordinary verbal communication. 
By exchanging greetings now, A and B allude to the 
private character of the sexual experience (its 
ultimately non-communicative quality) and express 
that they re-enter into the reality of everyday 
communication. 
(Streeck, 1980, p. 145) 
Of course, the issue is not whether this was in fact the reason that 
A and B had for exchanging greetings. It is conceivable that the 
exchange could preface a continuation of the 'lovemaking reality': 
the utterances could, so to speak, signal the commencement of 
'round two'. Analysis has no concern with what the actual intentions 
of the subject may have been. The task, on the basis of the information 
to hand, is to extract how the reasoning represented by Streeck in 
the above quotation can be seen as an accomplishment which the 
utterances establish. What the utterances do, we are told, is: 
... retrospectively establish a (sense of) context 
which is at the same time presupposed. The context 
is not simply given; it is constituted by speakers 
in part through their speech acts which are at the 
same time interpreted in the light of this context. 
(ibid.) 
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It is this establishing of the context of the utteranc~through 
their issuance which is the foundation of Streeck's account of the 
practical reasoning which competent speaker/hearers employ to 
understand those utterances. 
first quotation is explained on this basis. It is not a moment of 
some logically unrelated measure, for example, like a point on a 
clockface, but as Streerk says, the constitution of that moment 
through the speakers' issuance of 'Hi' to one another. This 
constitution of the utterance context is, according to Streeck 
what Searle's analysis cannot entertain because this theory requires 
that a speech act takes place in a given context . 
... a certain situational context must be 
established prior to the performance of the 
speech act in order for that performance to 
succeed. 
(Streecl<_, 1980, p. 139) 
He takes this to be Searle's view because in speech act theory the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the issuance of a speech act 
are logically equivalent to a statement that the utterance in 
question has been performed successfully. 
Searle's statement that the conditions are logically equivalent, 
ought to have informed Stre~k that the theory does not countenance a 
temporally prior setting up of conditions as a pre-established context, 
which the utterances then subsequently inhabit. The statement of the 
conditions formulated as rules, one of which is constitutive of the 
of performance, signals Searle's understandingtand commitment to the 
idea that context is constituted by speakers through their speech 
acts. Whatever other problems may be associated with it, his thesis 
that the meaning of an utterance is a realization of its underlying 
rules is nevertheless testimony to the idea that performance 
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establishes the conditions as determinate of a speech act's context. 
Nowhere does Searle suggest that utterances correspond to conditions; 
rather, the utterance announces that the speaker expresses commitment 
to ·the state of affairs T~vhich the conditions, as rules, fcu_Hlulctte. 
After all, what Searle offers is a performativist account of language 
where speech acts are understood to do the things they announce, such 
as 'I promise to pay you five pounds', promises you the five pounds. 
If Streeck was correct, Searle would be committed to the idea that 
it is impossible for a speaker to utter 'Hi' and mean it once an 
encounter was underway because the context ruled it out. This, in 
fact, is a mirror inversion of Searle's view. In terms of speech act 
theory the speaker would have abrogated a condition formulated as a 
rule, not performed a semantic miracle. 
Interestingly, this recognition of the abrogation of a speech 
act type condition is prec·isely what Streeck says happens when A and 
B accomplish their transformation of realities. 
The preparatory condition is 'exploited' ... to 
define the 'here and now' according to a model 
of a situation in which two people meet after a 
period of separation. 
(Streeck, 1980, p. 145) 
In other words, Streeck suggests that the contexted meaning of the 
exchange is accomplished by trading on what Searle terms the literal 
or direct meaning of 'Hi', which is to say a greeting uttered in 
conformity with the preparatory condition. In Speech Acts Searle 
suggests the existence of indexically specific meanings for direct 
speech acts which, as he summarises it later, consist: 
in indicating the satisfaction of an essential 
condition by means of asserting or questioning one 
of the other conditions. 
(Searle, 1975, p. 60) 
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Clearly, Streeck has not, with respect to this example of communication, 
moved beyond the position Searle took in that work. But we have seen 
how he regards the analysis presented there as 'incomplete' in 
certain respects; an analysis which the analysis of indirect speech 
was meant to remedy. Streeck does mention Searle's article on indirect 
speech acts but that is all, presumably because he could not see the 
relevance of that analysis to his example. 
However, I want to suggest that Searle's analysis of indirect 
speech is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to be able to explicate 
the practical reasoning involved in understanding the meaning of the 
greetings between A and B in their particular context. The steps 









I have uttered a greeting to B, and in response she/he 
has uttered the same illocution. (facts about the 
conversation) 
I assume that B is cooperating in the conversation and 
that therefore his/her remark is intended to be relevant 
in these circumstances. (assumption that the participants 
are cooperating in the conversation) 
A relevant response to a greeting such as 'Hi' is the 
reciprocal utterance of a greeting. (theory of speech 
acts) 
A condition/rule of greetings is that they are uttered 
on first encountering someone. (preparatory condition 
of the speech act class 'Greetings') 
But the circumstance of these utterances is such as to 
abrogate this condition/rule. (inference from steps 1 and 2) 
Therefore in uttering 'Hi', more is meant than the literal 
act of greeting and so the primary illocutionary point of 
this utterance differs from the literal act. (inference 
from steps 2 and 5) 
I know that making love is 
communication experience. 
not (primarily) a verbal 
(factual background information) 
Therefore we cannot both (primarily) make love and 
communicate verbally. (inference from step 7) 
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Step 9 Therefore we may utter this illocution when encountering 
the same someone on relinquishing one primary communicative 
mode for another. (inference from steps 4, 7 and 8) 
Step 10 Therefore the primary illocutionary point of 'Hi' is 
probably to transform our relationship from the reality 
of lovemaking to that of verbal communication. 
(inference from steps 6 and 9) 
Of course, this analysis does not contain anything in addition to what 
Strceck says about th~ transformation between lovemaking and ordinary 
verbal communication. Where it differs is that the reasoning process 
which it explicates is fully integrated into a theory of communicative 
competence. Whatever the actual merits of that. theory, Streeck' s 
analysis does look decidedly thin by comparison. Neither can it claim 
much in the way of originality, when one of the chief components of 
Streeck's explanation of the utterances' meaning involves the 
'exploitation' of a speech act condition. Thus it transpires that the 
relationship which Searle posits between literal and situationally 
specific meanings is actually employed by Streeck in his analysis of 
the fragment of discourse which he takes speech act theory to be 
incapable of analysing. 
The reason for this misrepn:;sentation of Searle's analysis may 
lie in a more fundamental misconception about speech act theory. 
Streeck claims that Searle's unit of analysis itself marks a failure 
to see acts of communication as interactively constituted. In 
examining other data he discovers: 
... a speech act whose performance is distributed 
over three subsequent turns by two speakers who 
cooperatively establish its illocutionary force. 
( Streeck, 1980, p. 141) 
Clearly, if this charge is t.rue, Streeck would have another set of 
grounds for questioning whether Searle's theory could effectively 
analyse the 'Hi' example. The question is whether such a distribution 
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is really incompatible with the premises of Searle's theory. For 
Searle a speech act is not necessarily tied to the actions of a 
single speaker because there is no necessary identity in his theory 
between utterer and utterance. The speech act lS a u1LL L uf Uiscourse, 
not the property of an actor. Searle's stress on the relationship 
between intentionality and illocutionary force in his theory does not 
entail a commitment to the view that one speaker must perform one 
speech act. The importance of intentionality to the analysis of 
illocutionary force does not require the analytic introduction of some 
actor's identifiable intent in speaking, but is rather the corollary 
of the idea that speech is performance. Perhaps Streeck's 
misconception of Searle's understanding of what a speech act is, 
rests on a confusion between the need to elicit the actual intentions 
of speakers (which as already stated is unnecessary) and the role 
intentionality plays in the analysis of meaning. 
So Streeck is incorrect in his view that speech act theory 
cannot analyse a paradigmatic act of greeting as a signal of 'reality 
transformation'. The fragment of discourse between the two lovers 
does not differ from the offer and indirect refusal to go to the 
cinema, at any rate so far as analysing it in terms of Searle's theory 
is concerned. What his critique does achieve, though, is to bring 
into even sharper focus the issue of how that flexibility can be 
squared with a rule governed semantics in which it is supposedly 
based. 
VIII Literal Speech and Indirect Speech 
The real contradiction in Searle's theory is that it requires a 
notion of literal speech (in order for a speech act to be a realization 
of underlying rules) that is entirely out of step with the intuitions 
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of the native speaker. Its importance is signalled by its 
transformation into a principle: the principle of expressibility 
which announces: 
... that for every possible speech act there is 
a possible sentence or set of sentences the 
literal utterance of which in a particular context 
would constitute a performance of that speech act. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 19) 04 ) 
This in turn supports the notion of rule governance and the logic and 
organization of the rule system for the communication of meaning 
which has its foundation in the supposition that: 
The meaning of a sentence is entirely determined 
by the meaning of its elements, both lexical and 
syntactical. And that is just another way of 
saying that the rules governing its utterance 
are determined by the rules governing its 
elements. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 61) 
The principle of expressibility is the keystone of speech act 
theory because it ensures a rule governed relation between the act of 
utterance on the part of S and the uptake of its meaning on the part 
of H. For whatever reason a speech act's meaning may become 
disconnected from the sentence actually uttered, there will be a 
sentence or set of sentences whose utterance would 'explicitly' 
indicate the meaning of that act. For example, you might be asked 
'Are you going to the cinema', and reply 'Yes'. For Searle, 'Yes' is 
a truncated version of 'Yes, I am going to the cinema', for 'Yes' 
alone might be elaborated as 'Yes, it's a fine day', or 'Yes, we have 
no bananas' . v.fnat allows us to retrieve the correct sense of the 
utterance, according to Searle, is its context, in particular its 
sequential placement behind the question. We know that it is a 
relevant response to the question because we can fill in its full 
literal form by recourse to the conditions and rules for the speech. 
- 51 -
act classes Questions/Replies (see note 14). Of course, this raises 
the issue we have met already regarding whether it is warrantable to 
claim that speakers have recourse to the conditions and rules to 
ascertain the meaning of such a response. Or whether such analytic 
formulations are merely alternative descriptions which are reliant 
upon our extant capacity to understand the utterances, rather than 
actually explaining how we know their meaning. That consideration is 
intimately related to a question raised by Wittgenstein in his 
Philosophical Investigations as to whether the 'full' sentence 'Yes; 
I am going to the cinema' is a literal rendition of the meaning of the 
(15) 
elliptical response 'Yes'. 
It might appear that the principle of expressibility would lead 
to a proliferation of speech act analyses since a response like 'Yes' 
would always have to be elaborated in order to indicate its literal 
meaning in a particular context. This, at least, might look as if it 
squared with Wittgenstein's view that there are a countless multiplicity 
of language games comprising our language (see Wittgenstein, 1968, paras 
23 and 24). In Speech Acts (p. 71), Searle brackets his theory with 
Wittgenstein's writings, differentiating their 'institutional' basis 
from 'naturalistic' theories of meaning like Quine's. However, a later 
publication reveals that Searle's analytic intent is, in fact, quite 
different. Commitment to the principle is part and parcel of 
repudiating: 
... the illusion of limitless uses of language 
engendered by an enormous unclarity about what 
constitutes the criteria for delimiting one 
language game or use of language from another. 
(Searle, 1976, p. 22) 
Consequently, whatever utterances speakers may conventionally or 
idiomatically come to regard as, for example, 'promising' or 
'apologising', the analyst: 
- 52 -
... need only study sentences whose literal and 
correct utterance would constitute making a 
promise or issuing an apology. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 21) 
At one level the principle r:o1Jlrl h0rdly be said to be artificiu.l or 
counter-intuitive. In ordinary human communication the clarification 
of utterances usually takes the form of issuing more explicit or 
literal versions of the original statement. For example, it is 
commonplace of promise-making that, if in doubt of a speaker's 
illocution, we get him or her to utter an explicit performative, 
thereby making clear the fact that a promise has been made. On this 
level at least, the analysis accords with our practices as native 
speakers of the language. However, I want to suggest that the 
concept of literalness as the principle of expressibility formulates 
it, and the commonsense notion of speaking literally, are in fact 
far from identical. In actual speech practice, 'literalness' is not 
so much a property or description of a range or class cf utterances, 
as a practical resource employed by speaker/hearers to evaluate the 
meaning, intent, sense and point of utterances, whatever their 
sentential form. 
Of course, any example can be re-phrased in order to conform with 
the principle and so meet the criteria necessary for the extraction of 
the rules which govern the speech act. But then what we are dealing 
with is merely a particular paradigm of our grammar concretized by 
the analyst as the foundation of any 'game' within the language. As 
Wittgenstei_n points out elsewhere in his Investigations, this leads to 
precisely the sort of theory Searle develops, where the recognition 
of the limitless uses of language goes hand in hand with an ever more 
limited set of explanatory concepts. It is true that such a picture 
of explanation is itself taken as the paradigm of valid knowledge in 
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certain philosophies of science (the search for laws of greatest 
generality and simplicity) . For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, the 
idea that knowledge of the world (natural or social) takes one 
particular descriptive and explanatory form is an idea that will only 
eventuate in misunderstanding the phenomenon of investigation. This 
view can be gathered from remarks he makes on the concept of 'game' 
which plays such a central role in his later philosophy. 
How should we explain to someone what a game is? 
I imagine that we should describe games to him, and 
we might add: 'This and similar things are called 
"games"'. And do we know any more about it ourselves? 
Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly 
what a game is? - But this is not ignorance. We do 
not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. 
To repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a special 
purpose. Does it take that to make the concept 
usable? Not at all! (Except for that special 
purpose.) No more than it took the definition: 
1 pace = 75 em. to make the measure of a length 
'one pace' usable. And if you want to say 'But still, 
before that it wasn't an exact measure', then I w1ll 
reply: very well, it was an inexact one. Though 
you still owe me a definition of exactness. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para 69) 
The clearest evidence in Searle's theory of this twisting of the 
phenomenon of investigation in order to fit the theory, lies in the 
special measures he takes to ensure that a paradigmatic speech act is 
understood in one, and only one, way. The need to do this lies of 
course in the requirement that a speech act should be meant and 
understood via a realization of its underlying rules. However, in 
order to do this, ordinary linguistic conventions which, as Searle says, 
express the intuitions of the native speaker, have to be understood 
in quite an artificial way. For example, Searle has told us that the 
class of explicit, literal performatives includes the sentence 'I 
promise that I will come' (Searle, 1969, p. 19). However, in the 
sequence: 
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A. How do you get me to throw these parties? 
(16) 
B. I promise that I will come 
it is clear that B is not promising something to A, but reporting what 
B regards as A's reason for throwing parties. As we ltctve seen, there 
are a number of ways in which Searle can try to accommodate a case 
like this. He has, for instance, suggested that the words 'I promise' 
are amongst the strongest :Lllocutionary force indicating devices and 
are sometimes used to convey the intent of the speaker in threats or 
warnings, e.g. 'I promise I'll beat you up'. However, B's utterance 
hardly squares with this sort of case because the illocution 'I promise' 
is not employed to indicate the forceful delivery of the propositional 
content of B's utterance, but is a formulation that supplies a relevant 
answer to A's question. Alternatively, one could analyse the utterance 
as an indirective where the reasoning steps made reference to sequential 
considerations. This was the strategy adopted in giving a Searlian 
analysis of Streeck's example. However, in that case, although t.he 
act was uttered in very special sequential circumstances, its primary 
illocutionary force was still that of a greeting. But in this case 
how much sense can we attach to the suggestion that B is giving an 
answer (primary act) by way of making a promise (secondary, literal 
act) as the theory of indirectives requires? B, in fact, is not making 
a promise at all, and given the illocutionary power of promising noted 
by Searle, it is difficult to see how its illocutionary force could 
ever play second fiddle to a mere answer. Of course, there is the 
option of divorcing meaning from illocutionary force, but this is 
something we have seen Searle criticize in the writings of Grice and 
( 1 7) 
Austin. Nevertheless, these various objections would not finally 
debar the utterance from being analysed in speech act terms. Probably 
the best option would be to analyse B's utterance as an indirective, 
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laying special emphasis on the sequential placement of the utterance 
in the inference steps. 
In the light of this kind of example, it is noteworthy that when 
Searle examines the pruwi~~ory act in connection Wlth his famous 
is-ought derivation (Searle, 1969, Chapter 8), he ensures that the 
utterance is not prey to such equivocation. 
'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.' 
(Searle, 1969, p. 177) 
The use of hereby, a reflexive demonstrative pronoun, makes reference 
to what one js doing by or in uttering that sentence. In other words, 
it is self-referential, equivalent to saying 'with these words "I 
promise", I promise' . Its introduction eliminates a continuous or 
tenseless reading of the verb, thereby ridding the utterance of the use 
it had in the previous example. One cannot construe the sequence 
A. How do you get me to throw these parties? 
B. I hereby promise that I will come. 
as having the same sense at all. Indeed, it is difficult to construe 
B's utterance as any kind of response to A's question. So, in this way, 
Searle ensures the literalness of the speech act, but in so doing makes 
its use non-equivalent to utterances that do not include the reflexive 
demonstrative 'hereby'. Thus it is questionable whether 'I promise 
that I will come' is a truncated version of 'I hereby promise that I 
will come', because their sense can have a degree of variability that 
Searle's concept of a literal utteranceShould properly exclude. 
There is also a different sort of consideration which Searle makes 
explicit reference to. It is doubtful whether uptake of the utterances 
would be identical because of the suspension of idiomaticity in Searle's 
explicitly explicit performative. He considers the idiomatic qualit.ies 
of speech to be a very important element to the sense of a 
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communication and therefore to the realization of the rules underlying 
a speech act. In the paper on indirect speech he says: 
In general, if one speaks unidiomatically hearers 
assume that there must be a special reason for it, 
and in consequence various assumptions of normal 
speech are suspended. Thus, if I say, archaically, 
Knowest thou him who calleth himself Richard Nixon?, 
you are not likely to respond as you would to an 
utterance of Do you know Richard Nixon? 
(Searle, 1975, p. 76) 
The introduction of 'hereby' could hardly be placed on a level with 
that example, but it is questionable whether its use is sufficiently 
common to leave those assumptions of normal speech completely 
unaffected. After all, one can see that there is a special reason for 
its introduction; to save U1e thesis of rule governance from the 
flexibilities of everyday usage. 
Thus the principle of expressibility, which is the foundation for 
the concept of literal speech in the theory, ultimately requires a 
repetition of the illocutionary verb in order for the utterance to be 
unequivocally 'realized' by the rules. The analysis by this stage 
looks not unlike a performativist version of Tarski's (1944) 
meta-linguistic truth-conditional analysis of meaning. For the truth 
of the meta-language, Searle substitutes the rules of the explicitly 
literal illocution in order to secure the meaning of the expression. 
In his discussion of reference as a speech act, Searle explicitly 
criticizes Tarski's theory, saying that its proffered fundamental 
convention for language, viz: that in any statement we make about an 
object, it is the name of the object which must be employed, not the 
object itself, 
must square with ... existing conventions. 




The problem for Searle is that language also seems to lack his 
proposed fundamental convention about rules underlying the meaning 
of speech acts. In fact, the powers of sense assembly inherent in 
language use allows his anal.ysis to instruct the reader to construe 
the meaning of an utterance as 'a realization of its underlying rules' 
If that realization is shewn not to be exclusive, then, as we have 
seen, special measures have to be taken in order to preserve its 
'literal' llleaning. 
Such 'instruction' suggests that the 'hypothesis' that speaking a 
language is performing speech acts according to rules, in fact acts as 
quite a restricted definition of what language is. It raises the 
possibility that the hypothesis and the analysis generated from it may 
not be explanatory at all. Rather, the extant competence of speakers 1 
supposedly the topic of explanation, is really used as a resource in 
making the analysis 'explain' the phenomena of language use. That 
would suggest that what Searle does is concretize the activities of 
language use as a theoretical requirement fgr the possibility of an 
~~ 
utterance having meaning. That would be to completely compromise the 
goal of his theory: to explain speech as social action. However 1 it is 
important to emphasize once again that these criticis~do not rely upon 
rendering problematic the concept of literal speech. That is a 
common-sense notion it would be both difficult and mistaken to dislodge. 
As already noted 1 speaker/hearers have constant resource to the 
possibility of whether their interlocut<:>rs literally mean what they say. 
But it is just that possibility which Searle diminishes when he 
designates a range of utterances as paradigm literal utterances. For 
Searle 1 the exchange: 
A. I hereby promise to pay you five dollars. 
B. Do you mean that literally? 
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would require that B's utterance was indirect, otherwise the question 
would be puzzling or defective. The concept of 'literal' itself comes 
to have as inflexible a sense as the paradigm utterances for which it 
stands as a criterion. Paradoxically, this then requires a tabulation 
of 'indirect' senses of literal (or any other concept or expression) 
which fails to tally with whaL the theory announces 'literal', etc., 
to mean. The upshot is a theory which begins by announcing its 
recognition of the organic and fluid character of everyday language, 
but ends up by rigidly defining for language users what a word can 
mean. At best, that is a theory for a dictionary, not for the actual 
lived experience of speaking and acting in the linguistic commnnitv. 
IX Speech Acts: A Conclusion 
According to the argument of this chapter, the aim of Searle's 
theory, to provide an explanation of language mastery compatible with 
the idea of a shared mastery of rules and consistent with the actual 
practices of language users, fails. The two principal ingredients of 
this failure appear to be these. Firstly, the idea that rules govern 
meaning eventuates in a picture of language that is so rigid and an 
analysis so complex, that evidence for the suspicion that our extant 
competence is really doing the work that the theoretical explanation 
is claimed to do, becomes overwhelming. The second, which follows on 
from the first, is that the nature of explaining language mastery is 
something that requires a much fuller investigation than it is given 
in Searle's theory. The principal reason for this may be summarized 
by saying that where the topic of explanation is actually the means 
of expressing that explanation, then understanding the nature of 
'analysis' may be no less crucial than analysing the nature of our 
linguistic 'understanding'. 
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In the next chapter the conception of language masteeyand social 
competence proffered by ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts 
is going to be examined for an 'answer' to these problems. 'Answer' 
ctppectrs in quotes because 1t will transpire that the insights of 
figures like Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks have less to do with 
finding solutions for such problems than with recognising that such 
analytical problems themselves compr.Lse crucially important features 
of language mastery. Their insights, as we shall see, require a 
fundamental re-appraisal of the nature of accounting for our mastery 
of language and a thoroughgoing re-examination of the character of 
rule analysis as well. 
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CHAPTER ONE - NOTES 
1. J.R. Searle (1969). 
2. See Wittgenstein (1968), para 88. 
3. The concepts of constitutive rule and illocutionary act are 
explored in the next section of the chapter. 
4. Contained in H.P. Grice (1957). 
5. The distinction between interactive and truth-telling conceptions 
of meaning is one of the central issues in contemporary debates 
in the philosophy of language and social science. It is 
interwoven with the problems concerning the distinction between 
causality and intentional action, relativism and the cluster of 
issues that divide 'positivist' from 'interpretive' sociology. 
See G. Evans and J. McDowell (1976) for a recent account of the 
philosophical arguments. C. Hookway and B. Pettit (1978) have 
edited a collection of essays which translates the arguments into 
social scientific terms. An excellent overview is provided by 
Roy Harris (1978). 
6. See J.L. Austin (1962a). His objections to Austin's account are 
to be found in Searle (1968). 
7. Austin (1950). Reprinted in G. Pitcher, ed. (1964). 
8. Compare Searle's arguments against Quine (above), and Searle's 
arguments against Tarski's theory of truth (Searle, 1969, p. 76). 
9. On this point see J.S. Ganz (1971), pp. 24 and 74. 
10. The analysis of this speech act has attracted considerable 
additional interest because of Searle's claim that its conditions 
and rules can establish a valid derivation of an 'ought' from and 
~is'. See W.D. Hudson, ed. (1969) and A.C. Genova (1970). 
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11. It may seem contradictory for Searle to say that the essential 
rule will only be satisfied if the other conditions obtain, and 
yet that the essential rule determines the others. But the 
contradiction is merely verbal. One cannot promise unless one 
coul~ promise, unless one was in a posi ti_on to promise, and unless 
one promised something. However, the satisfaction of those 
conditions would not, in and of themselves, amount to, or 
constitute, a promise. 
12. See also Searle (1975a) which is the same article under a 
different title. 
13. One could suggest that Searle's terminology is rather subtle at 
this point because the literal act which provides the foundation 
for the original theory has now become 'secondary'. 
14. Note the mention of context in the principle. Contextuality is 
introduced into the analysis of a speech act through the conditions 
or steps, and, as mentioned with regard to Streeck's criticisms, 
is thereby incorporated as an integral feature of speech performance 
rather than an external circumstance of it. 
15. This discussion occurs early on in the work. See the commentary 
by Rhees (1959). 
you can call 'Slab!' a word and also a sentence; 
perhaps it could be appropriately called a 'degenerate 
sentence' (as one speaks of a degenerate hyperbola) 
surely only a shortened form of the sentence 'Bring me 
a slab' But why should I not on the contrary have 
called the sentence 'Bring me a slab' a lengthening of 
the sentence 'Slab!' Because if you shout 'Slab!' 
you really mean: 'Bring me a slab'. But how do you 
do this: how do you mean that while you say 'Slab!' 
why should I translate the call 'Slab!' into a different 
expression in order to say what someone means by it? ... 
~ But when I call 'Slab!', the..n what I want is, that he 
should bring me a slab! - Certainly, but does 'wanting 
this' consist in thinking in some form or other a 
different sentence from the one you ut.ter? -
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The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves 
out something that we think when we utter it, but 
because it is shortened - in comparison with a particular 
paradigm of our gram_mar, - Of course, one might object 
here: 'You grant that the shortened and the unshortened 
sentence have the same sense. -- What is this sense, then? 
Isn't thcr2 u. verbal expression fol- thi~ sense? 1 - But 
doesn't the fact that sentences have the same sense 
consist in their having the same use? (In Russian, one 
says 'stone red' instead of 'the stone is red'; do they 
feel the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it 
in thought_?) 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, paras 19 and 20) 
16. I am indebted to D.W. Stampe (1975) for this example. 
17. Searle's criticisms of Austin are bound up with the development of 
his own theory and it is questionable whether the locutionary/ 
illocutionary distinction is as exclusive in Austin's writings as 
Searle says it is. In 'How To Do Things With Words', Austin says: 
to perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, 
also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act. 
(Austin, 1962, p. 98) 
There is good reason to suppose that the question, 'If you say 
that you will come, therein promising to come, have you performed 
act 
one~ or two?', would b~ regarded as Austin says elsewhere to 
exemplify the sort of question, 'that gets a philosopher stared 
at as an idiot'. But, as we have seen, Searle's theory of 
indirectives is framed in just these terms. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LANGUAGE USE AND SOCIAL LIFE AS RULE ORIENTED PRACTICAL ACTIVITY 
THE PERSPEC'riVES OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
I. On Explaining Language Mastery 
One way of interpreting the problems faced by speech act theory 
in analysing ordinary speech practice would be to conclude that 
language use is simply too rich and complex a phenomenon to even be 
described, let alone explained, by any theory. In other words, Searle's 
theory is not incorrect or wrong, its problem is that it is a theory 
at all. The fallacy of his approach lies not in selecting key 
principles like rule governance to exhibit the wherewithal of language 
and social life, but in assuming such principles are there to be found 
at all. 
I am not happy with this view because it has the effect of stopping 
any attempt to investigate the nature of language mastery. The argument 
looks basically anti-scientific, in that it claims language and social 
life to be incapable of being systematically analysed at all. However, 
it would be more accurate to say that the phenomena of language use 
are taken to defy theoretical explanation because, as we saw in the 
last chapter, their features are not reconcilable with particular norms 
of explanation. That chapter showed that language use was not dissectable 
into underlying constituents whose properties can be formulated in 
law-like or rule governed terms. From this, it is taken to follow 
that to attempt the explanation of language mastery is futile. In 
other words, one must either give an explanation in the sort of terms 
Searle proposes, or concede that one cannot endeavour 'to explain' 
language mastery at all. 
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In the light of these alternatives, it is clear that what needs 
questioning is not only the conception of explanation presupposed in 
a theory like Searle's, but also his methods of analysis. The purpose 
of this chapter 1s to exam1ne the writings of ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts in order to see how the concept of explanation 
and methods of analysis might be restructured. 
II. Garfinkel and Sacks's View of Language Mastery 
Unlike speech act theory, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
are not presented in terms of an explicit, programmatic theory of 
language mastery. Instead, emphasis is placed on the empirical scrutiny 
of actual language use. However, the absence of theorizing in the 
fashion represented in this thRsis by Searle's work is not merely an 
oversight common amongst those engaged in empirical inquiry, but an 
indication that a fruitful analysis of language mastery cannot be 
undertaken in that way. In fact, for ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts, the sense of programmatic is entirely revised: 
... wherever practical actions are topics of study, the 
promised distinction and substitutibility of objective 
for indexical expressions remains programmatic in every 
particular case and in every actual occasion in which 
the distinction or substitutibility must be demonstrated. 
In every actual case without exception, conditions will 
be cited that a competent investigator will be required 
to recognise, such that in that. particular case the terms 
of the demonstration can be relaxed and nevertheless be 
counted as an adequate one. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 6) 
What this means is that the kind of concepts employed in theory 
buiding exercises of the sort Searle undertakes, are viewed as 
inimical to a proper understanding of language use. Language mastery 
is not seen as the possession of interlocking sets of rules coupled to 
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practical reason when indirect speech requires its involvement, but 
as manifested in social skills more loosely assembled than the notion 
of governance could imply, which are recognised and legitimated in 
the particular circuwsla!lce~ of their use. Garfinkel and Sacks 
understand language mastery as the competent membership of social 
settings. 
'l'he notion of member is the heart of the matter. 
We do not use the term to refer to a person. It 
refers instead to mastery of natural language which 
we understand in the following way. 
We offer the observation that persons, because of 
the fact that they are heard to be speaking a natural 
language, somehow are heard to be engaged in the 
objective production and objective display of 
commonsense knowledge of everyday activities CJS 
observable reportable phenomena. We ask what it is 
about natural language that permits speakers and 
auditors to hear, and in other ways to witness, 
the objective production and objective display of 
commonsense knowledge, and of practical circumstances, 
practical actions, and practical sociological 
reasoning as well. 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 342) 
For Searle, we saw that 'the how' of communication is located in 
the possession and use by every speaker of a set of rules whose use 
governs the meaning of utterances. It is the existence of those rules 
which, according to him, allows someone to 'display' their membership 
of the linguistic and social community. However, the concept of 
literalness required for the operation of the notion of rule governance, 
presumes a canonical meaning for certain paradigmatic utterances in 
order for the issuance and uptake of speech acts to be intelligible 
to speaker/hearers. For ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, 
the basic problem which such a conception of language invites, is 
( 1) 
the failure to recognise the indexical nature of all uses of language. 
Consequently, that people are 'somehow ... heard to be engaged in 
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the objective production and objective display of commonsense 
knowledge', indicates that the sense and meaning of utterances is 
not guaranteed by rules, but achieved by speakers in the activity of 
spe.:tking itself. Whereas for Searle, the intelligibility of the act 
of speaking ultimately rests on i~he grasping of rules which are 
themselves reliant on literal meanings; for ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts, the intelligibility of spoken acts (and social 
actions in general) is something that can only be made out in the 
activities of speaking and hearing. 
So, instead of the idea that some linguistic expressions possess 
a literal meaning, Garfinkel and Sacks pose the view that all 
expressions are indexical. This means that any expression, be it a 
single word, gesture, exclamation, or phrase, sentence some longer 
stretch of discourse, is dependent for its sense upon the context in 
which it occurs. Garfinkel cites a diversity of authors who have 
commented upon the indexical properties of language. 
Husserl spoke of expressions whose sense cannot be 
decided by an auditor without his necessarily knowing 
or assuming something about the biography and purposes 
of the user of the expression, the previous course of 
the conversation, or the particular relationship of 
actual or potential interaction that exists between 
the expressor and the auditor. Russellobserved that 
descriptions involving them apply on each occasion of 
use to only one thing, but to different things on 
different occasions. Such expressions, wrote Goodman, 
are used to make unequivocal statements that nevertheless 
seem to change in truth value. 
(2) (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 4) 
However, he is not concerned to sort out or comment. upon the 
philosophical difficulties that indexical expressions pose for their 
views, but to observe there to be 'virtually unanimous agreement' 
(ibid. p. 5) that although they are enormously useful, they are a 
nuisance for those engaged in scientific work. 
- 67 -
Of course, the 'problem' of indexicality in professional activities 
is not confined to philosophy and science. As Atkinson and Drew (1979) 
note, lawyers view their activities as guided by precedents where the 
meaning of words has been tried and tested, so that their use in the 
future is certain and predictable in its results. However, the legal 
process is imbued with problems of construing documents, enactments 
and expressions generally. In this respect, a fairer description of 
the legal process might be to say that it settles a meaning at point x, 
only to thereby raise an issue of meaning at point y. There are even 
principles of construction for the interpretation of statutes; a 
recognition that the most careful and painstaking drafting cannot 
sidestep the indexicality of language. A canon of construction for 
lawyers is known by the latin tag noscitur a sociis (a word takes 
colouring from its neighbouring words). It was used by Lord Scarman 
in the 'Fares Fair' case. The point at issue was the meaning of 
'economic' in the relevant legislation. He said: 
... it is a very useful word: chameleon-like, taking 
its colour from its surroundings. Even in the 
statute now being considered, the adjective economic 
may have a wider meaning than the noun economy 
... I, therefore, refuse to consider the question of 
the meaning of economic ... as capable of being 
determined by reference to a dictionary. The 
dictionary may tell us several meanings the word 
can have, but the word will always take its specific 
meaning (or meanings) from its surroundings, i.e. 
in this case from the Act read as a whole. 
(Bromley L.B.C. v G.L.C. [ 1982} 
I All E.R. 129, 174 per Lord Scarman) 
Accordingly, says Garfinkel, the progress of science and knowledge 
in general, is seen to consist in the substitution of objective for 
indexical expressions. Furthermore, it is only practical difficulties 
which impede this substitution in any particular case, 
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since the distinction between objective and indexical 
expressions is not only procedurally proper but 
unavoidable. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 5) 
However, these remarks have suggested to some commentators that if 
indexical expressions are bound to a context for their meaning, then 
objective, scientific expressions are, by contrast, context-free. It 
is crucial to realize that ethnomethodologists and conversation 
analysts are not claiming this. They are not claiming that there 
are two mutually exclusive classes of expression and that the study 
of social life is hampered by its being an indexical phenomenon. In 
other words, they would not counterpose scientific investigation to 
practical action in terms of some epistemological or conceptual 
difference that marked them off as two completely distinct kinds of 
endeavour. Rather, they see the distinction as one which is 
occasioned, in this case, by scientific activity itself. 
So, whilst the criteria of knowledge may be very different for 
theoretical physics as opposed to an ordinary conversation, the 
inference that understanding and the principles of linguistic 
communication necessarily differ in consequence, is a view they would 
regard as dubious and in fact productive of considerable epistemological 
difficulties. For instance, if I say in the course of helping to bake 
a cake, 'the sugar is on the scales', would this be any less objective 
an utterance than the same proposition forming part of a scientific 
study? It might be argued that the auspices of science make such 
statements capable of rigorous verification, but it is a discredited 
idea even amongst positivist philosophers of science that the 
objective meaning of an utterance can be established by verifying 
operations. But, of course, that is not to suggest that there are 
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not differences between two such diverse activities as theoretical 
physics and cake baking. The emphasis placed on studying actual 
instances of communication is not the conunitment of empiricists, but 
the recognition that the wherewithal of language mastery is something 
which is made and found in the practical circumstances of its use. 
It is in this sense that the substitution of objective for indexical 
expressions (something which is no less com_mon in everyday activities 
than it is in science) remains a practical achievement, that is to 
say, 'programmatic in every particular case.' 
As a result, there is no question as to 'Whatever should be done 
(3) 
with indexical expressions?' , because they are not a problem for, 
but a condition of, all communicative activities. The analytical 
task is to specify the methods whereby members of a social setting 
furnish that setting with its objectivity, an objectivity which has 
less to do with criteria proposed by philosophers and scientists 
than with the mundane activities of making visible 'objective facts' 
in a social situation. This is to see that the: 
recognisable sense, or fact, or methodic character, 
or impersonality, or objectivity of accounts are 
not independent of the socially organised occasions 
of their use. Their rational features consist of 
what members do with, what they 'make of' the 
accounts in the socially organised actual occasions 
of their use. Members' accounts are reflexively 
and essentially tied for their rational features 
to the socially organised occasions of their use 
for they are features of the socially organised 
occasions of their use. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 3-4) 
Clearly, these remarks on objective and indexical expressions 
have some affinity with Searle's views. He, too, is critical of 
accounts of language mastery which propose strict criteria of meaning 
and sense in the name of a philosophic propriety or scientific 
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adequacy which ordinary language use manifestly fails to satisfy. 
His attack on Quine is an attack on a theory which involves a 
complete reconstruction of linguistic competence in order to satisfy 
its own proposals on criteria of meaning. But, as the last chapter 
made clear, Searle's own commitment to the existence of paradigmatic 
speech acts involves the use of objective expressions which are 
employed as a resource for theory construction. From the perspective 
of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, the result is that the 
theory fails to topicalize the features of language mastery which 
allow it to work as a systematic analysis of that mastery. That is 
the reflexive and essential tie which Garfinkel refers to in the 
quotation above. Paradigmatic typification, the method adopted by 
Searle, tacitly relies upon competent language use in achieving a 
'systematic' and 'general' account of that competence. It is summed 
up neatly in the following quotation: 
In a search for rigour the ingenious practice is 
followed whereby (indexical) expressions are first 
transformed into ideal expressions. Structures are 
then analysed as properties of the ideals, and the 
results are assigned to actual expressions as their 
properties, though with disclaimers of 'appropriate 
scientific modesty'. 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 339) (4 ) 
Thus, the problem as Searle put it of 'converting knowing how 
into knowing that', is not viewed by ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts as simply a troublesome characteristic of 
hwuankind's self investigation. Rather, it is an important 
manifestation of the accounting practices which comprise the mastery 
of language. But this perspective on the relationship between 
linguistic competence and its analysis comes with what looks like 
serious problems of its own. For example, it might appear to be 
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the case that if members' accounts are 'features of the socially 
organised occasions of their use', then such reflexivity must 
effectively write off any general account of language mastery. On 
the one hand, this seems to presuppose an utterly relativistic 
epistemology (one might call it situational solipsism), while on the 
other, lookingclearly inconsistent with the scope of the rules and 
devices which conversation analysts in particular have formulated. If 
such criticisms could be sustained, then not only would the epistemological 
foundations of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis be extremely 
suspect, but also the findings of the disciplines would bear no 
relation to their conception of how membership is possible. 
However, these app~rently fatal criticisms are really based on a 
misunderstanding. This is the idea that since all utterances are 
indexical, that must mean that 'meaning' is confined to some 
predetermined context. But although erroneous, it is nevertheless 
illuminating because it shows that context has been construed in such 
a way that it excludes the recognition that analysis is a reflexive 
enterprise. This point needs spelling out carefully. A moment ago, 
when referring to the idea of 'context' which I believe underlies the 
criticisms, I predicated the concept with pre-determined. That was 
deliberate since it was meant to contrast two views of context. One 
is as some hermetically sealed entity which an analyst, or for that 
matter anyone going about their everyday activities, confronts as an 
outsider. The other views 'context' as a device used by members and 
analysts alike for recognising the sense of activities. In other 
words, 'context' does not refer to a state which some utterances are 
in, but rather a recognition by language users in general that they 
do not necessarily share the meaning and use of any utterance. This 
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conception does not imprison meaning within a context. It widens 
rather than diminishes the meanings an expression can have. 
So to take the view that all utterances are indexical is not to 
say that the meQning of an utterance is sealed off from anyone who 
did not participate in that particular context. The recognition of 
the pervasiveness of indexicality means that the boundaries of context 
are constructed by members to ascertain the meaning of an expression. 
'Context' is not like a fence within which meanings can then make 
sense. It is better likened to a tool which members use to make 
utterances and activities meaningful to them. In fact, the idea that 
because sense-making is a collaborative activity undertaken in 
particular social settings, this entails that the meanings available 
in those settings are unavailable outside them, is scarcely intelligible. 
The reason for this is that it makes the notion of context itself quite 
incomprehensible since it would have the effect of making its 
boundaries equivalent to the limits of language (this is what I meant 
earlier by 'situational solipsism'). 
Thus, the recognition that all utterances are indexical, is not 
like saying that there is an epistemological barrier between utterances 
in different settings. What it really connotes is the idea that 
meaning and understanding are activities. Searle, whilst claiming 
to see speech as action, nevertheless views meaning to be the product 
of a pre-ordained structure of rules. Any such theory tacitly relies 
on the very features of language mastery it claims to explain if the 
rules are to be taken and followed in the 'right' way. Of course, 
that reliance is not in and of itself an object of criticism. Rather, 
it is the failure to perceive its implications for analytic activity 
which marks a critical failing in a project like Searle's. As noted 
earlier, the philosophical insight (which Searle certainly shares) 
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that knowledge of any fact, including linguistic facts, involves a 
process of evaluation, is restructured by Garfinkel and Sacks into 
the view that all uses of language are indexical. This indexicality 
of language means in turn that persons engaged in communicating have 
to achieve that communication methodically. It is to the substantive 
study of these ethno-methodologies that the chapter now turns. 
III Analysing Members' Use of Rules 
The issues covered in the previous section should have outlined 
the reasons why the analyses of ethnomethodologists and conversation 
analysts need not be any less general or systematic than Searle's 
theory of language mastery. It is not the scope and rigour of Searle's 
theory which is the problem, but the assumptions about language and 
its explanation that are carried along with it. Whereas Searle imposes 
rules on the activities of speech practice, Garfinkel and Sacks seek 
to explicate how rules as such are used by members in social settings 
to locate the sense of the interactions which comprise them. Given 
the pervasiveness of indexicality, it follows that social interaction 
cannot be analysed by specifying rules for the issuance and uptake of 
speech acts, even if those acts can be seen as particular instances of 
rules of greater generality. As we saw in the last chapter, this is 
not a viable way of attempting to explain the indexical phenomena of 
'indirect' speech. All that does is highlight the multiplicity of 
ways a rule can be followed, and that. realization is fundamentally 
iHcompatible with the principle of rule governance. 
For ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, the mastery 
of language is seen as comprising methods which are employed by 
members in social settings. To be sur~ those methods are explicable 
in terms of rules. But it is the methodic practices of the members 
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of social settings in the activities which make the setting meaningful, 
and not meanings guaranteed by the rules, that are the focus of this 
study. Those methods illustrate the diversity of ways a rule can be 
followed. That diversity is viewed as a condition of competent 
membership, not, as Searle saw it, a pervasive nuisance for 
theoretical explanation. As we have seen, such theorizing not only 
freezes the essentially active nature of language mastery. It also 
fails to recognise that analysis itself is no less a social activity 
of making phenomena 'observable and reportable' than the mundane 
practices of everyday life. 
In particular, what this means is that analysis is not viewed as 
the exclusive preserve of the professional investigator. Rather, it 
is taken to be a ubiquitous feature of social interaction. The mastery 
of language is seen by Garfinkel and Sacks to consist in the analytical 
work members do in actual social settings. The phenomena of language 
mastery are members' methods for constituting meaning and sense, not a 
grasp of rules they are deemed to possess, which in and of themselves 
are able to explain that mastery. Rules, in consequence, are not seen 
to govern understanding but to orient it. Consequently the professional 
analyst's task is not, 
to stipulate what rules members really were 'following' 
or 'governed by', but to locate rules which they might 
be 'orienting to' and using and producing a recognisable 
orderliness in some setting. 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 22) 
One immediate implication of this shift from governance to orientation 
is that it signals the acknowledgement of an ineradicable plurality 
of readings of the meaning or sense of utterances. Atkinson and Drew 
put the analytical consequences this way: 
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... while an analyst may not be able to arrive at 
the sense of what participants were actually orienting 
to in some particular context, his members' competences 
enable him, like them, to make a sense of what was going 
on by analysing the structure and location of speakers' 
utterances. 
(ibid.' p. 32) 
It is vital that this inherent defeasibility of the meaning of 
any utterance is not confused with the problem of correctly detecting 
the intention(s) of the party who is speaking. Ethnomethodologists 
and conversation analysts do not deny the importance of the intentions 
of members in speech and social action generally. It is, after all, 
a notorious fact that a significant proportion of social interaction 
is taken up with what might be called ascertaining the intent 
'behind' things said and done. Nevertheless, for that fact to have 
the significance it does, means that the wherewithal of meaning and 
sense cannot be equivalent to grasping the intentions of the speaker 
in speaking. In particular, the concept of indexicality must never 
be confused with the intentions a speaker may have or convey in making 
an utterance, as criticisms of the concept have sometimes appeared 
to suggest. In other words, intention cannot act as the sole foundation 
for meaning since the intended sense of utterances is something which 
is made manifest by the methods members use and monitor in making 
the utterance meaningful. In consequence, the criticisms directed 
against Grice's account of meaning by Searle, which were reported in 
the previous chapter, would be shared by ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts too. 
Hence the analyst's task is to specify the methods which enable 
participants in a setting to assemble or construct the (intended and 
unintended) sense(s) of the interaction in which they are immersed. 
Something which immediately distinguishes this task from the approach 
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adopted by Searle is that the primary focus is not placed on the 
utterance of the individual speaker, but on the social interaction 
of speaker~. The data base does not comprise examples thought up by 
the inve~tigator, but consists in transcripts of actual conversations. 
The complexity of interaction which these transcripts can reveal 
provide considerable ammunition for the claim that the 'armchair 
sentences' of philosophers and theorists are hardly likely to provide 
an adequate basis for the analysis of language mastery. Nevertheless, 
it is important to avoid the temptation of making the criticism of 
the armchair sentence stronger than that because otherwise one can get 
perilously close to arguing that it is somehow less a phenomenon of 
language mastery than those reported in the transcript. A further 
temptation is to then couple that with even more dubious claims about 
the accuracy inherent in transcribing what happened in a social setting. 
In other words, the recognition of the constructive features of 
professional analytic activity can be all too easily replaced with a 
form of empiricism. Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis do 
not involve and are not compatible with a claim that there is a 
'bedrock' of linguistic and social life which a correctly formulated 
analysis uncovers. In consequence, to suggest that any particular 
instance, or any kind of instance of language mastery, is representative 
of language per se, not only contradicts the constructive conception 
of language mastery clearly visible in Garfinkel and Sacks's writings, 
but also once again the idea that accounts are reflexive phenomena. 
IV The Machinery of Analysis 
The basic analytical concept of conversation analysis is sequence. 
It denotes a level of analysis that deals with relations between 
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utterances ratherfuan the constituents of the single utterance. 
Jefferson makes it clear that it is these sequential relations which 
must be considered as the formators of meaning rather than the rule 
constitution of the single speech act when she describes seqn<e>ncing 
as: 
... a type of organisation that is probably analogous 
to the sentence and that may provide for predictive 
monitoring by a recipient. 
(Jefferson, 1973, p. 55) 
Whereas sequential considerations only arise in Searle's theory when 
ordinary usage frustrates a 'literal' understanding of the speech act, 
here interactional sequences are seen as establishing the sense of 
the utterances. Moreover, the sequential relations which are found 
in conversations are considered to have a general and systematic 
character. In other words, there is taken to be a set of rules which 
enables the activities of speaking to take place. However, those 
rules do not underlie the meaning and sense of utterances but are 
formulated as rules of use of the interactants. This is not to say 
that these rules are any more the subject of immediate knowledge for 
the ordinary speaker than those formulated by Searle. The claim is 
that their use is manifested in the activities of speaking by members' 
orientation to them. 
The visibility of the rules of use and their connection with the 
relation between specific instances of interaction and the general 
scope of conversational rules and devices is discussed by Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson in terms of a research problem. Discussion 
in these terms is deliberate and instructive. Given the recognition 
that analysis itself is just as much a social activity of making 
phenomena 'observable and reportable', the professionals' task is 
viewed as an instance of the ordinary member's 'problem' of making 
the world meaningful and sensible. 
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To begin with, a problem for research is that it is 
always 'situated' - always comes out of, and is part 
of some real sets of circumstances of its participants. 
But there are various reasons why it is undesirable 
to have to know or characterise such situations for 
particular conversations in order to investigate them. 
And the question then becol!les: W'nat might be extracted 
as an ordered phenomenon for our conversational 
materials which would not turn out to require reference 
to one or another aspect of situatedness, identities, 
particularities of content or context? 
(Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974, 
p. 699) 
However, it is just at this point that the perspective looks as if it 
is really recapitulating the elements of Searle's theory. Where Searle 
talks of speaker/hearers realizing underlying rules, Sacks, Schegloff 
and Jefferson speak of what can be extracted from conversational 
materials in order to exhibit how members communicate with one another. 
Unless some rationale for construing their analysis in a different way 
from Searle's is to hand, the shift from 'act' to 'interaction' and 
from 'rule' to 'sequence' will not amount to anything more than 
terminological changes. 
In other words, the value of altering the focus of inquiry from 
the single speaker to cohorts of speakers, and the consequential shift 
to studying the importance of utterance relations must be grounded in 
a different conception of analysis. If it is not, then all you have 
is a restatement of the presuppositions of Searle's theory expressed 
in different terminology. (S) This is why the restructuring of the 
concept of analysis undertaken in Garfinkel's Studies is crucial to 
a proper understanding of the rules and devices for conversational 
interaction which the perspective has subsequently developed. 
Fundamental to that restructuring is Garfinkel's view that the 
relation between the specific conversational interaction and the 
general rules and devices formulated by the analyst 'remains 
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programmatic in every particular case'. What investigators 'extract' 
from the conversational materials they study are not rules which 
delineate the necessary and sufficient conditions of speech performance 
as Searl~ aryues. As we saw in the last chapter, that gives to the 
rules an objectivity and determinacy they can hardly be said to possess. 
So, why members are viewed as 'orienting-to' rules is not merely to 
purchase a degree of flexibility by, so to speak, loosening the bolts 
of the analytic framework which could be said merely to have been 
'overtightened' by Searle's theory. Rather, the concept of rule 
orientation marks Garfinkel's recognition that the 'objectivity of 
accounts ... their rational features are features of the socially 
organised occasions of their use'. 
Thus, the rules and devices which are extracted from interaction 
are general in terms of their scope and yet their application remains 
something that is made out in the circumstances of their use. Rules 
are not seen to underlie the possibility of meaning since that view 
brings the indexicality of language into conflict with the analytic 
use of the rule. Instead, the generality of the rule formulations of 
ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts are oriented-to by 
members as they work to assemble the sense of utterances in particular 
social settings. What this concept of rule is intended to capture 
is Garfinkel's insight that: 
members take for granted that a member must at the 
outset 'know' the setting in which he is to operate 
if his practices are to serve as measures to bring 
particular located features of these settings to 
recognisable account. They treat as the most passing 
matter of fact that members accounts, of every sort, 
in all their logical modes, with all of their uses, 
and for every method for their assembly, are 
constituent features of the settings they make observable. 
Members know, require, count on, and make use of this 
reflexivity to produce, accomplish, recognise, or 
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demonstrate rational-adequacy-for-all-practical 
purposes of their procedures and findings. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 8) 
What Garfinkel is recommending is that any social setting be 
viewed as a self-organising phenomenon and that the intelligibility 
of rule analysis be regarded in that way too. In other words, to 
reconceptualize the relationship between rules and their use requires 
that analysis is also viewed as an occasion for making the world 
accountable. In this way ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts 
seek to preserve the object of a theory like Searle's, viz., to 
understand the wherewithal of speech competence, but without allowing 
the prosecution of that tctsk to hamstring the flexibility of actual 
speech practice. So, although the scope and generality of the rules 
and devices formulated in this perspective may look indistinguishable 
in those respects from Searle's analysis, the understanding of 
analysis is entirely different. That 'understanding' is no mere 
ancillary to the analysis of language mastery. It is something which 
is vital to its proper comprehension. 
In the light of these remarks on the quotation from Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson's paper, we can now return to the elaboration 
of the rules and devices themselves. The common property of all types 
of sequencing from those which are characterised performatively, such 
as Greeting sequences, Announcement, Offer, Invitation and Correction 
sequences, etc., to those which are characterised technically as Side 
sequences and Insertion sequences, is speaker turns. ~1rns at talk 
are not only regarded as vital to the orderliness of conversational 
activities, but also as essential to the meaning and sense of those 
activities. The importance of turn~ at talk lays particular emphasis 
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on participants monitoring of the conversation. This, taken together 
with Jefferson's stress on the importance of sequencing quoted above, 
shows that rather than seeing speech as the consequence of the 
possession of rules, the perspective regards conversational activity 
itself as the location fer the production of the phenomenon of 
language mastery. 
So, instead of the actor being taken to arrive on the social scene 
in full possession of the requisites of menmership, ethnomethodologists 
and conversation analysts provide a conception of language mastery 
which is indivisible from and equivalent to mundane social interaction. 
This identity between language mastery and social action captured by 
Garfinkel and Sacks in their explication of the concept of member, 
differs fundamentally from Searle's avowal that his theory views 
language as social action. To begin with, the theory's grounding in 
sentence semantics ensures that the analytical role of the social, 
though important, is secondary. Or, as we have seen, it does until 
a point is reached when the theory's success in explaining utterances 
becomes problematic because of their flexible usage. Then, the role 
of social factors gains very considerably in importance although 
Searle attempts to preserve consistency with the thesis of rule 
governance by making the analysis of 'indirectives' retroductive in 
character. The basic problem is that if the theory is to work, speech 
has first to be idealized so that the analysis gains a sufficient 
purchase on utterances in order to account for them in its terms. 
Viewed in this way, the stress placed on studying actual 
occasions of language use is crucial since the resources for assembling 
the sense of utterances, the topic of study, are of importance to the 
analyst because they are of practical importance to the mundane speaker. 
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Again, this is not to claim that the rules formulated by this 
perspective are, to any greater degree, a subject of actual knowledge 
than the rules formulated by Searle's theory. But, since speakers 
are viev12d as orienting to rules, their activities do not have to 
be explained as something which the rules determine. The conceptual 
difficulty with Searle's account on this point is that his 
explanation of action relies on something which is unconsciously 
internalized and unwittingly employed in actual performance. Searle's 
view of his explanatory structure as a prerequisite for speakers' talk 
clearly contrasts with the view taken of the relationship between 
speech and analysis in the following quotation. 
in so far as the materials we worked with 
exhibited orderliness, they did so not only to us, 
indeed not in the first place for us, but for the 
co-participants who had produced them. If the 
materials (records of natural conversation) were 
orderly, they were so because they had been 
methodically produced by members of society for 
one another, and it was a feature of the 
conversations that we treated as data that they 
were produced so as to allow the display by the 
co-participants to each other of their orderliness, 
and to allow the participants to display to each 
other their analysis, appreciation and use of that 
orderliness. 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, p. 299) 
Thus, whilst ethnomethodology and conversation analysis need not 
abandon any of the rigour, systematicity and generality of a theory 
like Searle's, these qualities do not have to be construed as built-in 
features of the utterances themselves. Consequently, one of the most 
important features of conversational 'orderliness', takin0 turns at 
talk, can be portrayed in systematic and general terms without impinging 
on the freedom of speakers 'to turn' as they please. Sacks, Schegloff 
and Jefferson characterise the turn-taking system as: 
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... a basic form of organization for conversation-
'basic1 in that it would be invariant to parties, 
such that whatever variation the participants 
brought to bear in the conversation would be 
accommodated without change in the system, and 
such that it could be selectively and locally 
affected by social aspec~s nf context. 
(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 
1974, p. 700) 
They describe the relationship between its invariant nature and the 
context dependency of its use as requiring the following features 
to be incorporated by the analysis. 
~ 
Depiction of an organization for turn-taking should 
fit the facts of variability by virtue of a design 
allowing it to be context sensitive; but it should 
be cast in a manner that requiring no reference to 
any particular context, still captures the most 
important general features of conversation. 
(ibid.) (6 ) 
ore,the most general and systematic features of the turn-taking 
/.._ 
systems is the next speaker selection rules which Atkinson and Drew 
(1979, p. 38) have formulated in the following way: 
Firstly, a speaker may, if he chooses, construct his 
utterance so as to select next speaker by using certain 
allocation techniques - only one of which and infrequently 
used is to utter next speaker's name. The person thus 
selected, and importantly only that person, has rights 
and obligations to speak next. 
Secondly, if a current speaker has not so allocated, 
then the second rule operates which is that at a first 
point in a current speaker's turn at which completion 
may be detected, that person may select themselves by 
speaking first, and thus become first speaker for 
ensuing moves. 
Thirdly, if current speaker has not selected and no-one 
self selects at an initial completion relevance point, 
current speaker may, but does not have to, continue 
until one of the first two rules operates and transfer 
to next speaker is effected. 
The followi~ transcript extract furnishes two proximate instances 
of the first rule. ( 7 ) 
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WJS-I (7) 
----'> EP Now P ... B ... you are worried about aren't 
MT 
FT M.rn hmm= 
Who was the third one 
MT Umm C w ... 
(0. 7) 
Yes a ha 
I I 
Both of EP's utterances are constructed so as to elicit a response 
from MT in this sequence. Slightly later in the same transcript, 
we are presented with an example of the second rule where completion 
is detected some time before the turn is actually completed and as a 
consequence there are a few moments of speaker overlap. 
WJS-I (9) 
EP I wonder if that was because you felt they weren't applicable 
or because you wanted to focus on something else 
I I 
-------} MT er I I I thin well I: thin: k it probably 
I I 
was y'know urn as I say this n: a couple of weeks ago now. 
hhh urn and I seem to recollect thinking at the time 
Here is a likely instance of the third rule. 
WJS-I (18) 




~MT= came down to you know (0.6) umm (0.6) . thh although as I say 
at the time er it was:: th-th-the few occasions I must admit 
it wasn't 
MT's two pauses of (0.6) duration interspersed with an 'umm' followed 
by an inhalation and phrase 'although as I say', indicate that the 
speaker continues his utterance after a completion relevance point. 
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The inherent defeasibility of these formulations means that the 
activities which they rule are perpetually available under the 
auspices of other rules. This indicates that the rules do not 
determine any particular linguistic phenomenon such as a pause in 
speech as necessarily an instance of one (the third) rule, and 
similarly allows concepts within the formulations like 'initial 
completion relevance point', to be something which interactants decide 
rather than rules stipulate (e.g. when a response is an interruption) 
For example, the conversational interaction that immediately follows 
the example of the first rule has a texture which is sufficiently 
intricate to suggest that the participants may not be all orienting 
to the same rule, or at least orienting in the same way to one 
particular rule of the next speaker selection set. 
WJS-I (7/8) 
1 FT Right 
I i 
2 MT Thats right 
l j I I 
3 EP Now what did we do about her last time (because) that 
I J I i 
4 MT No I was 
l ) 
5 EP= doesn't ring a bell= 
6 MT= I withdrew I withdrew her referral form because because umm= 
I 
"'-7 FT Thats right 
l J 
8 FT= its here= 




t I j \ 
told 
~ 
11 FT me to inquire about 
l 
12 MT= trouble's basically that she's b-backward in-rr-tt-the academic 
13 sense 
I 
(0.4) urn so I mean there's nothing there's nothing wrong= 
-~. 
no its not that really 14 FT 
~ J 
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15 MT= with her personality or behaviour or anyth:: .hh she's a very canny~ 
' I 16 EP Mrnhrnrn 
l J 
17 MT= little kid 
18 FT (higher tone) She is really 
19 
20 EP 
Yes she is- very rnrnm 




MT's pause on line 13 is seemingly treated as a completion relevance 
point by FT, yet MT continues his utterance in a manner which suggests 
that he may not have completed his turn and consequently that the 
pause is a response toFT's interruption which he re-interrupts (8) 
Analysis of the utterances in the earlier part of this fragment could 
also have its effect on the understanding of this sequence. One 
could consider FT's and EP's interjections whilst MT is talking to 
be a sub-conversation where lines 7, 8, 10 and 11, comprise a series 
of turns between just these two. Line 14 could then be seen as a 
continuation of line 11, or perhaps a response to an unvoiced turn 
of EP's (9), thereby allowing the pause on line 13 to be a signal 
for attention by MT rather than to do with the speaker selection rules 
as such. 
So the rules are not only speaker relative inasmuch as analysis 
can detect where speakers may employ the rules differently in a 
fragment of interaction, but they also allow quite different 
characterizations of the progress and sense of those interactions and 
therefore what counts as a 'turn completion point', 'pause', 'interruption' 
and so on. This means that the rules operate on a turn by turn basis 
although their formulation is cast in universal terms, and demonstrates 
that this systematic feature of conversational structure is not elicited 
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at the cost of ignoring the individual activities which make up that 
structure. Atkinson and Drew, following Garfinkel, have put the 
matter this way: actors are to be viewed 
as practical rule using 'analysts' rather th<:tn 
as pre-programmed, rule governed 'cultural 
dopes' 
(1979, p. 22) 
which they say is how they have been portrayed by 'traditional' 
sociological models. Thus, this relationship between the specifics 
of practical action and a level of utmost generality is one example 
of how the commonality necessary to the stability and communicability 
of meanings goes hand in hand with viewing the rules as followable, 
modifiable, contravenable, or even as something for speakers to 
undermine. After all, flouting a rule is no less orientation to it, 
and is certainly no less meaningful in social settings. 
This interrelationship between the meaningfulness of what is 
said and the orderliness of saying it also indicates this perspective's 
conception of the actor. The most important feature of this conception 
is that whilst there is a focus upon the particulars of each individual's 
contribution to a social setting, the actor remains in a sociological 
frame of reference. In other words, this approach is not reductivist 
in that the attention so afforded is not the starting point for an 
explanation of the speaker's actions in terms of his or her motives. 
However, the next speaker selection rules exemplify how the wherewithal 
of communication can be portrayed in systematic and general terms and 
yet avoid a determinacy which could only crudely and unconvincingly 
deal with the unending originality of talk. Therefore, instead of 
these rules comprising a self-contained system in the ways in which 
Searle's are taken to constitute the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the issuance of a speech act, full cognisance is 
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taken of the fact that even the speaker selection rules rely on 
a complex of information for their detection and ascription by 
( 1 0) 
members and analysts. For instance, what differentiates the 
claim that in 1-'IJS-I ( 18) the pause signal speaker's completion of 
the turn whereas in WJS-I (7/8), the pause on line 13 does not, is 
partly to do with semantic evidence that in the first case MT repeats 
information just given, whereas in the second he still has information 
to impart. 
Of course, such evidence is no more basic to the meaning and 
sense of the exchange than the sequential environment which is 
formulated in part by the next speaker selection rules. The analytical 
use of rules by ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts is a 
display of the philosophical insight that no rule shows its own 
application and, as a consequence, that no utterance or set of 
utterances of necessity mark the employment of a particular rule. 
If matters were other than this, then there could, in principle, be 
one correct account of a conversational exchange. The implication 
of this would be that Jefferson's earlier noted stress on the 
monitoring of conversation would in many circumstances be redundant 
or perhaps confined to those persons who have a less than perfect 
mastery of language. However, her use of that concept is not intended 
to denote some imperfection in the speaker's grasp of language, much 
less connote some difficulty with language as a means of communication. 
Rather, it refers back to the idea that our understanding of utterances 
whether as an analyst or an ordinary member, is viewed as an 
accomplishment; as a job of work which consists in employing different 
speech systems in order to 'assemble' the sense of what is said. 
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V Rule Use and the Interdependence of Rule Systems 
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, when remarking upon the 
relationship between the speaker selection rules and other systems, 
make clear lhal the recognition of an instance of one of those 
rules itself relies on the network of relationships formed by the 
other speech systems. Even taking turns at talk cannot be determined 
by reference to the next speaker selection rules alone. 
And while a party selected by the use of such a 
technique will be constrained in what he says in 
the turn so allocated (e.g. being under some 
constraints to 'answer' if the technique employed 
to select him was 'question'), these constraints 
are given by the organization of the 'types of 
sequences whose first parts serve as the 'current 
speaker selects next' techniques and not by the 
turn-taking system per se. That the conversational 
turn-taking system does not constrain what occupies 
its turns frees the turns for use by other systems, 
and those systems components are then subject to 
the organizational contingencies of the turns that 
they occupy. 
(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 
1974, p. 711) 
One of the most explicit references to the interdependence of these 
systems is made by Schegloff and Sacks at the beginning of their 
paper on conversation closings: 
Our aim in this paper is to report in a preliminary 
fashion on analyses we have been developing of closings 
of conversation. Although it may be an intuitively 
apparent feature of the unit 'a single conversation' that 
it does not simply end, but is brought to a close, our 
initial task is to develop a technical basis for a closing 
problem. This we try to derive from a consideration of 
some features of the most basic sequential organization 
we know of - the organization of speaker turns. A partial 
solution of this problem is developed, employing resources 
drawn from the same order of organization. The incomplete-
ness of that solution is shown, and leads to an elaboration 
of the problem, which requires reference to quite different 
orders of sequential organization in conversation - in 
(.\. 
particu~ the organization of topic talk, and the overall 
structural organization of the unit 'a single conversation'. 
The reformulated problem is used to locate a much broader 
range of data as relevant to the problem of closings, and 
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some of that data is discussed in detail. Finally, an 
attempt is made to specify the domain for which the 
closing problems, as we have posed them, seem apposite. 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, p. 289) 
What those two quotations about the interdependence of speech 
systems illustrate is that the relationship between systems is 
criterial for the recognition and use of the rules which comprise 
them. Even the briefest of utterances, which might look devoid of 
semantic import altogether from the perspective of a theory like 
Searle's, will require reference to more than any one order of 
organization for its analysis, as Jefferson's paper 'What's in a 
Nyem?' demonstrates. Its topic is the equivocal pronunciation of 
affirmatives and negatives, and her analysis suggests ways in which 
this phenomenon 'is to be treated as a serious resource in the 
(11) 
construction of interaction'. What the paper shows is that the 
lax pronunciation of 'yes' and 'no' responses are employed as a 
resource by members in, for example, avoiding direct commitments in 
answering questions, pointing to the obviousness or irrelevance of 
prior remarks, or signalling a disinclination to continue with the 
current topic of conversation or perhaps the interaction altogether. 
In exhibiting members' use of this device, Jefferson begins by showing 
how the sequential organization of the utterance can be used to 
decide which member of the set is being used. 
/TG:3:r/ A telephone call 
1 Ava: You sound very far away 
2 (0. 7) 
3 Bee: I do:? 
4 Ava: Ne:uh 
5 Bee: nNo: I'm not 
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Jefferson suggests that while, 
Ne:uh has acoustic features which might urge for 
a hearing of /No/, its sequential features (that 
it occurs in a position in which affirmation of 
a queries prior utterance is acceptable) provide 
for a hearing of /Yes/. 
(Jefferson, 1978, p. 135) 
Conversely, the sequential organization's characterization may 
itself be altered by the use of one of these lax affirmative/ 
negative tokens. Jefferson notes that: 
A standard massively occuring sequence (comprises) 
a statement followed by a query followed by an 
affirmation of the queried statement. 
(ibid., p. 138) 
But in the fragment of interaction above, Ava's 'Ne:uh' can be used 
to construe the /statement ... query ... affirmation/ sequence as 
one signalling complaint at the obviousness or uninformativeness of 
Bee's prior remark. The general tripartite sequence categorization 
remains pertinent to the description of these utterances, but does 
not offer a complete enough description of them for the purposes of 
Jefferson's paper. That requires her telling us that Ava's opening 
remark is a touchy one since Bee is not at home and is unwilling to 
say where she is. In other words, a salient contextual particular 
has to be supplied by the analyst if the analysis is to offer a 
convincing account of how these lax tokens are used by members in 
interaction. 
Consequently, even within the confines of one working analysis 
such as Jefferson's brief paper, the analytic portrayal of the 
interaction alters as the focus switches from the properties of one 
type of speech system to another, and as the scope of practical or 
contextual considerations employed by the investigator widens or 
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narrows. Even the examination of a conversational minutiae like 
'N~:uh' provides an illustration of what Atkinson and Drew meant 
by saying that the perspective analysed the 'structure and location' 
of utterances in order to arrive at their sense. For all the 
technical sophistication which is brought to bear on reporting and 
analysing spoken interaction, and for all the attentiveness to 
detail, the rules distilled from those endeavours are reminders, not 
determinants, of how people speak and act because those rules are 
themselves reliant upon members to follow them and see their 
. 'f' d . t ( 12 ) s1gnl lCance an po1n . Turner makes the same point, but this 
time by reference to the materials used in, rather than the components 
of, the analysis. 
The sociologist inevitably trades on his member's 
knowledge in recognising the activities that 
participants to interaction are engaged in; for 
example, it is by virtue of my status as a competent 
member that I can recurrently locate in my transcripts 
instances of 'the same' activity. This is not to 
claim that members are infallible or that there is 
perfect agreement in recognising any and every 
instance: it is only to claim that no resolution of 
problematic cases can be effected by resorting to 
procedures that are supposedly uncontaminated by 
members' knowledge. 
(Turner, 1971, p. 177) 
The quotation from Turner regarding members's knowledge and the use 
by Jefferson of contextual particulars to explain that Ava's opening 
remar}·_ is 'touchy', brings us before the issue of how commonsense 
knowledge is employed by members to facilitate communication. The 
analysis of this 'component' of membership as an orderly and 
systematic feature of speech practice is particularly important since, 
as Turner has just pointed out, reliance upon it by the sociologist 
is inevitable. Therefore, it is vital to make its use in communication 
an object of analysis if it is not to become a wholly unexplicated 
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resource in accounting for how other speech systems rules are being 
used. However, it is necessary to point out straight away that 
what Turner has to say about the sociologist's reliance upon his or 
her membership remains essential to the documentation and analytical 
employment of 'commonsense knowledge systems' as well. In other 
words, there does not come a point when the analyst, by reference 
to other members' practices, thereby completely accounts for the 
wherewithal of his own. No analytic portrayal of members' use of 
corrunonsense knowledge can exhaustively delineate either its extent 
as a corpus of knowledge or the ways it can be invoked by members 
in their everyday practices. 
The reason for this is not because 'corunonsense knowledge' 
happens to be a large territory which it will take considerable effort 
and time to document. Neither is the reason that because members' 
methods are particularly complex, they will take great diligence to 
specify. Both, incidentally, happen to be true, but neither will 
serve to explain this lack of closure. Garfinkel spells out the 
reason in Studies in Ethnomethodology when commenting upon his 
students' failure to exhaustively describe what had been talked about 
in a brief exchange between husband and wife. As he successively 
imposed higher and higher standards of 'accuracy, clarity and 
distinctness' on his students' efforts, they found the task 
increasingly laborious. When, finally, he imposed the requirement 
that they assume he would know what the husband and wife talked 
about only from what could be garnered from their description, they 
gave up complaining that the task was impossible. 
Although their complaints were concerned with the 
labouriousness of having to write 'more', the 
frustrating 'more' was not made up of the large 
labour of having to reduce a mountain with buckets. 
- 94 -
It was not their complaint that what was talked about 
consisted of bounded contents made so vast by pedantry 
that they lacked sufficient time, stamina, paper, 
drive, or good reason to write 'all of it'. Instead, 
the complaint and its circumstances seemed to consist 
of this: if, for whatEver a student wrote, I was able 
to persuade him that it was not yet accurate, distinct, 
or clear enough, and if he remained willing to repair 
the ambiguity, then he returned to the task with 
complaint that the writing itself developed the 
conversation as a branching texture of relevant matters. 
The very way of accomplishing the task multiplied its 
features. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 26) 
The experience of Garfinkel's students has a lesson in it for 
the kind of analysis which regards the use of language as something 
capable of specificat-ion in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. The 'troubles' faced by the students is borne out in 
the development of Searle's work which begins by announcing that: 
The meaning of a statement is entirely determined by 
the meaning of its elements ... (which is) ... just 
another way of saying that the rules governing its 
utterance are determined by the rules governing its 
elements. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 61) 
but later on has to concede that for indirect utterances, the analyst 
and audience are required to make assumptions about interactants: 
mutually shared background information both linguistic 
and non-linguistic, together with the general powers 
of rationality and inference ... ( Seu..v~ [C-\15"ir.> rr- c;o-l} 
In other words, the apparent explanatory completeness of the theory 
has to be supplemented by the sort of thing 'anyone' knows. For 
Searle, the mundane quality of such knowledge means that jts use is 
not theoretically significant. But for Garfinkel, this failure to 
appreciate the crucial role such knowledge plays in lending sense 
and application to the rules formulated by any analysis, means that 
the value which can be extracted from portraying linguistic and 
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social practices in terms of rules is lost in the pursuit of an 
explanatory rigour which is totally unconnected with the actual 
character of language use. 
The incorporation of commonsense knov:l2dge as a topic of study 
puts an end to any idea of saying that the matters considered so far 
such as sloppy pronunciation, or even the speaker selection rules, 
merely deal with the pragmatics rather than the semantics of 
communication. A speech act theorist might be tempted to concede 
that whilst ethnomethodology and conversation analysis had a lot to 
say about the 'practicalities' of communication which could modify 
the theory, they were nevertheless incapable of undermining it because 
no analysis of meaning was undertaken by the practitioners in these 
disciplines. But from this perspective, the semantic/pragmatic 
distinction runs a very considerable risk, exemplified by Searle's 
theory, of reifying some elements of social action into essential 
rules whilst relegating others to incidentals of communication. As 
explained in the last chapter, Searle's analysis of indirectives 
does not so much reflect the character of members' practices, as it 
does the shortcomings of a theory based on that kind of distinction. 
The complete interdependence of the semantic and pragmatic 
dimensions of speech is well illustrated by Schegloff's contention 
that sequence does not refer: 
merely to 'subsequent occurrence' in the sense of 
the successive position of the hands on a clock, but 
rather to a specifically sequential organization - a 
property called 'conditional relevance' (that holds) 
between the parts of a sequence unit. 
(Schegloff, 1972, p. 76) 
The location of utterances in time is a necessary factorw in 
understanding their conditional relevance. Conversely, for the 
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( 13) brute fact of 'subsequent occurrence' to have significance for 
members, requires that such occurrences can be understood within a 
framework of conditional relevance. Schegloff portrays this 
interdependPnce very clearly in the following quotation: 
When one utterance (A) is conditionally relevant on 
another (S), then the occurrence of S provides for 
the relevance of the occurrence of A. If A occurs, 
it occurs (i.e. is produced and heard) as 'responsive 
to' S, i.e. in a serial or sequenced relation to it; 
and, if it does not occur, its non-occurrence is an 
event, i.e. it is not only non-occurring (as is each 
member of an indefinitely extendable list of possible 
occurrences), it is absent, or 'officially' or 'notably' 
absent. That it is an event can be seen not only from 
its 'noticeability', but from its use as legitimate 
and recognisable grounds for a set of inferences (e.g. 
about the participant who failed to produce it) . 
(ibid.) 
One immediate consequence of this complete interdependence 
revealed in that quotation is that the perspective can give a much 
more integrated account of conversational silence than speech act 
theory (see below). 
One variant of this organization of utterances has been referred 
to more generally by the term adjacency pair. Mention has already 
been made of different sequence types (e.g. Greeting; Announcement; 
Offer, etc.) and in an extract quoted earlier Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson (1974, p. 711) exemplify some considerations about turn-
taking by reference to the sequential organization of questions and 
answers. Their analysis places emphasis on interactional features 
that distinguish these types of utterance pairs from one another in 
addition to differences in their semantic form, and in consequence 
manages to avoid the sort of problems which confront Searle's 
classification of utterances. For example, in the following exchange 
tlte two part structure and semantic character of this greeting would 
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be viewed completely differently if it occurred as an exchange, say 
between a teacher and a student in a foreign language lesson. 
(Two acquaintances passing in the street) 
A: Isn't is a warm day? 
B: I think so. 
Searle can portray the difference using indirect speech analysis 
although, as we saw in Chapter One, the idea that sentences are 
semantic markers for underlying rules really amounts to little more 
than a fiction of the theorist. But as soon as the employment of 
silence as a conversational resource becomes the focus of analysis, 
then this fiction becomes entirely implausible, as there is no 
secondary act in Searle's terms to form the basis for inferring the 
indirect primary one. Some examples will illustrate this. 
To the ordinary speaker, it is clear that the absence of this 
adjacency pair's second parts will have very different meanings for 
interactants. To not reply to a greeting may involve deliberate 
rudeness, whereas not to reply to the same utterance as a question 
in a language lesson could be taken to indicate B's ignorance of what 
A said, or at any rate ignorance of some relevant response to it. 
And the ramifications do not end there; consider the likely implications 
of A's repetition of the utterance. In the first case, if A repeats 
the utterance it may involve further loss of face if the silence was 
a deliberate snub. In the second, A may lose control of the situation 
if the utterance is not repeated, since to try and elicit some 
response from B may be crucial to the maintenance of A's authority 
which in turn may be crucial to the maintenance of classroom order. 
Nevertheless, it is just at this point that a speech act theorist 
could point to the need to ground an analysis of meaning in Searle's 
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'paradigm' utterances, given the endless ramifications that are 
( 14) 
inherent in the sort of considerations that have just been mentioned. 
In short, it would be argued that the analysis of meaning would be 
hopelessly cluttered up by paying attention to these sorts of issues 
even if 'commonsense' makes it plain that those considerations can 
have a large part to play in understanding the meaning of that 
utterance. 
Of course, what this argument comes down to is a restatement of 
Searle's view that a 'core' analysis of meaning is both logically and 
theoretically primitive to considering the part that commonsense 
knowledge might play in modifying meanings in particular circumstances. 
In other words, 'semantic' and 'pragmatic' considerations have to be 
bifurcated analytically after all. In addition to the arguments that 
have already been made against this proposal, it is now worth 
considering Schegloff's comparison of conversation analysts and 
conventional sociologists' approach to knowledge in his paper on the 
use of place terms as resources for the achievement of communication. 
It has been part of the program of one approach in 
the sociology of knowledge that accounts, descriptions, 
theories, etc., are to be examined most importantly 
not with respect to the objects with which they seek 
to come to terms, but with respect to the circumstances 
of the producers of the account or its audience. To 
understand how some account comes to be offered, an 
investigator should look not to the objects being 
addressed; they will not explain the production of the 
account. It is to the circumstances of its production 
(its environing class structure, Zeitgeist, psychic 
states, cultural values, professional ambience, etc., 
in traditional studies) that one must look to understand 
its occurrence. I have argued here that formulations 
of bcation are used by reference to, and hence exhibit 
or 'reflect', the situational or contextual features 
of their production. That a formulation is 'correct' 
is, in this context, the least interesting of its 
features, for it would be equally true of a range of 
other formulations. Not any 'correct' formulation will 
do. 'Right' formulations are 'right' in part by 
exhibiting the particulars of the situation of their 
use. These notes may then be read as bearing not only 
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on issues in the study of conversational interaction, 
but also (if the two are separable) as an essay in 
the sociology of commonsense knowledge. 
(Schegloff, 1972, p. 433) 
The conventional sociologist's approach as described by 
Schegloff really amounts to a mirror inversion of Searle's. m1ere 
Searle begins by isolating the 'elements' of the speech act which 
the theory determines to be its essentials, the conventional 
sociologist looks to a cultural or intellectual environment to 
explain the nature of the subject matter of his or her inquiries. 
Both, in their respective fashions, refuse consideration to 
contextual particulars as an analytical resource because the 
'pragmatic' features of context inhibit the sort of explanatory 
closure which has been taken to be necessary to accomplish a 
warrantable account of the phenomena investigated. 'Context' for 
the conventional sociologist is merely an aspect of 'environing 
class structure or Zeitgeist', or some other feature: or in Searle's 
case, it is the product of underlying rules which, in realizing the 
meaning of an utterance, determines the sense of any 'circumstantial' 
use. How such constructs are actually recognised and employed in 
d l "f . dd . "d . Wh h" . d" every ay l e lS not awa~ serlous consl eratlon. at t lS ln lcates 
is that members' understanding and use of categories like clas~ or 
culture no less than their understanding and use of rules, is something 
which these accounts fail to consider. 
Thus, the sociology of commonsense knowledge, as Schegloff terms 
it, is part and parcel of the study of conversational interaction, 
which is to say that an account of the wherewithal of communication 
is completely bound up with epistemological issues. Moreover, the 
analysis of this interdependence between knowledge and communication 
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is itself an instance of what it describes, and accordingly, must 
be viewed as a 'located' or 'contexted' phenomenon in its turn as 
well. Of course, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, just 
like speech act theory, must employ a set of theoretical concepts 
to illuminate the workings of language use. The concept of 
indexicality, the formulation of the next speaker selection rules, 
and the notion of adjacency pairs are testimony to that. The 
perspective's focus on the mundane does not mark some sort of 
boundary which the tools of analysis must not overstep. One persistent 
misunderstanding of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis is that 
they are 'anti-theoretical'. The problems with Searle's theory have 
nothing to do with the activity of theorizing as such. Rather, it 
is his failure to see in theorizing just the sort of indexical 
qualities he notes in ordinary communicative activities. Consequently, 
there is no evaluation of the impact of this feature on the idea of 
analysing language mastezyin Searle's theory at all. The only mention 
of it is the oblique reference to the peculiar character of explaining 
something which you already perfectly well understand, or as he puts 
it, 'converting knowing how into knowing that'. 
This reflexive understanding of analytical concepts does not 
merely preserve consistency with Garfinkel and Sacks's view of 
language use. As noted earlier, understanding the reflexivity of 
analytical frameworks is of fundamental importance to the perspective's 
account of how members communicate with one another. What this means 
-
is that ethnomethodology and conversation analysis constitute in their 
own researches an example of commonsense knowledge at work. So the 
concepts these disciplines use to elicit 'the how' of membership 
display that r.1ernbership through the use made of them by the analyst. 
The reliance which the analyst and reader must place on their own 
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native competence, as Turner said, is the embodiment of this 
reflexivity. His claim that the sociologist 'inevitably trades on 
his members' knowledge' is not meant to bar theorizing, but rather 
to emphasize that no theoretical procedures are 'uncontaminated by 
members' knowledge'. What the critique of conventional sociological 
theorizing in Garfinkel and Sacks's work is intended to show, is 
that this apparent 'problem' with theorizing is the key to 
understanding how members make and understand utterances, give 
warrantable accounts, construct theories, and the rest. In other 
words, the 'contamination' is the indispensable condition of 
theorizing and analysing the phenomena of language mastery. 
VI The Use of Rules as Membership Categorization Devices 
This lack of differentiation between semantic and pragmatic 
elements of members' practices and analytic and mundane kinds of 
knowledge, is exemplified in the notion of membership categorization 
device. An examination of the perspective's use of this concept will 
show its view of the complete integration between knowledge (of states 
I 15) 
of affairs) and the mastery of language.' The idea of 'membership 
categorization device' can be introduced by the following 
consideration. When people are involved in any speech activity such 
as describing, evaluating, warning, etc., they categorize items in 
a way which, for a given culture, implies that certain characteristics 
and certain relationships hold between the items mentioned in the 
utterance. Such categorizations do not have to be conclusive. For 
example, in the following exchange, B's query about John and A's 
response to it show that the categorization 'my friends' may or may 
not include John. 
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A. Me and my friends went to the cinema last night. 
B. What about John? 
A. No. 
A's reponse 'No' is insufficiently explicit as Lo whether John is a 
good friend who did not go, or somebody who is not, or is no longer, 
a friend at all. The finality of the negative may indicate the latter, 
but alternatively might indicate, for example, annoyance at B's 
question. B, who is a witness to the intonation, style of delivery, 
prior interaction (if any), surrounding circumstances, biography of 
the parties, etc., etc., will probably be clued to which (if any) of 
these possibilities is the correct one. 
However, as the aim of analysis is not to decide which sense of 
the utterance actually obtained, as mentioned earlier, the discovery 
of this intended and received sense is not a goal of the perspectivs 
The point of the analysis is to alert us to the possible senses that 
the utterances could have and exhibit how members are able to detect 
those senses. Consequently, although a membership categorization 
may have only one sense for the participants in a 'here and now' 
situation, it is in no way restricted to that singular sense for them. 
This is necessarily true for the analyst as his or her viewpoint 
perforce involves another set of considerations alongside those of 
the interactants. So, the very analyzability of membership 
categorization devices (hereafter MCD's) is indicative of their 
character and, again, points to the reflexive nature of analysing 
language mastery. M1at this means is that the organisation of an MCD 
must be such as to be able to impart a specific sense in a certain 
context, and yet be so constructed that other senses can be readily 
ascertained from it as well. This also means that the use of a 
particular device may 'flag' other information about the speaker, 
- 103 -
what is spoken about, the situation in which the MCD is used and so 
forth. This 'back channel' feature of MCD's can then not only offer 
an account of how a particular communication is accomplished, but 
also, for example, how general facts of social structure are 
communicated by categorizations in talk. 
Something of this multiplicity of features is described by Sacks 
in his investigation of the interaction between potential suicidees 
and staff at an emergency psychiatric clinic. He exhibits the 
methodicalness of the clinic procedures, not primarily in terms of 
its organizational particulars or as a consequence of surrounding 
societal facts, but through an analysis of the use of categorization 
devices to establish the conclusion that 'there is no-one to turn to'. 
Consequently, the aim of the research is to: 
construct a description that provides the 
reproducibility of the conclusion a suicidal person 
may reach - I have no-one to turn to - (which) 
involves us in attempting (a) to locate the 
collections of membership categories in terms of 
which the help for suicidalness is formulated, and 
(b) to describe the ways such collections are used 
to determine whether there are eligible persons 
available (to give 'help'). 
(Sacks, 1972, pp. 31-2) 
Accordingly, what enables a commonplace clinic interaction such as: 
( 1) 
S1 You don't have anyone to turn to 
C1 No 
S2 No relations, friends? 
C2 No 
to be meaningful, is not a Searlian formal body of rules, but a no 
less elegantly organized set of categorization devices to facilitate 
that conclusion ... 'no-one to turn to'. 
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In a series of numbered propositions beginning with a 
definition, Sacks elaborates a set of rules which constitute a 
device. 
1.1.1. By the term categorization device we mean that 
collection of membership categories containing at 
least a category that may be applied to some 
population, containing at least a Member , so as (16) 
to provide, by the use of some rules of application 
for the pairing of at least a population Member and 
a categorization device member. A device is then a 
collection plus rules of application. 
1.1.2. It is our task to show that for any population N 
(where N is equal to or larger than 1), there are 
at least two categorization devices available to 
Members, each of which (devices): (a) can categorize 
each member of the population N in such a way that 
one does not get for any Member of the population 
(population Member + no category member) , where (b) 
no member of either device is a member of the other. 
Any device that satisfies constraint (a) , will 
hereafter be called a Pn-adequate device, type 1. 
(Sacks, 1972, pp. 32-3) 
However, Sacks immediately makes clear that Pn-adequates do not 
comprise all the devices available in the language. If analysis 
attempted to retail this analytic characterization as a condition of 
competent membership, it would reduce Members' categorizations to 
the passive operation of a calculus. The complexity of some 
utterances and the possibility of indecisiveness on the part of the 
utterers means that categorization may not only overlap, thereby 
abrogating condition (b), ( 17 ) but also that: 
1.1.3 .... many devices that a categorization devices by 
reference to (1.1.1.) are not Pn-adequate ones 
(ibid.) 
Thus, even in terms of their definition, MCD's are inherently 
defeasible. This means that whilst they can perform the task of 
describing salient features of social interaction, they are not in 
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and of themselves determinative of the interaction studied. The 
device has to be employed by the analyst in order to exhibit the 
membership practices of some group of speakers. This offers a very 
clear contrast with the elements of a speech act which are held to 
determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for its 
performance and intelligibility. The ensuing rigidity of the theory 
is, as has been argued, a result of trying to make the role of 
native competence in understanding the theory something which the 
theory itself determines. Sacks's opening propositions indicate 
agreement with Turner's insight that a proper understanding of 
language mastery must look to the relation between analysis as an 
'accounting procedure' and the analyst as a native speaker, i.e. as 
a producer of 'accounts'. 
On the other hand, it is already apparent that Sacks's analysis 
is no less formal than that proposed by speech act theory. Here, 
though, formal considerations are not introduced simply to serve the 
explanatory purposes of the analysis. As we saw with Searle, what 
this leads to is a trimming of the use of language until the remainder 
fits the explanatory framework. For Sacks, formality is a tool in 
that it supplies a means for portraying the competence of members 
through tleuse of our own native mastery. In Garfinkel's words, it 
serves to render the commonplace 'anthropologically strange' in order 
that salient elements of communicative practices, which might otherwise 
remain un-noticed, are placed in an analytic framework so that 'the 
strangeness of an obstinately familiar world can be detected' (see 
note 12). 
This relational conception of explanation between on the one hand 
the analytic framework, and on the other, the ineluctable reliance 
upon extant membership, in fact exhibits a further development of 
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the idea of language use as performance. The elicitation of 
membership categorization devices as 'describably methodical' clearly 
exemplifies the idea of meaning being a product of the use of rules. 
Whereas for Searle the idea of speech action remains a theoretical 
characterization of communication, in Sacks's work, the idea is 
actually embodied as a feature of the production of the account of 
members' usage. The 'grasping' of the meaning of an action is 
displayed in the methodical use of the devices and that is a job of 
work for each and every member on each and every occasion of the use 
of the device. This contrasts very strongly with the passivity of 
the grasping of sets of rules in Searle's analysis. In consequence 
that, 
Members' activities of categorization are not only 
describably methodical but also that activities are 
done methodically, is quite essential to the ways 
they are seen as graspable by Members 
(Sacks, 1972, p. 37) 
Thus, following or being in accordance with a rule is susceptible of 
the kind of axiomatization that Sacks finds in categorization devices. 
However, this formality does not dismiss the fact that 'following' or 
'being in accordance' with a rule is something which is made out in 
the following or being in accordance with them. 
This understanding of rules is clearly replicated in the 
formulation of the regulative rules of the devices. These Sacks terms 
'rules of application'. But again, any application of the rules is 
a member's achievement, not the result of some property of the rule 
which determines or otherwise governs that achievement. Take, as an 
example the consistency rule. 
If some population of persons is being categorized, 
and if a category from some device's collection has 
been used to categorize a first Member of the 
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population, then that category may be used to 
categorize further Members of the population. 
(Sacks, 1972, p. 33) 
Clearly, this rule does not regulate action imperatively. The 
italicized 'may' is not only permissiv~, in that it furnishes 
members a licence to warrantably re-deploy the device for further 
categorization of a population. It is also possibilist in the sense 
that an alternative categorization device or no device at all could 
be employed at that point. So neither the 'definitional' (constitutive) 
or regulative rules of the device govern the actions of a member, 
much less entail that his or her utterance by virtue of the rules 
mean such and such and only that. 
Of course, non-use of the consistency rule may be significant 
insofar as it signals by the absence of its continued use a difference 
noted at the beginning of this section like: 
A. This is my friend Paul, and this is John. 
However, analytically and practically, we are not dealing with the 
necessary consequences of rule abrogation and its entailed semantic 
consequences which Searle's theory requires. One reason, as we have 
seen, is how the interdependence of the rules of the different systems 
have particular and located ramifications on the employment or 
non-employment of the rule in question. Garfinkel emphasises this in 
the Purdue Symposium when replying to questions about the status and 
definitiveness of the rules Sacks elaborates. It is clear from his 
reply that at least some of his questioners have characterised Sacks's 
rules in a manner that would be appropriate for speech act rules. 
We now have gone through a procedure in which you 
have elicited rules out of these sentences. It is 
now proposed that these structures are to be treated 
as prescriptive rules with which to recover from any 
~entence you might now encounter the possibility of 
a similar structure in their particulars. You are 
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talking in the way in which linguists would talk of 
the structural features of a sentence. These 
sentences are not 'iffy' sentences. One does not 
merely dream up a sentence knowing already what a 
good sentence would have to be. Instead, one 
encounters it anywhere in these transcriptions as 
something a person has actually said . . . The way 
to see the import of the analysis is to have 
materials which can be considered given these 
findings as resources to use to accomplish an 
analysis. 
(Hill & Crittenden, ed., 
1968, p. 45) 
What is surprising to anyone familiar with conventional forms 
of analysis is the rigour of conversation analysis. Perhaps it is 
the unwillingness to associate this rigour with a commitment to the 
idea of the reflexivity of analysis which has led to the view that 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis are incompatible. In 
fact, Sacks's elaboration of the structure of MCD's is accomplished 
with greater economy than the formulation of the conditions and rules 
for speech acts. Of course, the basic reason for Sacks's comparative 
economy is that given the analytic acceptance of the reliance on 
existing competence in understanding the analysis, Sacks does not have 
to try and delineate it as 'conditions' or 'reasoning steps' in the 
way Searle attempts to. This overall difference in the understanding 
of the relation between rules and actions is clearly exhibited by 
Sacks's criterionof reproducibility which he describes 'as a set of 
rules which give me back my data' (Hill & Crittenden, eds, p. 42). 
The criterion is quite unlike Searle's idea of a generative mechanism 
in a set of rules that, if activated, necessarily constitute some 
particular utterance and meaning. Sudnow succinctly expresses this 
difference in the Purdue Symposium when he says: 
The test of our analysis is to reproduce reality. 
This is not the object of our research: it is the 
test of it. 
(ibid. 1 P• 70) 
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By being the test rather than the object, Sudnow points to the 
importance of the reliance that is placed on our native competence, 
not only in assessing the 'rightness' of the results of analysis, 
but also in providing the resource for formulating that analysis in 
the first place. 
VII Rules as Findings about Members' Practices 
So the findings of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
are recognised as something which is facilitated by the relationship 
between the rules of the devices and our extant mastery. The 
reproduction criterion has no affinity with the idea of distilling 
rules that ensure the meaning and orderliness of members' interactions~ 
because it is acknowledged that the reproduction itself relies on 
members to follow the rules and see their import. Consequently, rules 
cannot determine what is there to be found in members' interactions 
in an analysis, any more than those rules could determine the utterances 
and actions of members themselves. Where analysis purports to do more 
it simply gets out of step with the actual practices of members whilst 
using those practices it is supposedly explicating as an unacknowledged 
resource. For Searle, the only relevant action which lies outside the 
scope of his analysis is the choice of whether to speak or not and what 
to say or answer (e.g. in the negative or affirmative). In this sense, 
a speaker is only master of those elections. From there on the 
conditions and rules of the speech acts take over. But for Garfinkel 
and Sacks the rules of the devices are the tools of language masters 
which are used in an indefinite variot.y of ways to create meaning. 
At the end of the day, the analysis of the devices could just as easily 
become the 'victim' of that mastery just like the commonsense 
- 110 -
expectations of his students became the victim of Garfinkel's 
experiment about writing 'more' in Studies (see above). 
The work performed by our extant mastery which remains effectively 
unexamined ~n a theory like Searle's, is a theme that Garfinkel 
returns to time and again in the Purdue Symposium. Near the beginning 
of the session, he puts the issue in general terms in response to 
remarks made by his 'conventional' sociological questioners: 
The sin is not that you are wrong. The sin is that 
you circle back to use the same devices of practical 
reasoning to recommend the scientific character of a 
finding, which makes it a very puzzling ... not wrong 
... but a very puzzling enterprise with respect to 
how those scientific arguments now come to be seen. 
It is not the question of so-called infinite regress. 
It is not that when you circle back, you, therefore, 
lose the reasoned character of your argument. You 
merely gain. What happens is that your argument 
remains reasonable within the same unexamined members' 
devices for making out the discourse as rational, or 
clear enough for practical purposes. 
(Hill & Crittenden, eds, 1968, p. 29) 
That extract, particularly the last sentence, pithily expresses how 
the indexicality of language use requires a reflexive understanding 
of analysis. Garfinkel describes the use of members' knowledge in 
a way which has the effect of making the sort of explanation of 
language mastery which Searle desires, amount to little more than 
an exposition of what his theory deems language mastery to be. In 
other words, Garfinkel is also making the point that the indexicality 
of language cannot be conceived as something additional to the mastery 
of Searlian rule governed utterances, because the sense of that 
conception is itself indexically made out as rational in the analytic 
discourse. 
~(ll.ti .... 
Sacks gives a powerful illus~ . of what Garfinkel is saying in 
his well-known analysis of the 'story' offered by a two and three-quarter 
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year old girl. Employing visual prompts, the little girl narrates 
the scene like this: 
The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. 
His analysis of this story exemplifies the usc of membership 
categorization devices in this type of work and will therefore provide 
a practical example of how the sort of insight regarding indexicality 
and analysis which Garfinkel has made ties in with the analysis Sacks 
conducts. However, before embarking on the analysis proper, Sacks 
reminds us that indexicality is not to be equated with subjectivism 
even if the observations about the story which follow are those of a 
particular subject (i.e. Sacks himself) and are not the only 
observations which could be made (either in terms of correctness or 
completeness) . 
... if these observations strike you as a ranker sort 
of subjectivism, then I ask you to read on just far 
enough to see whether it is or is not the case that the 
observations are both relevant and defensible. 
(Sacks, 1974., p. 216) 
The first observation Sacks makes is that he hears the 'mommy' 
who picks up the baby to be the mommy of that baby. He asks us to 
note that the second sentence does not contain a genitive; the child 
did not say Its mommy picked it up, or vairants of that identifying 
reference. The second observation is that we, the hearers, would also 
understand the sentences in that way. In other words, the sentences 
are implicative, even though on a strict reading of the words 
d 
( 18) 
themselves, the family connection between mommy and baby is not rna e. 
His third observation is that the sequentiality of the statements 
replicates our understanding of the occurences the sentences describe. 
That is, tha.t the baby first cried and tht.f\its mother picked it up. 
Of course, the reader is not being asked to agree with Sacks about 
these observations in the usual sense of that term, but rather to 
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see whether their knowledge of linguistic usage squares with the 
observations insofar as they are warrantable implicatures of the two 
( 19) 
sentences. The fourth observation possesses a general importance 
for conversation analysis inasmuch as: 
To recognise that some form of words is a possible 
description does not require that one must first 
inspect the circumstances it may be characterizing. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 217) 
Sacks is emphasizing a point made earlier in this chapter; namely 
that the indexicality of language use does not mean tying the meaning 
of words to the boundaries of some actual context. Rather 'context' 
is something which is itself constructed in part by members' 
categorization activities; which activities can include further 
categorization of the initial devices and so on. In fact, one could 
say that the constructive quality of categorizing itself indicates 
that the 'boundaries' of a context are not to be confused with any 
idea of a 'contexted' boundary of sense. 
The importance which Sacks attaches to avoiding making context 
into a determinant of sense is connected to the implicative quality of 
his 'observations'. Those observations are what 'anyone knows' if 
they speak the same language as the little girl. The fact that the 
st.ory is uttered by such a young speaker is significant. A Searl ian 
might say that the little girl's sentences are uttered by her in a 
manner consonant with Searle's direct speech act analysis, which might 
suggest an empirical confirmation of the view that the direct speech 
act was the primitive unit of linguistic colflpetence. In other words, 
a re-statement of the earlier arguments that Sacks's observations 
describe a more mature level of competence which depend upon the 
mastery of 'paradigmatic' utterances in order to be understood. 
However, the plausibility of this ~ argument diminishes 
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considerably when one considers that it would be necessary to presume 
some insulation of the little girl from the competence of the 
community she addresses. That is, we could assume that at this stage 
of her linguistic development, she was working toward a mastery of 
'paradigmatic' acts in Searle's terms, the further development of 
which would employ the genitive, make use of indirect speech acts 
and so on. But that involves taking the 'implicative' use of 
language in her surroundings at the moment as being of less significance 
than the tenets of speech act theory. Such a view is, of course, 
implausible. 
What Sacks tries to capture with his observations is how the 
little girl's utterances rely on our competence to determine their 
sense and reference. What is noteworthy with respect to these 
particular circumstances is our willingness to coax little children 
into the language community through our understanding of their 
utterances; an 'understanding' of language which we obviously convey 
to them. If later the little girl is 'corrected' by being informed 
about the use of the genitive, it will be on the basis of that 
understanding that she is able to make use of the instruction at all. 
In the light of considerations like this, Sacks's task for analysis, 
namely to elicit how the sort of observations that comprise what 
'anyone knows' are there for 'anyone to see', join together issues 
of acquisition of, and competence in the use of language. He specifies 
the task in this way: 
What one ought to seek to build is an apparatus which 
will provide for how it is that any activity which 
members do in such a way as to be recognisable as 
such to members, are done, and done recognisably. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 218) 
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So, even in terms of these initial observations, we can see in a 
practical way how the 'linguistic intuitions' of the speaker, as 
Searle terms them, do not only supply criteria for the validity of 
analysis but o_cutally constitute the topic of analysis. What members 
of a language community 'know intuitively' are the linguistic 
practices of that community and so th~ analyst's ·task is to explicate 
the practices which manifest themselves as those intuitions. Whilst 
such an analysis may involve the same degree of dissection as that 
found in speech act theory, we have seen that not only is that 
dissection of a very different kind, but that it also involves very 
different considerations about the nature of analysing language 
mastery. 
VIII Analysing 'The Baby Cried' 
On the basis of the observations, Sacks develops an analysis of 
the MCD's in the little girl's story along the lines suggested in his 
. (20) (1972) artlcle. Employing its analytical scheme he develops 
propositions 1.1, through to 1.1.3.2. by considering a device whose 
application to members is completely general. This, not surprisingly, 
is the sex categorization device which is also extremely simple, its 
collection being the two categories 'male' 'female'. Its universality 
with regard to at least human populations is explicit though unvoiced 
in categories of the family device such as 'Mommy', 'Daddy', 'sister', 
'brother' and implicit in categories such as 'parent', 'child' and 
'baby'. Sacks notes that a collection consists of categories that 'go 
together', for example neither of the collections just considered 
would include 'centre forward' as a category. However, this does not 
amount to a strict exclusionary rule, since the flexibility, 
adaptability and inventiveness of language use means that any such 
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'exclusion' can be flouted. For example, a parent might say of a son, 
'He's the centre-forward', meaning he's the bright, successful member 
of the family unit. Conversely, the use of familial terms in 
football teams (and other collaborative enterprises) is a common 
phenomenon. This element of boundary crossing is recognised by Sacks 
to be intrinsic to the use of MCD's and in consequence must be intrinsic 
to the analyst's conception of them. 
The analytic recognition of this flexibility does not mark a 
weakness in the concept of MCD's. Rather, it is a mark of the 
strength of the notion, because the existence of 'collections' as 
something oriented-to by members, provides an anchor for reference 
that does not have to be achieved expressly by members. The 
parent can say, 'He's the centre-forward' because the 'family' MCD 
provides the context for employing the football categorization to 
describe the son. Of course, the value to be attached to that 
categorization is also a matter for negotiation between interactants. 
Said by the father, it might, for example, be simply an expression of 
fatherly pride. Said by the mother, it might be ironic (she endures 
a football-mad household), or even an implied criticism like, 'he's 
a show-off'. Related to this sort of consideration is another 
important feature of MCD's which Sacks notes. This is that if someone 
adds to the list of categories applicable to a member, it will not 
necessarily entrench reference or provide a fuller description. For 
example, the universality of the sex categorization device can make 
its use (a) pleonastic, or (b) indicative of further categorization. 
(a) My mommy is female. 
(b) My mommy is female. 
parents) 
(uttered to child with homosexual 
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Such constraints illustrate the economy rule (see Sacks, 1.1.5.2.) 
which he casts in negative and permissive form . 
.. . and it is not necessary that some multiple of 
categories from categorization devices be employed 
for recognition that a person ls being referred to, 
to be made; a single category will do (I do not mean 
by this that more cannot be used, only that for 
persons to be recognised, more need not be used) . 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 219) 
More positively, the economy rule generates relations between different 
categorization devices and their contexts which is exemplified in the 
example above between the sense of utterance (a) and utterance (b). 
The importance of the rule is considerable. 
1.1.5.3. 
The economy rule permits us to partially formulate one 
central socialization problem. Once a child has reached 
that stage of learning, he makes utterances like: 
Once there was a baby pig. He played with 
his Mommy. He went to Mommy. Mommy went to 
Daddy. 
From such a point, the child's task of becoming 
adequately socialized to doing categorizations of 
Members consists in learning (a) what categories must 
be added to 'Mommy', 'Daddy', and 'baby' to complete 
the collection of which they are members; (b) of 
adding to their apparatus of category collections ... 
and (c) of learning proper occasions and rules of use 
of each of the devices. 
(Sacks, 1972, pp. 34-5) 
No longer does the child face the task of procuring adequate reference 
in description. Though the lack of a genitive in the two sentence 
story 'The baby cried. The mommy picked it up'. may not satisfy the 
precision of adult formulations (much less those of a logician) , it 
nevertheless indicates a grasp of the family categorization device 
which Sacks exhibited with his first observation: viz. that he hears 
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the mommy as the mommy of the baby. Such a grasp is the foundation 
for the combinatorial tasks of reference and description which he 
then tells us, 
have been solved when infants can make such utterances 
as: 
Pussy scratched. He cried. He's a bad boy. 
He banged. He stopped crying. He's a good 
boy. He cried again. 
(ibid, 1 p, 31) (21 ) 
The working of the economy rule is intimately associated with the 
use of the consistency rule (Sacks, 1972, 1.1.4.) which, as we have 
seen, is not cast in imperative form either, but rather: 
tells us that if the first person has been categorized 
as 'baby', then further persons may be referred to by 
other categories of a collection of which they are a 
member ... 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 219) 
However, in this weak form, 'the consistency rule may exclude no 
category of any device' (ibid.) and Sacks introduces what he terms 
the consistency rule corollary which operates as a hearer's maxim. 
It holds: 
if two or more categories are used to categorize two 
or more members of some population, and those categories 
can be heard as categories from the same collection, then: 
hear them that way. 
(22) (Sacks, 1974, pp. 219-20) 
This maxim clearly operates as a constraint upon the consistency rule 
and Sacks tells us that coupled to others it alters the 'may' to a 
'must' in its formulation. Earlier I argued that the permissive form 
of Sacks's rules block the determinacy inherent in Searle's rule 
formulations. The question now is whether the corollary and its 
associates effectively dismiss that argument? 
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That question can be expressed in the following way. If Sacks is 
to rigorously delineate how we understand his observations to be 
implicatives of the little girl's story, then the rules he elaborates 
must be able to constrain some possible hearings we can generate 
(e.g. like hearing 'the mommy' and 'the baby' to be unrelated). The 
problem is to provide a constraint that can be distinguished from 
Searle's rule determinacy. What we are dealing with, then, is a 
specific instance of the general problem that has been examined in 
these two chapters, namely, that an adequate analysis of the 
phenomena of membership itself generates troublesome restrictions 
around the very freedom and inventiveness it seeks to investigate. 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that the constraint 'if those 
categories can be heard as categories from the same collection, then: 
hear them that way', does not formulate a necessary meaning which the 
maxim 'governs'. When Sacks says the maxim transforms a 'may' into a 
'must', the modality of the latter is not to be equated with the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of a speech act. Those conditions 
require that only one meaning can be attached to a rule governed 
utterance because the rules are taken to be constitutive of meaning 
ab initio. For Sacks, on the other hand, the rules in his analysis, 
even when stated in a maxim like this, are concerned with trying to 
restrict the possible meanings that may otherwise be attached to any 
utterance. 
In consequence, Sacks's analysis of 'the how' of language mastery 
can never foreclose on the meanings that members may generate in their 
interactions. The consistency rule collorary's 'must', does not 
transform the maxim into one of the ingredients of a determinate 
account of how members' use of an MCD is to be heard. In fact, the 
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constraint it introduces could always be challenged, or seemingly 
employed by a member, only then to be repudiated as soon as someone 
hears it that way. To strain the example somewhat in the direction 
of absurdity, but in order to make the point: 
A. The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. 
B. Isn't mommy kind to her baby? 
A. Did I say her baby? 
Sacks makes the point somewhat more elegantly later in the article 
when elaborating what he means by saying that the analysis specifies 
in part how sense is assembled. 
'in part' because for the materials at hand it 
happens that there are other means for providing 
that the same hearing can be made, means which can 
operate in combination with the foregoing otherwise 
sufficient ones, to further assure the hearings we 
have observed. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 221, emphasis added) 
Clearly, this quotation takes us to the heart of the difference 
between the way Searle and Sacks view language and its use. For 
Searle, we have seen that analysis is a matter of providing enough 
conditions and rules to get past the post of semantic certainty. 
For Sacks, analysis is a matter of tracing possible ways in which a 
mutuality of understanding is achieved collaboratively by members. 
The semantic certainty claimed by Searle's theory would not be 
viewed by Sacks as something which is constituted from the ruled 
elements of a speech act. Rather, those elements would be seen as 
really doing the job of trying to cut down the meanings that can be 
attached to the speech act (as we saw in Chapter One). In consequence, 
the maxims in Sacks's analysis actually perform the same role as 
Searle's speech act rules, namely, as instructions for hearing. The 
difference is that they are acknowledged as such in Sacks's work. 
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An examination of Sacks's analysis of his second observation 
(viz. that not only he, but we (any native speaker), hear the mommy 
to be the mommy of the baby) indicates how the firmness of the 
consistency rule corollary lies alongside the requirement for the 
defeasibility of any rule which analysis locates. Sacks begins his 
account of how this observation is heard by noting that the category 
'baby' may not be combinably usable with regard to a single person. 
For example, a woman might refer to someone as 'my baby' with no 
suggestion that she is using the category that occurs in the stage 
of life device (whose collection includes 'baby', 'child', 'adolescent', 
'adult'). Her baby is a fully fledged adult. Here the listener is 
directed to her endearment for the person referred to, not that person's 
immaturity. In the little girl's story such ambiguity is not present. 
In consequence, the task for Sacks is to elicit the resources that 
make us hear the story as we do. He points out that neither the 
economy rule nor the consistency rule (or combination) show: 
the legitimacy of hearing the single term 'baby' 
as referring to a person located by reference both 
to the device 'family' and to the device 'stage of 
life'. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 220) 
The rules examined so far secure adequacy of reference and provide 
for the hearing of categories as members of the same collection but 
they, together with the corollary, do not in and of themselves 
delineate why the meaning of the sentences is as the observations 
describe. To rectify this, Sacks adds a further modification to the 
consistency rule (cf. Sacks, 1972, 2.2.4/5) which specifies some more 
relations that can obtain between categories from different collections. 
The corollary has provided for the hearing of categories as members 
of the same device. This modification rules: 
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... if a hearer has a second category which can 
be heard as consistent with one locus of a first, 
then the first is to be heard as at least consistent 
with the second. 
(ibid.) 
This rule provides a foundation for (1) the combined reference (i.e. 
'family', and 'stage of life') of 'baby' being heard, and (2) for the 
genitive relation between 'mommy' and 'baby' also being heard. As 
regards the second point, Sacks concentrates his analysis on what he 
terms a central property of these devices which is that they are 
duplicitively organized (cf. Sacks, 1972, 1.1.6.1. to 2.2.2.2.). 
I mean by the use of that term to point out the 
following: When such a device is used on a population, 
what is done is to take its categories, treat the set 
of categories as defining a unit and place members of 
the population into cases of the unit. If a population 
is to be treated and then is counted, one counts not 
numbers of daddies, numbers of mommies and numbers of 
babies, but numbers of families - numbers of 'whole 
families', numbers of families without fathers, etc. 
A population so treated is partitioned into cases of 
the unit, cases for which what properly holds is that 
the various persons partitioned into any case are 
'coincumbents' of that case. 
(Sacks, 1974, pp. 220-1) 
He then formulates this property as another hearer's maxim. 
If some population has been categorized by use of 
categories from some device whose collection has 
the duplicitive organization property, and a member 
is presented with a categorized population which ~ 
be heard as 'coincumbents' of a case of that device's 
unit, then: Hear it that way. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 221) 
Sacks notes the generality of this maxim, and that for the purposes 
of the current analysis, it 'is of far more general scope than we may 
seem to need'. This comment is noteworthy because of a previous 
remark in which he says that his analysis does not deal in generalities. 
An explanation for this apparent contradiction can be found later in 
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the article when Sacks talks about how his analysis may seem 
altogether too complicated for the utterances examined: 
we invite the reader to consider that our analysis 
has intendedly been 'overbuilt'. That is to say it 
may turn out that the elaborateness of our analysis, 
or its apparent elaborateness, will disappear when one 
begins to consider the amount of work that the very 
same machinery can perform. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 224) 
In the light of this comment, it seems that the previously referred 
to 'generalities' concern generalizations made about language use by 
virtue oftheoretically imposed requirements for communication. If 
that is so, then Sacks is once again drawing attention to idealized 
descriptions of how members communicate that are rooted in the analyst's 
extant competence, and how those descriptions fail to inquire into the 
way those resources furnish theoretical generalizations with their 
warrantability. In consequence, the scope of this maxim and the 
others is 'general' in the sense of the 'amount of work' they can 
perform, since any analysis of how members communicate will account 
for the particular instance of communication by means of general rules. 
What Sacks seeks to avoid is the imposition of generalizations about 
the make-up of speech forms by the employment of what ultimately 
transpire to be rather vague generalizations about the con5Qtuent parts 
of any act of communication. In this way, the generality of the maxim 
is intended to remain sufficiently analytically specific in order to 
secure how we understand what the observations say we will hear in the 
little girl's sentences, while at the same time ensuring that such 
'generality' does not exclude the work members do in making sense of 
utterances. 
However, given that this could be the right way to interpret what 
Sacks means by the generality of his maxim, it only brings us before 
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the problem of understanding what he means when he says that it is 
also formal and predictive. As regards saying that it is formal, 
this appears to refer to the point made earlier that rules and the 
uses to which they are put are not localized phenomena; that is, they 
are not purely creatures of the circumstances of their use. Clearly, 
this characteristic is closely allied to the generality of the maxim, 
particularly the way that generality provides members with resources 
for interpreting their utterances, rather than the maxim simply 
stipulating what the employment and relations between particular 
membership categories amounts to in terms of overall meaning. 
'Formality', then, is not to be construed as though it were a 
property of the rule which somehow established or guaranteed the 
meaning of utterances. The formality of the maxims is better understood 
as enabling members to use them like tools. Like a tool, a particular 
rule can have many different uses and can be used to construct many 
different things. But any particular 'construction' is not something 
which the rule encapsulates any more than, as Garfinkel says, any 
instance or form of analysis is the final, correct, or only way to 
explicate members' activities. To make of rules anything more than 
this is, as we have seen, to break the essential reflexivity between 
analysis as a member's activity, and the members' activities which 
analysis studies. 
The use of the term predictive elaborates this understanding of 
rules still further but requires a slightly more extended commentary 
because the word has come to be closely associated with the verification 
procedures of hypothetico-deductive inquiry. The first thing to say is 
that Sacks's use of the term does not re-instate any of the explanatory 
commitments associated with those methodological proposals. He 
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clarifies the meaning of the concept in his work when commenting upon 
the italicized 'can be heard' in the quotation before last. Sacks 
notes that some duplicatively organized devices have proper numbers 
of inct@bents for certain categories of any units. For example, a 
family has but one father, a kingdom but one monarch, a football team 
but one centre-forward, etc. From this it follows that: 
If more incumbents of a category are proposed as 
present in the population than a unit's case can 
properly take, then the 'can be heard' constraint 
is not satisfied and a prediction would not be 
made. 
(ibid.) 
In other words, 'prediction' is the meaning which the categorization 
apparatus produces through the relations it establishes between the 
incumbents of categories. This is why the maxim: 
permits us to predict, and to understand how we 
can predict, that a statement such as 'The first 
baseman looked around'. The third baseman scratched 
himself', will be heard as saying 'the first baseman 
of the team of which the third baseman is also a 
player' and its converse. 
(ibid.) 
Accordingly, if the little girl had said, 'The baby cried. The mommies 
picked it up', the rule for hearing a categorized population as 
coincumbents of a device's unit would be abrogated and the prediction 
. (23) 
would fall. 
With the notion of category bound activities (cf. Sacks, 1972, 3.0 ff) 
Sacks sets out to analyse the first point (viz. how the combined 
reference of 'baby' is heard). He tells his readers that: 
By the term I intend to notice that many activities 
are taken by members to be done by some particular 
or several particular categories of members where 
the categories are categories from membership 
categorization devices. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 222) 
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Sacks notes as an obvious fact for native speakers that 'cry' is 
bound to the category 'baby' as a member of the collection from the 
'stage of life' device, but once again stressing that this fact only 
serves to pose a problem for the analyst. As Turner puts it, Sacks 
'trades' upon his and our knowledge as competent members of a culture 
for the awareness of this, but faces the task of eliciting how it 
h f . . . - ( 24) . l h possesses t at actlclty ln our talk. Accordlng y, what t e 
analyst needs: 
... is to construct some means by reference to which 
a class which proposedly contains at least the activity 
category 'cry' and presumably others, may have the 
inclusion of its candidate members assessed. 
(ibid.) 
However, this proposal is immediately qualified in order to circumvent 
it ruling out alternative meanings that the sentences could have. For 
example, the story could be about a crying adult who has fallen in the 
street and is picked up by 'the mommy'. Of course, that is a far-
fetched construal of the sentences. But the point is that it is a 
possible meaning of those sentences. The qualification runs as 
follows: 
We will not be claiming that the procedure is definitive 
as to exclusion of a candidate member, but we will claim 
that it is definitive as to inclusion of a candidate 
member. 
(ibid.) 
What Sacks seeks with this analytic construct and its qualification 
is not only a portrayal of how members 'bind' categories and activities 
together, but also how that binding can then be employed to break 
that tie in order to create further categorizations of members' 
activities. Once again, the analytic construction of a system which 
enables members to assemble the sense of their utterances must stand 
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four-square with the fundamental flexibility of members' activities. 
The aim of the analysis is to show how 'system' (analytic construct) 
and (members') 'action' can be seen in a framework of rules without 
implicitly fettering the freedom of the latter by means of the 
. t h' h 'll 'l . h . h f (2S) constraln s w lC Wl necessarl y ln ere ln t e ormer. As an 
illustration of this flexibility, consider how the binding of 'cry' 
and 'baby' can be employed to refer to incumbents of later positions 
of the stage of life device (e.g. child, adolescent, adult). This 
is commonly used to praise or degrade the activities of members. The 
binding of these categories makes it available to members as a method 
for noticing the fact that an incumbent of that category may not, in 
circumstances that would warrant it, actually be crying. This can 
secure the proposal that the infant is, 'acting like a grown-up'. 
Alternatively, an older child's tears may be degraded by coupling 
them to the behaviour of an infant: 'Only babies do that'. The 
procedure is not confined to the categorization devices that have been 
examined for the purposes of illustration. For example, membership 
of a sexual category can be hinted at by the use of an occupational 
role. 
S. What interests did you have before? 
C. I was a hair stylist at one time. I did some 
fashions now and then. Things like that. 
S. Then why aren't you working? 
C. Because I don't want to I guess. Maybe that's 
why I'm afraid to go out and look for a 
job I'm afraid of myself because I don't 
know. I'm terribly mixed up. 
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S. Have you been having some sexual problems? 
C. All my life. 
s. Uh huh. Yeah. 
c. Naturally. You probably suspect - as far as 
the hair stylist and - either go one way or the 
other. There is a straight or homosexual, 
something like that. 
(source: Sacks, 1974, p. 223) 
Here, 'hair-stylist' is a candidate for binding C to the category 
'homosexual', a fact which C acknowledges in his last utterance. 
Something which is closely related to this binding of categories, 
together with members' artful ways of sundering the ties which others 
expect to hold, is the extent to which a 'specific vagueness of 
reference' is intrinsic to our use of them. In Studies, Garfinkel 
demonstrates that adequacy of reference does not depend on the 
precision of the category employed, as that might be formulated by a 
linguist or philosopher. In fact, the request for such precision is 
seen to be a nuisance by members. In the following experiment, the 
persistent refusal of the experimenter to tie categories together in 
a commonsense manner by insisting on a high degree of precision in 
their use by her subject, occasions open hostility toward her. 
CASE 3 
On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. 
My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, 'How are 
you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?' 
(S) I don't know I guess physically, mainly. 
(E) You mean that your muscles ache or your bones? 
(S) I guess so. Don't be so technical. 
(After more watching) 
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(S) All these old movies have the same kind of old 
bedstead in them. 
(E) What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or 
some of them, or just the ones you have seen? 
(S) What's the matter with you? You know what I mean. 
(E) I wish you would be more specific. 
(S) You know what I mean! Drop dead! 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 43) 
It is possible to say that the wife was merely trying to get her 
husband to say plainly what he meant. Her questions really do no more 
than elicit the unstated presuppositions in his statements. However, 
we do not see her utterances as a laudable analyticity, as an attempt 
to remove the many ambiguities which can be seen in what he said. We 
all know she is being hopelessly pedantic. In this setting, the 
resolution of these ambiguities is not looked upon as the exercise of 
a keen mind to which deference will be paid or admiration felt by 
members. It is not a seminar or a law court. Such forensic 
questioning, as the husband makes clear, is not to be tolerated. 
However, what Garfinkel and Sacks also want to keep in perspective 
is that if the circumstances of this very interaction were altered 
(say E had just had a row with S), then we could just as easily find 
a point to E's utterances. Such category precision might be construed 
in terms of 'putting on pressure', either because the 'irrelevance' of 
the questions would itself create a situation of hostility between 
questioner and answerer; or the pursuit of such detail could be 
construed as a badly managed attempt to normalize relations. The 
analyst's problem is not to find a particular and certain meaning in 
the words uttered by members. Rather, the problem lies in showing how 
a particular meaning is located by members from an indefinitely large 
set of possible meanings. 
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In order to show how the combined reference for baby is heard in 
the little girl's story, Sacks still has to formulate the claim about 
the definitive inclusion of members to categories from other devices 
as a maxim or rule for competent speakers. 
If a category bound activity is asserted to have been 
done by a member of some category where, if that 
category is ambiguous (i.e. is a member of at least 
two different devices) but where, at least for one of 
those devices, the asserted activity is category 
bound to the given category, then hear that at least 
the category from the device to which it is bound is 
being asserted to hold. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 224. cf. Sacks, 
1972, 4.2) 
This maxim provides for hearing 'The baby cried.' as making reference 
to at least the incumbents' membership of the 'stage of life' device. 
The consistency rule corollary ruled that a category could be heard 
as a member of more than one device and so coupled 'baby' with the 
family device. The combination of these rules secures membership of 
'baby' with both devices and thereby shows how the story is heard as 
Sacks's observations describe. 
IX. The Significance of 'The baby cried' 
Perhaps one of the most significant things about the analysis of 
the little girl's story is how remote that story is from ordinary 
conversational interaction. Comprehending it involves no 'two-way' 
conversational elements at all, and yet Sacks chooses this simplest 
of examples of a 'one-way' communication in order to display the 
mechanisms members use in conversational activity. This fact in and 
of itself is indicative of the ubiquity of the conversational rules 
which Sacks brings to light in his paper. It also provides perhaps 
the starkest contrast with the problems that beset Searle's theory. 
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Earlier, I noted how the simplicity of the sentence structure of the 
story might tempt a Searlian to argue that they had been uttered in 
a manner consonant with the rules for a direct speech act. Leaving 
aside any difficulties that would arise in actually making that 
argument (especially the referential problems of the non-use of the 
genitive in the second sentence), plainly whereas for Searle's 
analysis such a simplicity of utterance in effect comes to the rescue 
of the theory, in Sacks's case the analysis used for exhibiting the 
wherewithal of complex conversational interaction is equally capable 
of providing an account of this tiny fragment of language use. In 
other words, Sacks does not only provide an analysis which possesses 
internal consistency, it also manifests a continuity in its approach 
to the phenomena of language use. After all, the story for Sacks and 
for ourselves is something reported on the printed page, yet this 
reading of a text comes within the purview of his analysis. By 
contrast, Searle's theory, as the analysis of indirect speech acts 
makes abundantly clear, is not only internally inconsistent, it also 
faces intractable problems in trying to cope with the multitude of 
different ways language can be used. 
This final comparison between speech act theory and conversation 
analysis brings us to a consideration of Sacks's fourth observation, 
namely, that for members the little girl's sentences are recognisable 
as 'a possible description'. The fact that some form of words, 'can 
apparently, sound like a description' (Sacks, 1974, p. 217), has 
importance not only for ordinary everyday activities but for the 
practices of social science as well. 
Were it not so, both that members have an activity 
they do, 'describing', and that at least some cases 
of that activity produce for them, forms of words 
recognisable as at least possible descriptions 
- 131 -
without having to do an inspection of the 
circumstances they might characterize, then it 
might well be that social science would necessarily 
be the last of the sciences to be made do-able. 
For, unless social scientists could study such 
things as these 'recognisable descriptions', we 
might only be able to investigate such activities 
of members ... when social scientists could employ 
some established, presumptively correct scientific 
characterizations of the phenomena members were 
presumably dealing with ... 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 218) 
Sacks makes the importance of 'doing descriptions' relevant to social 
science via a discussion of the concept of norm. He agrees with 
conventional sociology's claim that norms provide a structure for the 
interpretation of social reality. But, whereas conventional 
sociology looks to those norms both as a determining constraint on 
that 'reality' and as a guarantee of its sense, Sacks views norms as 
procedural features of the actual production of social reality and 
social interaction. In consequence, social order is seen to consist 
in the recognisability of members' activities through the collaborative 
employment of, inter alia, the devices examined in the previous pages 
of this chapter. Although Sacks does not make the point explicitly 
in his paper, it is implicit in his discussion that what conventional 
social scientists have done is employ 'established, presumtively 
correct scientific considerations' as if they exhibited the foundations 
of members' 'recognisable descriptions'. 
Sacks prefaces his analysis of how the little girl's story is a 
recognisable description by offering some considerations on how we see 
describable occurences. He invites readers to suppose that they are 
standing somewhere and see a person crying. He suggests that if we 
can, each of us will see what happened as 'a baby cried', and 
continues: 
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Suppose again you are standing somewhere and you 
see two people you don't know. Suppose further 
that one cries, and the other picks up the one 
who is crying. Now if I can I will see that what 
has happened is that a baby cried and its mother 
picked it up. And I take it that you will if you 
can, see that too. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 224) 
Sacks uses the term 'people' as its neutrality will not prejudge the 
outcome of the 'if ... can' constraint regarding the categories 'baby' 
and 'mother'. As we have seen, Sacks concedes that the one who cries 
may, by reference to the stage of life device, be seen to be an adult. 
He also points out that members could use categorizations like 'male' 
and 'female' which are usable irrespective of the person's incumbency 
of a category from the 'stage of life' or 'family' devices. However, 
this leads him to observe that we would not, in seeing the scene, see 
that 'a male cried', if we could see that 'a baby cried'. The 
neutrality (in this context) of categories like 'people' or 'person' 
draws attention to the work we do in tying activities to an 
identifying reference, even though there is no independent evidence 
for that identification. Consequently, Sacks suggests the following 
viewers' maxim: 
If a member sees a category-bound activity being 
done, then, if one can see it being done by a 
member of a category to which the activity is 
bound, then: Bee it that way. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 225) 
The observation of one person picking another up at the inception 
of that other's crying is used by Sacks to remind us of the norm 
which he formulates a3: 'A mother ought to soothe her crying baby'. 
He argues that as competent members our knowledge of this norm has 
already been displayed in the analysis \vhen used to fuL·nish the 
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genitive hearing of 'The baby cried. The mommy picked it up'. This 
suggests another viewer's maxim which can operate without the use 
of any device's categories and is in consequence primitive to the 
property of duplicitive organization as well. The maxim reads: 
If one sees a pair of actions which can be related 
via the operation of a norm that provides for the 
second given the first, where the doers can be seen 
as members of the categories the norm provides for 
that pair of actions, then: (a) see that the doers 
are such members and (b) see the second as done in 
conformity with the norm. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 225) 
Thus Sacks's formulation of these maxims is bound up with the 
norms of the society in which the witnessed event or conversational 
exchange took place. Members' use of the maxims in witnessing or 
participating in social situations serves to warrant the 'correctness' 
of their observations. No-one seeing 'the baby cried', will ask 
whether the other who picks it up is the mother of that baby, although 
of course they could, and will, where say the age of the candidate 
mother makes her incumbency of that category unlikely. Nor will they 
ask whether she picked it up because the baby was crying. However, 
where the expectations of norms are not fulfilled, such questions may 
be asked. For example, where the second person in picking up the 
first makes the latter cry, viewers might question that person's 
incumbency of the category 'mother'. Each of us orients to the way 
we know others will see and hear us. Our competence as societal 
members is bound up with seeing for ourselves how others will see us. 
It is this mutuality which secures the possibility of a mastery of 
language since language is a collaborative phenomenon. For Sacks, 
the recognisability and orderliness of the social world relies for 
its reproduction (as a ceaselessly occasioned phenomenon) upon members' 
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use of norms manifested in their utterances and interactions by the 
mechanisms he specifies. It is by virtue of those mechanisms that: 
A string of sentences which may be heard, via the 
hearer's maxims, as having been produced by use 
of the viewer's maxims will be heard as a 
'recognisably correct possible description'. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 226) 
It is clear that for Sacks the formulation of these maxims 
suggest features about norms which the conventional sociological 
literature fails to address. The normative analysis undertaken in 
sociology replicates the understanding of rules as governing 
utterances in that 
... the focus on norms is on the conditions under which 
and the extent to which they govern, or can be seen by 
social scientists to govern, the relevant actions of 
those members whose actions they ought to constrain. 
(Sacks, 1974, p. 225) 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the work sociologists do in 
searching out and delineating norms is not criticized as such. 
What is problematic from Sacks's point of view is the operationalization 
of normative analysis in the discipline. So, for example, there is 
no criticism of the fact that a sociologist may choose to study a 
very complex social situation with the result that the delineation 
of its norms is a very protracted and complex business, and certainly 
by comparison with formulating something as obvious as 'mothers ought 
to soothe crying babies.' After all, in Sacks's own work one can 
readily appreciate that the elicitation of the economy rule and 
consistency rule may have involved a considerable amount of research 
time and effort on his part. Neither, of course, is there any 
criticism of the fact that the norms sociology unearths may be 
concealed from the awareness of members, since the conversational 
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devices which Sacks explicates could hardly be said to be a matter 
of common knowledge amongst members either. As we have seen, the 
perspective offers a no less modelled system of actual interaction 
than the most abstract of sociological approaches. It is no part 
of Garfinkel and Sacks's critique of sociology to claim that 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis somehow get closer to 
the realities of social life. The anal¥st as member is already as 
close to that reality as it is possible to be. It is a misunderstanding 
of the perspective that it seeks to offer a phenomenological intimacy 
about members' everyday lives. By contrast, what it aims to study 
is, amongst other things, the accomplishment of that biographical 
work by members. 
In consequence, the basic problem with the understanding of norms 
in conventional sociology is that the fact they may be concealed from 
the awareness of ordinary members is taken to licence the view that 
they operate like invisible strings on the sociological actor. This 
is how norms come to be viewed as constraints that govern the actions 
of members, just as Searle's speech act rules govern the issuance, 
uptake and meaning of utterances. As a result, the members become 
no more than passive recipients of the 'instructions' of the theory 
or analytic framework which therEby effectively construes rules or 
norms as performers of the acts and creators of the meanings. The 
main thrust of Garfinkel and Sacks's critique is that this amounts 
to a sociological category mistake since it is persons not rules or 
norms who perform and~- It also displays how the modelled 
character of any analysis can be reified into a constitutive property 
of membership, or in philosophical terminology, how analysis can 
predicate of the object of analysis what lies in its mode of 
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representation. Garfinkel and Sacks, quite appropriately, refer to 
this as the constructive practices of sociology. Such constructivism 
is in one sense inevitable since any analysis is but one more occasion 
for making the world a reportable phenomenon, in this case for the 
practical purposes of sociology. In consequence, the critique of 
sociology is not directed at the discipline's constructivism per se, 
but rather that its analysis of the social world is not understood 
by the discipline itself as a re-presentation of the social world. 
understanding the character of that re-presentation in the activity 
of analysing provides an account of salient features of the mastery 
of language since: 
The fact that natural language serves persons doing 
sociology - whether they are laymen or professionals 
- as circumstances, as topics, and as resources of 
their inquiries furnishes to the technology of their 
inquiries and to their practical sociological 
reasoning, its circumstances, its topics, and its 
resources. That reflexivity is encountered by 
sociologists in the actual occasions of their 
inquiries as indexical properties of natural 
language. 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 338) 
X Ethnomethodology and ~onversation Analysis: A 6onclusion 
Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have been examined in 
this chapter as a positive response to the problems that result from 
attempting to explain the phenomena of language mastery in the manner 
adopted by Searle. Although a critique of sociology is offered in 
the writings of Garfinkel and Sacks, this thesis has chosen speech 
act theory to exemplify the sort of analysis which is the focus of 
their criticisms. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the 
topic of Searle's analysis is language mastery and for Garfinkel and 
Sacks, as we have seen, the concept of membership means the possession 
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of that faculty. Secondly, Searle prosecutes his theorizing with an 
explicitness and an attention to philosophical and analytical questions 
which is more rarely found in the sociological literature. In other 
words, Searle is a very powerful adversary. Thirdly, of course, it 
is his use and understanding of the concept of rule in analysing the 
wherewithal of language mastery and social action which makes his 
work especially relevant to this thesis. So his work is not only a 
very important contribution to the field of language studies in 
general, it also provides perhaps the best comparison with the 
understanding of rules and language found in ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis, moreover from a writer who shares the view 
that language is social action. 
In this chapter I have argued that what the writings of 
Garfinkel and Sacks offer is not only an alternative conception of 
the mastery of language, but one which also posits a crucially 
important internal relationship between the conception and methods of 
analysis and the subject matter of that analysis. The recognition of 
how we understand analysis, since the latter is itself an instance of 
language mastery, is exemplified in Garfinkel and Sacks's view that 
analytical frameworks are themselves indexical and reflexive phenomena 
of language mastery. Whilst it can be seen that this insight shapes 
their whole approach, it is nevertheless the case that a systematic 
account of how communication is possible is also undertaken. In the 
minds of some commentators, this twin emphasis on the reflexivity of 
analysis and a commitment to the formulation of a speech systematics 
seems at least very dubious if not flatly contradictory. Given that 
the former seems to receive more attention in the writings of 
ethnomethodologists and the latter is undertaken more positively by 
conversation analysts, there have been suggestions, as noted at the 
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beginning of this chapter, that what Garfinkel says and what Sacks 
advocates, cannot be squared one with the other. 
As noted earlier, in Chapter Three, this question of the 
compatability of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis is going 
to be looked at explicitly. It will be done by focusing on the 
arguments presented in a paper which argues that they ought to be 
separated. This paper explicitly addresses the philosophical issues 
that underlie the two conceptions of rule-following and the 
understanding of language mastery disclosed in these two chapters. 
In doing this, it also raises the question of whether a reflexive 
understanding of analysis can be compatible with such a positive task 
as elaborating the systematics of speech practice. In order to 
address this issue from a different standpoint, the next chapter also 
examines the views of Alan Blum on analysis, theorizing and their 
reflexive nature. However, the person whose work occupies a central 
place in answering this question is Wittgenstein. His philosophy will 
be examined and employed to secure a philosophical footing for the 
research practice inspired by the writings of Garfinkel and Sacks. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Searle, of course, does recognise the particular and located 
character of certain uses of expressions, but explains them as 
'indirect' departures from 'direct' literal meanings. 
2. See Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1943, pp. 237-8. Bertrand 
Russell, Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company Inc., 1940, pp. 134-43. Nelson Goodman, The Structure of 
Appearance, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1951, pp. 287-98. 
3. See the article by B. Barnes and J. Law, 1976. 
4. Searle puts it like this: 
In short, I am going to deal only with a simple 
and idealized case. This method, one of 
constructing idealized models, is analogous to 
the sort of theory construction that goes on in 
most sciences, e.g. the construction of economic 
models, or accounts of the solar system which 
treats planets as points. Without abstraction 
and idealization, there is no systematization. 
(1969, p. 56) 
He also manages an 'appropriate modesty' whilst claiming consistency 
with the facts, which, in turn, ensures a programme of work for 
future. 
It is important to emphasize that I have by no 
means demonstrated the thesis being argued for in 
this chapter. I have so far only suggested a 
pattern of analysis that is consistent with the 
facts. Even supposing that this pattern of 
analysis could be shown to be successful in many 
more cases, there are still several problems 
that remain ... 
(1975, p. 75) 
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5. This is what Streeck's proposals, discussed in Chapter One, 
really amount to. 
6. A notable feature of these quotations is that the systematics of 
turntaking are set out in 'would' and 'should' terms. In other 
words, the system is modelled, a fact which is announced explicitly 
in the paragraph immediately following these quotations. 
To merit serious consideration, it seems to us, 
a model should be capable of accommodating (i.e. 
either be compatible with, or allow the 
derivation of) ... grossly apparent facts ... 
7. Proper names have been deleted from these transcripts (e.g. 
MrS ... : P .... B •••• ) as this was a condition laid down for 
the tape recording and transcribing of these interactions. 
8. These alternatives by no means exhaust the possibilities of 
rule-orientation and also raises the issue of the transcriptionist's 
representation of the interaction which itself can play a large 
part in making such determinations. For example, if the sequence 
is transcribed: 
MT her trouble's basically that she's b-backward in--rr-tt-the 
academic sense 
I I 
FT ~J its not that reilly\ 
MT urn so I mean 
l .I 
we can ascribe the rules differently to the speakers. Here it 
appears that FT correctly detects the completion, followed by a 
similar detection by MT who begins a new turn. 
9. The interactants had a good deal of paperwork in front of them 
which often formed the topic of sub-conversations where (initially 
at least) to avoid interrupting current speaker, these persons 
would point to relevant paragraphs to be read by another. In 
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this way, they could carry on communicating whilst another 
speaker held the floor. 
10. The ascription of motives to a speaker's utterance may be one 
consideration in that 'complex' of information which will be 
used by the transcriptionist and analyst in order to organize 
and make sense of the utterances. However, this is very 
different from basing the analysis in speculations about the 
motives of speakers and thereby letting the analytical structure 
merely provide a gloss for looking at interaction on an 
idiosyncratic or biographical basis. 
11. G. Jefferson, 1978, p. 138. 
12. Garfinkel puts it this way: 
Despite their procedural emphasis, my studies are 
not, properly speaking, experimental. They are 
demonstrations, deisgned in Herbert Spielberg's 
phrase, as 'aids to a sluggish imagination'. I 
have found that they produce reflections through 
which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar 
world can be detected. 
(196 7, p. 3 8) 
13. See Anscombe (1958) and A.D. Genova (1972) on the concepts of 
brute and institutional fact. 
14. For example, in the classroom, there may be a world of difference 
in not forcing a reply from B, if B is one of a group of adult 
students as opposed to schoolchildren. 
15. See Phillips (1978) for the opposite view, discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
16. When member is used with an upper-case M, it refers to a user of 
the categorization devices; when with a lower-case m, it refers to 
a category of some collection. However, Sacks drops this 
convention in his 1974 paper and I shall follow that change. 
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17. Sacks notes that (b) is largely introduced for purposes of 
simplicity and that there are Pn-adequate devices that do have 
overlapping members. 
18. For an analysis of conversational implicature, see Grice (1975). 
Although Grice develops his analysis along different lines, the 
following quotation makes evident similarities with Sacks's 
work. 
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual 
friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks 
B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, 
Oh quite well I think; he likes his colleagues, 
and he hasn't been to prison yet. At this point 
A might well inquire what B was implying, what he 
was suggesting, or even what he meant by saying 
that Chad not yet been to prison. The answer 
might be any one of such tfuings as that C is the 
sort of person likely to yield to the temptation 
provided by his occupation, that C's colleagues 
are really very unpleasant and treacherous people, 
and so forth ... I wish to introduce, as a term 
of art, the verb implicate and the related nouns 
implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf. 
what is implied) Conversational implicatures 
(are) essentially connected with certain very 
general features of discourse ... 
(Grice, 1975, pp. 43-45) 
19. In a footnote, Sacks emphasizes that: 
In the term collection of categories, collection 
is not used in the weak sense, as equivalent to 
the weak sense of set, but is only used to refer 
to groups of categories that Members of that 
community do indeed group together. Thus, the 
issue of whether some particular category is a 
member of some particular collection of categories 
is an empirical issue, upon which any particular 
assertions we make can be erroneous. 
(1972, p. 430, n. 5) 
20. I shall cross-tabulate Sacks' 1972 and 1974 publications as far 
as possible. However, this task is hampered by the differences 
in rule formulation and terminology which he employed in these 
articles. 
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21. These materials are procured by Sacks from Children Tell Stories 
by Evelyn G. Pitcher and Ernst Prelinger, New York: International 
Universities Press, 1963. 
2 2. Cf. The Category relevance rule 1. 1. 4. and i. 1. 4. 1. (Sacks, 19 7 2) . 
23. It is perhaps worth considering whether Sacks's use of concepts 
like 'general', 'formal' and 'predictive' have helped some 
critics to conclude that the perspective is essentially positivist 
in character. 
24. Sacks's use of the concept of culture in this article is 
noteworthy (see especially 1974, p. 218). He says that his 
observations give some sense 'right off, of the fine power of a 
culture'. Moreover, culture does not 'merely fill brains in 
roughly the same way, it fills them so they are alike in fine 
detail'. Evidence for this is that we (native speakers) all 
hear the sentences as Sacks describes, which means 'that we are 
dealing with something finely powerful'. 
In his writings, the concept also possesses a deliberate vagueness 
of reference (e.g. a national culture; a convict culture) and 
implicit in that vagueness there is, of course, the importance 
of a sociological dimension to the understanding of language 
mastery, so long as that dimension avoids broad sociological 
generalizations. For a discussion of cross-cultural validity 
of the analysis, see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974, p. 700, 
footnote 10. 
25. As the last chapter has shown, such a fetter is intrinsic to the 
governance of the speech act rules. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DESCRIBING THE MASTERY OF LANGUAGE AND MEMBERSHIP OF SOCIETY: THE 
REFLEXIVITY OF RULES 
I. Conceptions of Rules and the Character of Analysis 
At the end of the last chapter, I spoke of two conceptions of 
rule-following and language mastery described in the first two chapters 
of this thesis. When I first said to someone that this is what had 
been portrayed, he asked: 'Is it really two conceptions of rule-
following, or simply two conceptions of the place of rules in analysis?' 
This question bothered me because it seemed to be saying that the 
distinction that I had drawn between the analytic programmes of Searle, 
and Sacks and Garfinkel, had given rise to the idea that there were 
different kinds of rule. Plainly, rules come in lots of different 
guises. Searle marks what he feels to be a rather basic distinction 
between rules which constitute activities and rules which regulate 
pre-existing (i.e. already constituted) activities (see Chapter One). 
But he is quick to point out in Speech Acts that distinctions in the 
modality of rules cannot supplant a comprehensive analysis of rule 
following when he considers the two-way translatability of regulative 
into constitutive rules (see Searle, 1969, Chapter 2, section 5). 
This leads him to conclude that: 
... since constitutive rules come in systems, it may 
be the whole system which exemplifies this form (of 
rule) and not individual rules within the system. 
(Searle, 1969, p. 36) 
He is not alone in this view. Max Black (1962) issues warnings 
against elevating the distinction into a metaphysical difference and 
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Warnock (1971, pp. 37-9) concurs, although he mistakenly considers 
Searle himself to be guilty of helping to sustain the myth that there 
are 'two sorts of rules', instead of two ways of formulating them. 
What concerned me abont the question was whether I had succeeded 
in portraying the modifier's 'governance' and 'orientation' in such a 
way they represented two different kinds of rule. If I had, then 
clearly I had fallen into a trap successfully avoided by all those 
whose work I was commenting upon, and, moreover, would be relying upon 
a conception of rules which had been the focus of weighty philosophical 
criticism. In addition, had this in fact happened, the problem was not 
going to be confined to the issue of the modality of rules in analysis. 
I would then also have succeeded in transforming the differences 
between the analysis of language mastery and social action offered by 
Searle, Garfinkel and Sacks into a metaphysical gulf between two sorts 
of analysis which replicated the idea of there being two sorts of 
rules. Thus, what my questioner was driving at was clear. An 
elaboration of his question might go something like this: 'You have 
been stressing throughout this thesis the practical qualities of 
analytic activity ..• how it must be seen as another member's 
accomplishment for all practical purposes. Yet, in order to do this, 
it would appear that the concepts you employ and the analytic 
attitude you adopt is of a different kind than the practical activities 
of linguistic and social life which form the topic of your analysis'. 
In other words, was it the case that in order to get a clear view 
of members' practices, I .had tacitly elevated the members' practice of 
gaining that view above those other practices? Where Searle elevated 
some utterances into paradigmatic speech acts in order to make his 
theory work, had I merely managed to portray the analysis offered by 
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Garfinkel and Sacks in as privileged and reified a fashion? If that 
was the case, then one immediate consequence would be that the concept 
of reflexivity would be effectively nullified by what I had done. 
The first thing needed was a clearer picture of the nature of the 
problem. It was apparent straight away that it bore affinities with 
the issue discussed at the end of Chapter Two, viz. the question of 
the reconcilability of the positive character of conversation analysis 
research with the reflexive conception of analysis apparent in 
Garfinkel's writings. I argued that these inquiries form one 
perspective (an argument which will be closely examined in Section IV 
below) . Perhaps any problem with my portrayal of rules had its 
foundation in trying to make that argument out. 
II. Theorizing and Positivism 
In order to come to terms with these issues, it is worthwhile 
re-examining speech act theory and comparing it with the understanding 
of theorizing that is found in the work of Blum. (l) Blum has also 
criticized ethnomethodological and conversation analytic practitioners 
for the positivism inherent in their researches. Therefore, such a 
comparison will help to illuminate the nature of these issues and, 
given Searle's philosophic credentials, also, perhaps, clarify some 
ways the word positivism has been used. As noted in Chapter One, the 
tenor of Searle's theory is exemplified in his marginalization of the 
problems that surround converting 'knowing how' into 'knowing that', 
when explaining language mastery. He takes this view even though he 
is critical of the idea that the only option is to ignore questions 
about the relationship between explanans and explanandum. The basis 
of his criticism is that this leaves prediction to signify the 
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warrantability and correctness of theory. That he considers an 
insufficiently firm epistemological foundation in the philosophy of 
natural science: for speech act theory the concept is simply 
inappropriate, Nevertheless, Searle makes it clear that he ls not 
going to depart very far from scientific method in the construction 
. (2) 
and use of h~s theory. 
All the same, there is a clear recognition in Searle's work that 
the presuppositions of a positivist view of knowledge simply will not 
square with the epistemological character of actual language use. 
Rules are not fit subjects for verifying operations and therefore 
cannot be tested in at all the same way that a putative law in the 
natural sciences can. This, in turn, means that the (alternative) 
criterion of falsifiability in the formulation of scientific knowledge 
is inappropriate too, since the concept is categorically incompatible 
with rules, as rules are neither true nor false but simply followed 
or abrogated. Neither will it do to attempt to sidestep that point 
by acknowledging that while the logical character of a rule may 
preclude its being true or false strictu sensu, the point of the 
criterion is to be a safeguard of scientific knowledge, and it can be 
ascertained whether a candidate rule may yet be (truly) followed by 
(3) language masters or not. That is either merely a truism or 
eventuates in the claim that analysis can be replaced by a head-counting 
empiricism. 
In this way Searle repudiates any alliance of his work with the 
positivist tradition as understood in the philosophy of science. 
However, that, as we have seen, still allows him to retain the degree 
of determinacy found in speech act theory, which for Searle marks 
the requisite degree of theoretical closure and explanatory adequacy. 
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In consequence, the indexical and reflexive features that accompany 
the explanation of language mastery are 'bracketed' for analytic 
purposes as the deep but, he believes, irrelevant puzzle that surrounds 
converting 'knowing how' into 'knowing that'. However, if one looks 
to the construal of positivism offered by Alan Blum, his collaborators 
and those inspired by their writings, it is obvious that Searle's work 
falls squarely within its boundaries. One of the clearest expositions 
of the meaning of positivism appears in a paper on bias in social 
research. In the introduction to the volume which contains the paper, 
the authors say: 
Analy,sis depends on that which enables it to be done 
in any case, not on the contingent description which, 
as product, serves to obscure its origins. Analysis 
for us is generative. It is not finding something in 
the world ... making sense of some puzzling datum ... 
or locating a phenomenon worthy of study ... To analyse 
is instead to address the possibility of any finding, 
puzzle, sense, resolution, interest, location, phenomenon, 
etcetera, etcetera. Analysis is the concern not with 
anything said or written but with the grounds of whatever 
is said - the foundations that make what is said possible, 
sensible, conceivable. For any speech, including of course 
speech about speech, our interest is reflexive •.. To 
analyse the subject of research bias, for example, we 
do not identify instances or propose remedies. Instead, 
we try to show the deep auspices - positivism in this 
case - which makes sensible any actual charge of bias 
or any urge to remedy it ... So an interest in analysis 
is an interest in auspices. 
(Blum, McHugh, Raffel & Foss, 1974, 
pp. 2 & 3) 
On a cursory examination, it might appear that Searle shared the same 
kind of analytic interest. He says in Speech Acts that his concern is 
to elicit the conditions of possibility of any speech. But Blum et al. 
make clear a few pages later that the task Searle sets himself to 
reveal those conditions is not what they have in mind at all. 
If our format ... represents our version of rational 
discourse, then we must say that, as we conceive of 
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theorizing, the theorist cannot produce a set of 
standard rules which, if followed, will lead to 
actual discourse that is rational ... To commit 
oneself to programming the real world is to give 
up on theorizing. 
( -Lbi a., p. 7) 
The reason that by so doing one gives up theorizing, is that 
such a project conceals the grounds which makes it possible. In this 
act of concealment, such analysis also co~etizes its own nature as 
a linguistic achievement. Thus, instead of focusing on its own 
accomplished character an analysis like Searle's seeks to portray 
others' speech as the product of its own speaking. Latterly, Blum and 
McHugh have termed this 'Empire-icism'; a desire to rule the world of 
discourse by stipulating what a proper sentence can be. (4 ) The 
essence of their recommendation for analysis can perhaps be put this 
way. To say, as a description of their conception, that language 
exists by virtue of what people do with it would not properly express 
their view. That description still retains a separation between 
persons and language which according to them supplies the underlying 
rationale for a positivist epistemology and methodology. Rather, 
language is persons doing, which is why analysis can only properly be 
concerned with uncovering its own auspices. 
It is clear that this conception of language and theorizing 
closely resembles Garfinkel and Sacks's conception of membership. 
They record the 'great influence of the writings of Garfinkel', but 
then go on to say, 'though this influence has not worked itself out 
in our thinking in the ways it has in his students' (ibid., p. 22). 
Given the emphasis on a reflexive conception of analysis in both 
types of inquiry, the pressing question is whether the analytic 
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focus of Blum et al. and Garfinkel's 'students' can be reconciled 
with each other. It appears that they can not. 
Ethnomethodolog~ as it is practiced by these students, 
not only fails to supply our programme with its 
rationale but denies that rationale at critical 
analytic points. Ethnomethodology seeks to 'rigorously 
describe' ordinary usage, and despite its significant 
transformation of standards for conceiving of and 
describing such usage, it still conducts its inquiries 
under the auspices of a concrete, positivistic 
conception of adequacy. 
(ibid., p. 22) 
So, not only is Searle's work a clear exemplar of positivism, but 
also the work of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts 
described in the previous chapter. The distinctions which have been 
made between the programmes of inquiry are acknowledged to be there 
(viz. the 'significant transformation of standards ... '), but for 
Blum and his collaborators the perspective is as positivist as 
Searle's and irredeemably so. 
It is undeniable that this critique is powerful. It is so 
precisely because of what ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
say about membership; stressing the indexical and reflexive features 
of language use, the unfinished, wait and see, collaborative quality 
of communication, whether such speech is 'analytic' or 'everyday'. 
It is as though Garfinkel, Sacks and their students had caught a 
glimpse of the true nature of language mastery and its consequences 
for analysis and then backed off and returned to the familiar 
well-trodden paths of positivism. But there is another aspect of 
this power which becomes manifest in the conception of language which 
their analytic endeavour promotes. Consider first the reply that 
they suppose followers of Garfinkel and Sacks would make to their 
proposals: 
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... ethnomethodologistis would regard our task in this 
paper as a stipulative exercise in legislating the use 
of a 'concept', while we would treat such an objection 
as a failure of analytic nerve, as the typical positivist 
gambit (which goes back at least as far as Protaooras :, of 
refusing to exercise analytic authority, despite the fact 
that ~uch authority grounds their entire enterprise with 
its intelligibility. 
(ibid. 1 p. 23) 
It is a peculiar supposition and all the more so for those who, we 
have just been told, are interested in 'rigorous description', since 
it would be a very careless reading of Blum et al. 's paper on 'Motive' 
to see it as legislative at all. In fact 1 such a reading is really 
quite impossible to maintain in the light of an addendum to the paper, 
written some time after its original publication. There we are told, 
that in the light of 'our current analytic interests', it cannot be 
seen as a paper about motives since it 'is really about sociology'. 
So, if it ever was the case that such a reading was possible, then it 
is a mark of the 'obsolescence' of the paper reviewed from their 
current interests; that is as if it were something like an unintended 
consequence of 'the organization of that paper as a substituting or 
correcting operation' (ibid., p. 43). 
Seemingly then, what Blum and his collaborators are prepared to 
concede is that if ethnomethodology and conversation analysts were to 
read the paper as they surmise (i.e. as an attempt to 'legislate'), 
that may have something to do with the way the paper had originally 
been conceived and organised. But if these presumed ethnomethodological 
criticisms of the paper may have their roots in the paper's own attempt 
to act as 'a substituting and correcting operation', it is abundantly 
clear that the later position adopted by Blum et al. has even less in 
common with the perspective. The reader is told: 
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Our analysis of motive today would provide for the 
enigmatic world which would produce a concern with 
motive as an interesting problem. In that world, for 
example, the analytic segregation of the grounds of 
clarity (method) creates a preoccupation with method 
in itself (in rule) as the Good. In that world, the 
source of any ascription or attribution is only 
methodic, however, and in the absence of language, 
it ignores (fails to recognise) the solution that is 
sought. Any interest in the actual success of 
collecting, or in the criterion that one is able to 
accor~lish collecting, or in the artfulness of 
collecting, shows itself in the treatment of method 
and rule as the Good. This can be seen clearly in 
our own speech about motive which terminates in its 
formulation of parameters such as rule. In contrast, 
we are currently interested in grounds of clarity or 
language as they become disclosed through any method 
or speech, whereas these grounds themselves are not 
the end (as if a determinant solution) but the 
beginning which authorizes the very problem of motive, 
or method, or whatever. Thus, our interest is not in 
a solution because the solution is not an end, only 
representing or showing the interest and commitment 
to language, and consequently the end is what is 
displayed in such a showing. 
(ibid., pp. 45 & 46) 
The research commitment of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
is taken to be another instance of an analytic concern which is 
foreshortened by the 'formulation of parameters such as rule'. In 
finding 'solutions' for its problems, the perspective inevitably 
concretizes the display of membership used to formulate the analysis 
in the first place. In other words, 'what is displayed in such a 
showing', in the activity of theorizing, is transmuted into the 
product of rules and devices which the analysis unearths. In this 
way, the grounds of analytic activity are themselves covered over in 
the search for, and the portrayal of, members' methods. 
This very inclusive notion of positivism, which covers any form 
of inquiry not concerned with its own grounds in the manner specified 
by these analysts, is described by Blum in terms of the alienation of 
speech from reason. 
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'I'he question of speech's Real value as a way of making 
reference to its relationship to Reason is silenced 
and the security of speaking is posited as a common 
position from which we will begin to speak and listen. 
Speaking is then subjected to some general notion of 
the method for its production because it is only such 
a notion that unifies the speaking that is produced by 
separable, different speakers. 'I'he value of a 
commodity is measured in terms of the methods which 
enter its production. Speaking has value insofar as 
it is methodically produced ... Members who act to 
make their activities observable and reportable are 
members who orient to their speaking as commodities 
Marx's description ... typifies the alienation to which 
speech falls heir. Marx's metaphor helps us to see the 
instabilities of a rational-legal ideal of speaking 
which drives to unify differences under rules of method 
developed from an image of commonality ... In this 
sense, the modernization of thought exemplified in the 
rise of sociology represents the way in which thinking 
has become alienated from Being ... 
(Blum, 1974, pp. 259-262) 
'I'he communal use of language which they say their analysis uncovers 
is alienated from speakers via the positivistic delineation of 'rules 
of method'. What they term a positivist idea of society is then 
created by this form of alienated theorizing, manifesting itself in 
the discipline of sociology (including ethnomethodology) with its 
'rational-legal idea of speaking'. 'I'he discipline does not really 
inquire into the world made by the community of speakers but instead 
creates an image of various possible societies generated as grammatical 
consequences of the laws, rules, practices, devices, etcetera, which 
the discipline formulates. 
Clearly, for Blum, the problem of tacitly elevating the analysts's 
methods over and above those of the ordinary member, is an inevitable 
consequence of conducting research in terms of formulating rules, 
specifying conversational mechanisms and so forth. Such analytic 
activity, for Blum and his colleagues, is necessarily positivist and 
it is therefore no surprise that a perspective which is prepared to 
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concede that all analytic frameworks ~reflexive phenomena encounters 
difficulties in reconciling that insight with the positive character 
of its own findings. From his viewpoint, such tension merely 
signifies another manifestation of Ll1e unease Searle admits about 
converting 'knowing how' into 'knowing that'. For these analysts, 
the work of Garfinkel's students and, no doubt, the work of conversation 
analysts in particular, does effectively nullify the reflexivity of 
social inquiry. 
In fact, in their view, the current practices of ethnomethodologists 
and conversation analysts really amount to a more pernicious 
misrepresentation of membership than mainstream (positivist) 
sociological research. The reason for this is that the apparent 
reconciliation of the reflexivity of analysis with the conduct of 
empirical social research makes it look as if they have overcome the 
problems of positivistic social science altogether. In other words, 
whereas the inattention to the reflexivity of analysis in mainstream 
research is a mark of its positivist grounds, Garfinkel's students 
recognise that reflexivity, but only conceal its import with a more 
sophisticated variant of positivist method. Consequently, rather than 
revealing the 'auspices' of their analysis, they are in fact guilty 
of a deliberate, or at least seriously misguided, attempt to cover 
them up. 
As noted earlier, a significant element of the power of this 
critique derives from the conception of language on which Blum's view 
of analysis rests. As we have seen, that conception, expressed simply, 
is that language is what persons do. It is taken to follow from this 
that to explicate this 'doing' in terms of rules or mechanisms 
inevitably involves obscuring the actual grounds of lAnguage. The 
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reason Blum discusses this 'obscuring' in terms of alienation can, 
in part, be discerned from the personal sense of commitment required 
by the form of analysis he proposes. Analysis requires personal 
involvement because th2 doing of language is the uio;-covery, indeed 
the creation of community and society by the particular member. This, 
the essence of our faculty of langauge, is what is concealed in the 
'drive to unify differences under rules of method developed from an 
image of commonality'. Employing Marx's analysis of capitalism, Blum 
sets out to show how the use value of linguistic activity is transformed 
into the exchange value of professional inquiry. Blum further explores 
the resulting idea of language as commodity in these words: 
The image of the material powers of production is an 
image of a collection of individual speakers ... each 
orienting to what is present to one as a possession. 
Under such conditions, speech becomes valuable only 
when it is seen as a transformation of many possessions 
into what is commonly possessed. Valuable speech then 
becomes speech which can be expressed in terms of 
general conditions for the production of speech, and 
the notion of commodity personifies the locus of such 
values. For example, commodity acquires value only 
through exchanges, and the valid exchange values of a 
given commodity express something equal because for 
two commodities (two speeches) to have an equivalent 
exchange value, there must exist in equal quantities 
something common to both, i.e. the two speeches must 
be equal to a third which in itself is neither one 
nor the other. Exchange value presupposes some 
standard which is external to the two commodities 
as two speeches. 
(Blum, 1974, p. 260) 
This is to be contrasted with the doing of language which reveals the 
commitment of the individual speaker to the community of speakers. 
Blum says: 
The kind of labouring in which Marx is interested is a 
re-creating; through his labour man makes reference to 
his commitment by 'calling to mind', by re-constituting 
it, and by evoking it. To say that men relate through 
their labour is then to say that men relate through 
their commitments. This is what speaking means in the 
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strongest sense ... to say. Through speaking, men say 
and what they say is that they are men. The situation 
of theorizing is itself a speaking situation. Men speak 
in order to maximise the salience of commitments which 
provide for the intelligible character of speaking. It 
is only through such making reference that men speak with 
value, i.e. rationally; men who orient to their speaking 
as commodity accept the security of commitment as a posit 
- a common position - and protect this position from 
being explored while simultaneously employing it as a 
resource to do speaking which merely strengthens the 
unassailability of the position ... This is why the 
rational legal interest is essentially conservative:; 
it seeks to conserve the authority created by its own 
rule, the authority of its common-speaking starting 
point. 
(ibid., pp. 263-4) 
If Blum is correct, this means that the form of analysis 
described in Chapter Two simply recapitulates the analytical problems 
of Searle's theory described in Chapter One. If analysis does not 
exemplify the 're-constituting commitment' as described by Blum, then 
it cannot but endorse the tacit conservativism and authoritativeness 
of positivism. 
III. Systematic Anal~sis and Reflexivity: Their Compatibility 
Outlined 
The aim of the rest of this chapter is to argue that a reflexive 
conception of analysis is compatible with the kind of research discussed 
in Chapter Two. In fact, my claim is that the reflexivity of analysis 
is better understood in the writings of ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts than in the programme of work Blum advocates. 
The fundamental reason for this is that the conception of language 
underlying their perspective is of an endless multiplicity of activities 
or 'games', in the sense that word is used in the later philosophy of 
Wittgenstein. As noted at the end of the last chapter, Wittgenstein's 
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philosophy will be explored in this Chapter in order to secure a 
philosophical footing for the research practices of ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis. 
The nature of the argument can b~ lJriefly stated in this way. 
For Blum, the 'doings' of a particular member ground the possibility 
of language and thereby provide the source of any analyst's authority 
to talk. This is why any analysis must seek to uncover its own 
auspices. Garfinkel and Sacks see members' doings as the collective 
work of making the world sensible and rational for the particular 
purposes at hand and that, as we have seen, includes the analytic 
purposes of social inquiry. Consequently, reflexive understanding is 
not seen as the product of theorists' collaborations, but rather 
viewed as endemic to members' doings generally. But in saying that, 
it is important not to misconstrue the conception of language in 
Blum's work. It would be easy, but mistaken, to view Blum's 
understanding of language as having its source in the particular 
member, as if he or she authored their linguistic practice in 
isolation. Blum's arguments contain no such solipsistic elements. 
His concern and criticism is directed at the apparently democratic 
conception of analysis in the writings of Garfinkel and Sacks, through 
their appeal to the collaborative nature of members' practice. This, 
for Blum, merely conceals the authorship, authority and partiality 
of the investigator behind the fact that language is a communal 
phenomenon. This misunderstanding is revealed in its true colours by 
the desire to produce a systematic analysis of membership, that is 
an image of society: 
... acting concertedly under the auspices of scientific 
rules (i.e. a democracy) Sociology becomes a 
metaphor for the rational-legal development of thought 
and sociological rationality becomes typified in the 
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reflexivity of the rational-legal agent - the 
typical, conventional scientific actor. 
(ibid • 1 p • 227) 
My response to this view can also be outJined briefly. I take u. 
reflexive conception of analysis to derive a large part of its point 
from the provision of systematic approaches to the study of social 
phenomena. It is a reminder that the apparent conclusiveness or 
explanatory adequacy of social scientific analysis is the product of 
the elections which the analyst makes with respect to his or her data. 
Social scientific findings are inherently perspectival because the work 
of the analyst in assembling his or her 'results', is another instance 
of the 'sense assembly' which members undertake to produce the social 
world in their everyday activities. As Searle's work shows, a 
systematic analysis can marginalize the concern with how analytic 
practice is a methodic recapitulation of the phenomena studied (viz. 
the problem of converting knowing how into knowing that) . But this is 
not an inevitable outcome of systematic rule analysis. 
Hence, the reflexivity of analysis as it is understood in this 
thesis is directed at that kind of marginalization of the problem; the 
rationalism of which Blum speaks. But that conception is no more at 
home with the reflexive analysis Blum and his collaborators wish to 
pursue, because in this thesis the reflexivity of analysis is understood 
as having an object, and that object is the work of assembling a 
systematic analysis of social phenomena in terms of rules. In other 
words, a reflexive understanding of analysis is necessarily parasitic, 
as the work of Blum and his collaborators in fact shows. 
However, it cannot be denied that my argument has its difficulties. 
One which immediately springs to mind, given the reliance I place upon 
the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, is the fact that his later 
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philosophy is profoundly unsystematic. So, some way has to be found 
to reconcile that fact with my understanding of reflexivity. In 
addition, 'reflexivity' is not a word that has a currency in the later 
philosophy at all, and there is something to say for the view that the 
concept is alien to the deliberately pedestrian approach he takes to 
philosophical problems. In essence, my response to this is to say 
that reflexivity must be looked at in a mundane fashion, in the way 
I have just outlined. 
The next section sets out to make the beginnings of that 
reconciliation between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and the 
conception of reflexive analysis offered in this thesis, by considering 
a paper which argues that the indexical and reflexive conception of 
analysis in Garfinkel's work ought to be divorced from the systematic 
analysis of membership offered by Sacks and other conversation analysts. 
This paper argues that such a divorce would be compatible with the 
later philosophy of Wittgenstein because Garfinkel's ideas are so close 
to the solipsism which the later philosophy criticizes. In other words, 
the paper argues more or less the opposite of the position taken here. 
Apart from suggesting that the view of Wittgenstein taken in that paper 
is wrong, and in particular what is said about Wittgenstein's 
understanding of rules, I shall also suggest that its conception of 
analysis exemplifies the sort of work which is the object of Blum's 
criticisms. A consideration of these arguments overall will provide 
the basis for my view of the compatibility of Garfinkel and Sacks's 
work with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
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IV. A Revised Rule Determinism 
In his paper, Some Problems in Locating Practices, John Phillips 
concludes: 
A recognition of the actual methodologies of 
conversation analysis, at present disguised beneath 
layers of quasi-philosophy based in 'indexicality', 
could lead to its facing problems that at the moment 
it skirts around, particularly the perspicuous 
representation of the rules for action outside and 
underlying those which may be read in 'short texts', 
including the manner of the layering and embedding 
of actual courses of action. 
(Phillips, 1978, p. 72) 
'Short texts' is an oblique way of referring to the preoccupation 
with specific instances of social interaction reproduced in the form 
of transcripts. Phillips says that the potential of the rules and 
devices which have been elaborated by conversation analysts to 
determinately explain the possibility of linguistic competence, is 
frustrated by an unwillingness to depart from the indexical conception 
of language propounded by Garfinkel. In looking at the discipline, 
Phillips is confronted by what he sees as the irony of studies which 
find and formulate the rules which govern language mastery, but whose 
intellectual commitments, or perhaps more accurately debts, undermine 
its further development. The argument is clear: if conversation 
analysis will dispense with the preoccupation of ethnomethodology as 
understood by Garfinkel, its aim, to document the wherewithal of 
competent membership, will be realized. 
In order to convince conversation analysts that Garfinkel's 
analysis is a fetter, not a .cesource, Phillips sets out to show the 
incoherence of an indexical conception of rule and language. Aware 
of the empirical inclinations of his target audience, he suggests that 
the discipline is currently working with two conceptions of 'practice', 
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... one theoretically specified, another much 
more broad and inclusive, demonstrated in 
empirical studies. 
(ibid. 1 P• 60) 
The theoretical specification, it is not surprising to learn, belongs 
to Garfinkel and arises from his deliberately articulated 'gulf' 
between ethnomethodology and orthodox sociology, together with 'the 
study of related "practices" in other disciplines' (i.e. rule-governed 
semantics) . This self-imposed divorce, we are told, is the result of 
Garfinkel's conception of meaning which rests upon an 
... appeal to 'experience' as the basis for the 
present 'meaningful interpretation' of a situation 
of symbol. 
(ibid., p. 56) 
Experience must refer to the consciousness of a knowing subject and 
this provides the rationale for asserting that: 
The notion of 'indexicality' ... demonstrates 
immediately the connection between a focus on 
the 'subjective' and an interest in language. 
(ibid.) 
He then argues, noting the order or rationality of an event as 
understood by Garfinkel consists in the substitution of objective for 
indexical expressions, that this picture of meaning is consistent with 
th h 1 . 1 . f . b. t. . f. t. (S) e p enomeno oglca notlon o lntersu Jec lve typl lCa lon. 
According to Phillips, phenomenology begins with a concept of 
meaning that resides in the unique experience of an individual ego 
(subjective consciousness) that is brought to common consciousness 
through a process of typifying reality in concert with a subject's 
peers. The processual character of this enterprise replicates in its 
particulars the finding or constructing of an order and meaning which 
members have to undertake in the repair of indexicality. Both 
phenomenologists and Garfinkel, 
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... imply the identity of 'member' and 'theorist' 
engaged in the same kinds of investigation. 
Garfinkel deepens and clarifies this identification, 
stressing that investigation and theorizing are to 
be located in normal 'talk' about everyday events. 
Social 'order' or 'structure' is a reflexive 
consequence of the investigation and theo:Lizilly 
that are thus located. 
(ibid., pp. 56-7) 
Despite this questionable affiliation of Garfinkel's work with the 
views of phenomenologists, something which Phillips 'proposes to 
neglect' anyway, the last quotation does represent what Heritage 
calls 'a fair and perspicuous representation of the Garfinkelian 
position'. (Heritage, 1978, p. 80). However, this affliation between 
indexicality and subjectivism is in fact immediately attenuated by 
Phillips in his recognition that the two cannot simply be regarded as 
identical, if by the latter concept one indicates a logical or 
existential commitment to a mental or material event that is prior to 
1 . d d t f . ( 6 ) anguage or ln epen en o lt. So, as soon as he has made it, 
Phillips loosens the tie between Garfinkel and any such phenomenological 
conception of meaning, and in a footnote acknowledges that many 
ethnomethodologists have explicitly repudiated such subjectivism. 
Nevertheless, he still feels he can say: 
I am proposing only that in his use of 'indexicality' 
Garfinkel seeks to achieve a representation of the 
acute variability of perspective with experience 
which in others is straightforwardly a matter of 
'subjective variation', without losing an observable 
world of data. 
(ibid., p. 73, note 5) 
This apparent equivocation on the issue of the relationship 
between subjectivism and indexicality, and, more generally, Garfinkel's 
affinities with the phenomenological tradition, in fact conceals a 
clever strategy. By illuminating these apparent similarities, Phillips 
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endeavours to make indexicality and rule mutually incompatible concepts, 
and at the same time secure the rationale for re-assigning the 'subject' 
as a rule possessing entity. In this way, the concept of subjectivity 
loses the mentalistic or empiricist overtones that it has been given 
and thereby allows Phillips to restructure the concept as the locus 
(or Kantian faculty) of the rules which govern language and interaction. 
In consequence, an actor's competence is construable as the upshot of 
underlying rules and so it follows that: 
The idea of 'practice' and 'practical activity' 
are in essence typified, recurrent forms of 'social 
intercourse' with linguistic usages necessarily 
embedded in them and making them possible. Each 
device makes possible a 'social function' or the 
fulfilment of a social task. 
Phillips's rules, then, are not simply given or innate, but have to be 
learned through 'recurrent' social activities. This reconstructs the 
phenomenological concept of intersubjective typification as a process 
of acquiring and internalizing the structure of rules that comprise a 
common culture, allowing, in effect, the logic of rule governance to 
be fully consistent with a sociological emphasis on their procurement. 
Such a reconstruction is taken by Phillips to render superfluous the 
need for a concept like indexicality which is really no more than a 
counterweight to the over-determined character of some forms of rule 
analysis. 
In other words, the concept of indexicality and its use by 
ethnomethodologists merely betokens a mistaken response to the 
determinacy of rule formulations. Instead of the irredeemable 
vagueness of meaning which accompanies every expression if Garfinkel's 
analysis is adopted, Phillips says he is proposing a conception of 
rules and their use which preserves the clarity and explanatory 
efficacy of rule-governed formulations, whilst avoiding their robotic 
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determinacy for actual speech practice. And, given that practical 
activity is the foundation for knowledge of, and the capacity to use, 
rules, Phillips also considers that he rids the concept of rule-
governance of ;omy dubious metaphysical suppositions abou L how S.f:.>eakers 
know what the speech community's rules are, or how to use them. In 
saying that words have situated meanings which must be found by members 
on every occasion of their use, Garfinkel is taken to be robbing words 
of their sense, which in turn denies the possibility of applying any 
rule. The concepts of rule and indexicality are simply incompatible, 
and as a result there are good grounds for suggesting that Garfinkel's 
analysis is, in fact, internally incoherent. 
Phillips regards his construal of the notion of rule-governance as 
enabling him to demonstrate the way in which Garfinkel's concept of 
. d . l" I • b I ( 7 ) • f h t l ln exlca lty lS a camera o scura representatlon o t e ac ua 
relation between rule and language. The vehicle for this demonstration 
is the identity between ordinary and theoretic members which, as we 
have seen, Phillips accepts is 'an accurate view'. But, according to 
Phillips, Garfinkel is mistaken in taking 'the professionals' problems 
as enlightening as to the nature of the members' problems'. Rather, 
this idea needs to be inverted: seeing, 
the members' problems as enlightening as to 
the nature of the professional's problems. That 
is, one might look at the special features of 
human social life and the problems that arise 
for those living it, and then assess the problems 
of professional sociology from that perspective. 
(ibid.' p. 71) 
In other words, the concept of indexicality does not really describe a 
feature of ordinary membership, but rather something which is made 
available through the opportunity for theoretical speculation. 
Extending the Marxian analogy, Garfinkel may be compared to the idealist 
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philosophers Marx criticized, whose speculations on the relation 
between man and man were informed by ethical or metaphysical ideas 
rather than a perception of man's concrete and material relations with 
his fellows. Thus Phillips's 'inve::csiun' amounts to saying that if 
the practices of members are understood as governed by rules, then the 
permanent availability of alternative characterizations, instead of 
being understood indexically, can be seen to be facilitated by: 
... finite and definite mechanisms which are 
themselves both context-free and yet responsive 
to context 
(ibid., p. 73) 
Phillips's suggestion that Garfinkel attempts to make theoretical 
procedures explanatory of ordinary social competence is difficult to 
sustain in the light of what Garfinkel actually says in Studies and 
elsewhere. Given his interpretation of Garfinkel's work, it is 
significant that whereas Phillips is concerned to establish the 
contradictory status of concepts such as 'rule' and 'indexicality', 
Garfinkel never employs his analysis in this fashion. That is, he never 
attempts to assert that an indexical understanding of language use 
denies meaning to general or even universal concepts. However, Phillips 
argues that it is a necessary implication of Garfinkel's argument that 
the meaning and sense of these concepts is rendered indefinitely 
problematic. Yet this implication is never detectable in Garfinkel's 
work, where he displays the artfulness of members' use of these terms, 
not their puzzlement at being confronted with a pervasive semantic 
indeterminacy. Thus, when Phillips complains that Garfinkel denies: 
the successful use or understanding of a term, 
could happen 'by rule' or any mechanical recognition 
procedure ... 
(ibid., p. 58) 
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it is not the practices of ordinary speakers which warrant this 
observation. Rather, it is the claims of philosophers, linguists and 
sociologists which supply the sense of this complaint via their 
interest in determining the conditions of possibility for language use 
and social action. As Garfinkel says, the indexicality of language is 
not a problem for ordinary members. But it is an obstinate nuisance 
for theorists whose analytic framewo~ks require a language which will 
afford the degree of determinacy required by their explantory criteria. 
Therefore, if a choice is to be made regarding whose ideas appear 
upside down by reference to ordinary members' practices (i.e. as if in 
a camera obscura), then it is not difficult to see that Garfinkel's 
perspective is in fact more remote from this charge than Phillips's 
own claims. 
Consequently, when Phillips's own inversion of Garfinkel's 
understanding of the relationship between 'professionals' and 'ordinary' 
members' practices is put the right way round again, the claim that the 
concepts of rule and indexicality are incompatible loses its force. 
Phillips seems to anticipate this discovery about his argument and he 
responds to it in two ways. His first stratagem is to offer a 
consideration of analysts' work which would make their findings 
compatible with his perspective. Of the studies he considers, e.g. 
Sudnow (1967), Schegloff (1972), the interpretation offered of 
Zimmerman's (1971) paper is the most detailed and important. 
Zimmerman shows that the 'sense' of a formal rule 
is discovered only over the course of applying it. 
Thus, in the welfare agency he studies, the rule: 
cases are to be handled in strict order of arrival, 
is 'broken' in numerous instances. Members in the 
course of applying it, find that it exists to 
maintain orderly processing of applicants through 
the office. Hence, to skip a case, in particular 
difficulties, may be justified in terms of a 
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broader purpose. He insists that to see some rule 
as applied by reference to some further set of 
rules ducks the issue of 'judgemental processes'. 
(ibid., p. 60) 
However, according to Phillips, what Zimmerman documents as judgemental 
processes involved in the practicalities of rule use is the 'involvement' 
in the application of formal rules of a wider, more inclusive set of 
rules. Although he does not demonstrate this view by reference to 
Zimmerman's materials, there is no difficulty in principle with making 
such processes the outcome of applying other rules. The latter's 
comments about 'ducking the issue' makes that clear. So really, this 
first reponse does not go deep enough; merely offering the 'alternative' 
to Garfinkel's conception rather than demonstrating its coherence and 
explanatory effectiveness. 
This demonstration is the task set for his second response which 
we are told will be achieved by critically comparing the indexical 
conception of language with 'certain arguments, in recent philosophy 
of language' (ibid., p. 61). Given his equivocation over the actual 
extent of the affiliation between Garfinkel's ideas about subjectivity 
and those of the phenomenologists, it transpires that the tools of 
analytic philosophy are going to be used to demonstrate an implicit 
link in the absence of clear substantive evidence. Thus, whatever 
practitioners, including Garfinkel, may say about the relationship 
between ethnomethodology and phenomenology, Phillips argues that there 
is a philosphical continuity between the thesis of indexicality and 
the view that the foundation of meaning resides in the unique experience 
of the individual ego. The philosopher whose work provides the chief 
resource for this demonstration is Wittgenstein, someone who was himself 
no stranger to drawing attention to hidden similarities in philosophical 
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antitheses. However, apart from that, and the authority of his work, 
there is an additional 'strategic' reason for Phillips's choice. This 
concerns the claim that there is a convergence between the conception 
of language mastery in Wittgenstein's later philosoplty and Garfinkel's 
work. The following quotation provides a very clear example. 
An awareness of indexical expressions occurs ... in 
the work of major authors. Consider, for example, 
Pierce and Wittgenstein, Pierce because he is usually 
cited to mark the beginning of the interest of modern 
logicians and linguists in indexicals, and Wittgenstein 
because his later studies are read to see that he is 
examining philosopher's talk as indexical phenomena, 
and is describing these phenomena without thought of 
remedy, his studies will be found to consist of a 
sustained, extensive and penetrating corpus of 
observations of indexical phenomena. 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 348) 
Phillips sees his task as showing that this convergence really amounts 
to nothing more than a 'superficial resemblance', and that a proper 
understanding of Wittgenstein's analysis of meaning and rule following 
in language use is consistent with the interpretation which Phillips 
has given to Zimmerman's study of rule use. 
We are told that the essence of this convergence claim, 
... rests on the notion that 'meanings' are 
essentially 'contexted', and not exhaustively 
or finitely specifiable 'in advance'. The rules 
which may be located in semantic usage cannot, in 
principle, specify that usage; for they remain to 
be applied. 
(Phillips, 1978, p. 61) 
Phillips adds that additional evidence for this view can be seen in 
Wittgenstein's own intellectual progress which, 
generally speaking ... was from a view of 
language as a 'calculus' to seeing the rules 
of language as necessarily embedded in the 
practical contexts that make up a way of living 
or a form of life. 
(ibid.) 
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He continues his characterization of Wittgenstein's ideas by saying 
that if the way a rule has been applied is questioned, then it may be 
possible to cite yet a further n1le to show how the first is to be 
interpreted. But he acknowledges that this process cannot continue 
indefinitely because there comes a point when the competent speaker 
will say that a particular way of proceeding simply is what the 
community of speakers do. (S) That appeal to comn1on practice is not 
open to justification by reference to some essential set of rules 
comprising the 'core' of language because the validity or justification 
of any such finding itself arises from within those practices. In fact, 
the uses of language are immensely varied and so the idea of a core set 
of rules resembles the mistaken attempt to find a single fibre running 
(9) 
through all linguistic usage. Phillips suggests that this 
misconception can be traced to the attempts to construct a reformed, 
logically constructed language, an aim which Wittgenstein shared in 
his early philosophical work. This aim, which would provide the 
philosophical footing for the precise formulation of propositions 
ignored the fact that: 
... precision and vagueness are relative to contexts 
and practice, and the reform of language is 
unnecessary, as well as generating acute and 
pervasive philosophical difficulties. 
(ibid.) 
The commitments displayed by Phillips in his reading of Wittgenstein 
make clear that his idea that Zimmerman's 'judgemental processes' can 
be recast in terms of rules, does not involve the claim that they 
comprise some essential 'core' of very general rules. The emphasis 
which Wittgenstein places on practice and usage indicates the social 
nature of language mastery, Language, says Phillips, is a public 
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phenomenon because it is the community which makes the application of 
rules and linguistic usage generally, 'natural' and 'obvious'. However, 
this is where the surface resemblance between Wittgenstein's philosophy 
and Garfinkel's indexical conception of language starts to break down, 
as a result of the latter's view that meaning and interaction are the 
outco~e of work. This work, the repair of indexicality, which Garfinkel 
says members do in communicating with one another, effectively dismisses 
Wittgenstein's hlea that within a community (a form of life) there are 
large areas of communication and interaction which are unambiguous 
and settled matters for members. The practical use of language does 
not involve a ceaseless overcoming of the 'situated uniqueness' of 
every expression, because if this was the case with language use, 
there would never be anything natural or obvious about it. Consequently, 
'practices' in Wittgenstein's sense of the term 
- whatever these might be - could not possibly be 
'methods', or 'methodical', or 'artful'. 
(ibid., p. 62) 
V. Garfinkel and Waismann's 'Open Texture' 
Phillips then backs up his attack on this convergence thesis by 
arguing that a real affinity of ideas can be found between Garfinkel's 
work and the writings of the linguistic philosopher Waismann. Although 
Waismann himself is generally regarded as a 'Wittgenstenian', this, 
Phillips argues, is a view which is no better thought out than the 
superficial resemblance of outlook between Garfinkel and Wittgenstein. 
In one of his most well known papers, Verifiability (1952), Waismann 
says that all linguistic terms have an open texture. The specific point 
of his argument is that empirical terms do not possess a boundary of 
application that makes them amenable to being determined by a rule. 
At one point he asks how we can know that a creature we are disposed 
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to call a 'cat', really is a cat. For example, would we still call 
it a cat if it began to speak Old Norse, or grew six feet tall? 
Phillips asks us to compare Waismann's questions to what Garfinkel 
refers to FIS t.he members' invariable problem of repairing the sense 
of the other's utterances. Garfinkel's member who can never be 
'certain in advance' of how sorne utterance will be regarded by others 
is taken to exemplify the views Waismann has about the perpetual 
indefiniteness that surrounds the application of the category 'cat' 
to a particular creature, 
Perhaps it would not be too much of an injustice 
to suggest that for Waismann, calling a cat a cat 
is achieved over unknown contingencies, always 
subject to the possibility that what it is is 
at the mercy of what it turns out to be - and 
so on. We call a cat a cat for all practical 
purposes, only and unavoidably. 
(Phillips, 1978, p. 63) 
The absence of a ruled determination for the application of a category, 
according to Phillips, entails that a member is always confronted by 
a dilemma about the meaning of terms (and utterances generally) . This 
irreparable 'vagueness' of meaning is, we are told, 'deeply 
consonant' with Garfinkel's indexical conception of members' practices 
because: 
If the ordered nature of social interaction rests 
on the categorizations and interpretations of 
members, as seems indubitable, then it now seems 
as if those categorizations and interpretations 
cannot, in principle, be the outcome of the 
unproblematic and direct application of 'rules': 
and ethnomethodology establishes its subject 
matter. 
(ibid.) 
Phillips's critique of Waismann is, in fact, based upon arguments 
first developed by Harrison, a philosopher who, we are told, endeavours 
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'to combine the insights of Wittgenstein and Chomsky' (ibid., p. 66). 
Phillips employs Harrison's analysis in order to distance his proposals 
for rule analysis from the theoretical requirements like that of 
'litcru.lness' as found in speech act theory, and yet show how the 
'acute variability of perspective' that can obtain between members 
in their linguistic activities is nevertheless the outcome of applying 
rules. Harrison's (1972) critique of Waismann is used by Phillips to 
unearth the presuppositions which he sees as underlying Garfinkel's 
understanding of membership. The most telling similarity for Phillips 
is built around Waismann's 'rule scepticism' and theories of language 
f d . . .. t h l ( 1 0) oun 1n emp1.r1c1s psyc o ogy. So, in essence, what Phillips 
sets out to do, given the difficulties of straightforwardly arguing 
that ethnomethodology has a subjectivist approach to meaning, is to 
elaborate and seek to justify the more damaging claim that it in 
fact tacitly rests upon an empiricist epistemology. 
Harrison explicates the link between rule scepticism and empricism 
by considering the characteristics of a favoured learning device in 
empiricist theories of language mastery viz. the abstraction of the 
common properties of a paradigm series. In this situation, the 
language learner has to decide if a potential member of the paradigm 
series resembles the already determined incumbents in just those 
respects in which they constitute a set. The problem is that each 
incumbent multiplies the possible criteria of membership, given the 
infinity of features which could provide the basis of a categorization 
( 11) 
for any collection of objects. For Phillips, this exhibits a 
clear parallel between the learner's problem in empiricist theory and 
the members' problem in ethnomethodology. Each faces: 
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... a problematic 'indexical' world where every new 
instance and next case raises an unspecified range 
of problems. 
(Phillips, 1978, p. 67) 
In other words, the language learner in empiricist theory confronts 
the same difficulties that beset Garfinkel's students in his 
conversation clarification experiment who, as we saw, in trying to 
resolve the possible ambiguities in their descriptions complained that: 
... writing itself developed the conversation as a 
branching texture of relevant matters. The very way 
of accomplishing the task multiplied its features. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 26) 
Continuing in his employment of Harrison's critique, Phillips then 
argues that the similarity between these conceptions of meaning is 
traceable to the elision of a distinction that must be made between 
knowledge of language and knowledge of the world. Waismann is seen 
as running together two sorts of vagueness. The first is a consequence 
of the scepticism that we can have about our knowledge of the empirical 
world; Harrison terms this epistemological vagueness . 
... unless I can completely exclude the possibility 
that the animal before me is sometimes in the habit 
of speaking a human language, I must remain in doubt 
as to whether the word 'cat' is definitely applicable 
to it. But this possibility is one, by the very nature 
of epistemological scepticism, it is logically 
impossible for me to completely exclude. 
(Harrison, 1972, p. 132) 
This, we are informed, must be sharply distinguished from 'linguistic 
vagueness'. In this case, vagueness is due to a fluctation in the 
criteria for the application of certain terms; a clear example is 
determining when we should apply the word 'heap' to a collection 
of objects in a pile. Whilst it may seem that this kind of vagueness 
can be secured by a rigid definition of terms, such an exercise is 
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guaranteed to generate the 'acute and pervasive philosophical 
difficulties' which Phillips has suggested beset the 'calculus' 
approach to linguistic analysis. Harrison says it is crucial to 
acknowledge the semantic importance of ordinary usage; for example, 
that the term 'heap' may be applied unequivocally to a quantity of 
coal in a merchant's yard. The point is that whether or not 
something is a 'heap' in this sense is different from epistemological 
doubts about whether or not it may be a heap at all (it could be the 
(12) 
enlarged shadow of Waismann's cat against the wall!). 
in such cases 
... are not epistemological but linguistic: 
what worries us is not the thought that in reality 
this could be quite other than it appears, but 
the thought that one could equally well argue 
that this ought to be called a heap or that it 
ought not to be called a heap. 
(Harrison, op.cit., p. 135) 
Our doubts 
Clearly then, the argument is that these sorts of doubts must be 
clearly distinguished from one another. In the first case, doubt 
arises because of the incompleteness of our knowledge. But in the 
second case, it arises because what we do makes it possible for 
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us to make out an equally good case for something being called and 
not being called a certain thing. The second kind of doubt has 
nothing to do with our incomplete knowledge of the object but is, 
rather, 
... a matter of the rules of language not 
specifying for the present case whether it is 
or is not the thing in question. 
It is crucial to their argument that there is not taken to be something 
amiss with the rules when such cases arise. There is no suggestion, 
either in Harrison's work or in Phillips's article, that a reform of 
the rules should be undertaken where vagueness enters in. Such reform 
would simply amount to a backdoor reintroduction of the 'calculus' 
approach, acting now as an attempted repair of ordinary language rather 
than the hoped for creation of a language lacking all ambiguity. 
However, the notion of indexicality, by rendering all usage 
'indefinitely problematic', makes its repair replicate a commitment 
to such precision as necessary for intelligible communication. To 
be sure,the commitment is differently articulated. In the one case 
it is said to be achievable by the rigorous delineation of words and 
their logical relations, while in the other it is taken to be an 
accomplishment of members on every occasion of their use of such words. 
Thus by subverting the efficacy of rules, Garfinkel is seen to place 
himself in the same relation to ordinary language as the logical 
reconstructionists, albeit with a very different set of recommendations, 
as to how words can have meanings and sense. So, although Garfinkel 
rejects 'positivist' sociology, his conception of membership is seen 
to involve a positivist approach to language. Phillips puts it this 
way: 
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Obviously, there is no intention of accusing 
Garfinkel of espousing an empiricist theory of 
language. Rather, he explicitly rejects it 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 71), But the empiricist 
theory is notoriously tempting in disguised and 
covert versions. 
(ibid., p. 67) 
So when subjected to a proper philosophical analysis, all the 
concept of indexicality amounts to is a perplexing and erroneous way 
of describing the problem of induction. It is not a thesis about 
language mastery at all really, but simply the product of a confusion 
between two separate orders of knowledge. The outcome of this 
analysis secures for Phillips the demonstration of the implicit link 
between Garfinkel's perspective and phenomenology. By injecting the 
pervasive doubts that can attend our knowledge of the world into our 
knowing how to speak, Garfinkel then has to resolve the attendant 
linguistic scepticism through the certitude supposedly afforded by 
the unique experience of the knowing subject. If Garfinkel's members 
are not solipsists in the classical sense, Phillips also appears to 
suggest thatthey can be seen as situational solipsists; where meaning 
and knowledge are co-extensive with some particular social context. 
This inflation of contextuality into what any member can 'occasionedly' 
mean and know, ruins for Phillips the proper appreciation of the 
context of a practice. 
Thus, by drawing on Wittgenstein's philosophy in particular, 
Phillips sees himself as demonstrating, 
why a phenomenological input should lead 
to a phenomenalist output in Garfinkel's 
work. 
(Phillips, 1978, p. 56) 
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In consequence, far from there being any detectable convergence between 
the ideas of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein, the former manages to propose 
a combination of ideas which the latter criticized at great length 
in his later philosophy. Garfinkel's work may be seen as constituting 
a massive over-reaction to the calculus approach to language, a 
reaction which makes the concept of rule effectively useless. This 
was never Wittgenstein's aim, and Garfinkel, in subverting the role 
of rules, replaces them with a conception of meaning in which the 
domain of interaction rescues and repairs each member's essential 
privacy. By contrast, as Phillips says, rule-following in 
Wittgenstein is something which possesses an inherently public 
character. 
So, shorn of the preoccupations of ethnomethodology, the work 
of Sacks and his followers can be seen as the specification of finite 
and definite mechanisms which constitute the ruled basis for our 
speech practices. The contextuality of utterances is nevertheless a 
key analytic component in the perspective since the recognition of a 
particular conversational mechanism depends on its conversational 
surroundings. In other words, 'context' is criteria! for the 
understanding and use of conversational rules, unlike in speech act 
theory where the rules of a speech act are logicallyprimitive to 
considerations of context. Plainly, Phillips sees his proposals as 
striking the right balance between the over-determined nature of a 
theory like Searle's and what he sees as the analytic anarchy in 
Garfinkel's work. l·1oreover, the mechanisms elaborated by conversation 
analysts are seen by Phillips as embodying what Wittgenstein meant by 
the notion of 'language games'; and an aggregate of such mechanisms 
as what he meant by 'forms of life'. Citing Harrison once more, 
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Phillips (1978, p. 68) argues that linguistic devices are to be seen 
as: 
... systems (of rules) each of which determines 
and is determined by a certain sort of social 
intercourse. The system of rules, and the type 
of social intercourse which it mediates, are on 
this view to be regarded as a single indissoluble 
unity: a form of life in Wittgenstein's phrase. 
(Harrison, 1972, p. 153) 
If one takes the comparison between Garfinkel and Searle a little 
further with respect to Phillips's own position, it can be seen that 
whereas Garfinkel is looked upon as reducing the facticity of social 
life to the situated accomplishment of objectivity, Searle would be 
seen as reifying social facts through his delineation of a class of 
speech acts as the conditions of possibility for any form of 
communication. In maintaining that practices are derived from rules, 
Phillips does not commit himself to Searle's view that a set of rule 
formulated conditions are jointly necessary and sufficient to express 
some particular meaning. In Phillips's view, the flexibility of 
actual usage is based in rule governed mechanisms, but with the 
crucial distinction that they do not inscribe any particular meaning 
to an utterance or sequence of utterances. Rather, they have the 
potential for being used in a variety of different ways to constitute 
different meanings. This construal of the relationship between rule 
and context is what Phillips regards as allowing him to maintain that 
meaning is a contextual phenomenon without relief, but where the 
flexibility of usage is nevertheless a product of members arranging 
and combining linguistic devices in novel configurations. The 
intuitive appeal of this account is considerable, since it appears to 
provide a way of analytically reconciling how language is at one and 
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the same time possessed of its massive regularity and certainty, and 
members' endlessly novel uses of it. 
In this way, Phillips says that he can maintain a sense in which 
members are tn be seen as 'methodical' and 'artful' in their doin0s, 
and even on occasions how their interactions can be seen to be vague 
or indexical. However, members' 'artfulness' and 'methodicity' 
cannot, in Phillips's view, be taken as constitutive of meaning, any 
more than Searle's speech act rules can. Meaning is, in the first 
place, facilitated by the already established and commonly accepted 
devices that, together, make up a socio-linguistic structure, which 
members then use to construct and locate the contexted meanings of 
their interactions. This conception of linguistic devices, in 
conjunction with the argument that there is an undertow of empiricism 
in Garfinkel's analysis, then provides the basis for explicitly 
challenging the idea that Garfinkel can be said to provide an 
inter-actionist account of meaning at all. In fact, ethnomethodology 
can be seen as tacitly undermining a performativist conception of 
language mastery because it splits the identity between meaning and 
action. 
. .. understanding social interaction- grasping 
its meaning - is much more like understanding 
some linguistic utterance than it is understanding 
an enquiry and make some report of the non-human, 
non-social world ... what it suggests for present 
concerns, is that the theory of meaning may extend 
... beyond understanding language, and into the 
understanding of interaction ... In short, 
Garfinkel's misunderstanding of the nature of meaning 
in language is also a mistaken understanding of the 
nature of meaning in social interaction. 
(Phillips, 1978, p. 71) 
Clearly, if Phillips's critique does hit the mark, it constitutes 
a serious indictment of the semantic and epistemological footings of 
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ethnomethodology. However, it is noteworthy that towards the end of 
his article, distinctions which are an obvious corollary of the 
difference drawn between knowledge of language and knowledge of the 
world are alluded to j_n a significantly less confident tone. 
Firstly, Phillips observes: 
It must have been obvious that the notion of the 
meaning of some utterance, or what we might call 
linguistic meaning, has been run together in an 
undiscriminating way with social meaning, or the 
meaning of some event in interaction as the 
members understand it. 
(ibid., pp. 70-71) 
But this obviousness is short-lived. Phillips concedes that 
ethnomethodologists would not make a distinction of this kind which, 
given that article is an attack upon ethnomethodology, is hardly a 
surprise. But then he says: 
Nor ... do I want to hold that it is a clear or 
useful distinction. The only point now being made 
is that it deserves much further analysis. 
(ibid.) 
Now, that remark is very difficult to reconcile with the central plank 
of his critique, since it consists of the view that the problem with 
ethnomethodology is precisely that it runs together 'linguistic' 
meaning and knowledge of the world (including the 'social' world). 
Elsewhere there are other signs of difficulty. The most 
significant of these concerns the implicit contradiction about the 
status of rules in the mastery of language. We have been told 
repeatedly that a rule system 'determines and is determined by a 
certain sort of social intercourse'. This interdependence, we are 
told, represents an advance on an analysis like Searle's, but without 
falling into the conceptual anarchy which is said to lie at the heart 
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of Garfinkel's analysis. In other words, what Phillips proposes 
strikes exactly the right balance between rule and context, where 
each has a part to play in the recognition and use of the other. 
But then in differentiating betwee!l "'rule-licensed procedures''' and 
"'experienced-licensed implications'", we are told: 
The ability to mean something gained from a mastery 
of the first, precedes and is the basis for the 
second. 
(ibid., p. 69: emphasis mine) 
Quite where that is supposed to leave the idea that Phillips offers 
analysts a new way forward is not clear, as that sentence would 
accurately represent the outlook of speech act theory. So, it appears 
as if an analysis of language use cannot take the direction advocated 
by Phillips without ulitmately falling back on the primacy of rules 
as determinants of the meaning of utterances and social interaction 
generally. 
In spite of these problems, Phillips's article does pose questions 
about the relationship between analysis and language mastery which 
deserve an answer. In order to work towards one, I shall act on 
Phillips's suggestion that this whole set of issues 'deserves much 
further analysis'. Since Garfinkel, and Phillips (and indeed Searle) 
regard their own analyses as working exemplifications of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy, or at least consistent with it, the next section of 
this Chapter is going to examine that philosophy directly. By now, 
the reader will be in no doubt that I regard Garfinkel's perspective 
as the one which is really consonant with Wittgenstein's own views. 
However, that is hardly the end of the matter. Firstly, that 
consonance is, of course, itself predicated upon my understanding of 
Wittgenstein's thought. Quite apart from its notorious difficulty, 
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one also has to bear in mind the fact that Wittgenstein's work 
possesses a chameleon-like ability to blend in with whatever one 
brings to it. The fact that Searle, Garfinkel, Sacks and Phillips 
all claim consistency with his philosophy is testimony to that. Thi;;, 
in turn, raises the possibility that the meaning of such consistency 
is itself part and parcel of any author's activity of seeing and 
commenting upon these apparent connexions. And, if there is mileage 
in that idea, then it has profound ramifications on the concept of 
analysis itself. 
Then there are a second set of considerations, of a less general 
character than those above, but nevertheless of great importance in 
terms of this thesis. For instance, there is the issue referred to 
earlier of how one is to reconcile the speculative, somewhat hieratic 
style of Wittgenstein with the rigorous and systematic approach of 
the conversation analysts. For Wittgenstein at least, such an issue 
is not something which can merely be glossed over. In his Philosophical 
Remarks, a work which pre-dates the later philosophy, he distinguishes 
the spirit of his philosophizing 'from the one which informs the vast 
stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand'. 
And in the Investigations, he explains its workbook style in the 
Preface like this: 
It was my intention to bring all this together in 
a book whose form I pictured differently at different 
times. But the essential thing was that the thoughts 
should proceed from one subject to another in a 
natural order and without breaks. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my 
results together into such a whole, I realized that 
I should never succeed ... my thoughts were soon 
crippled if I tried to force them on in any single 
direction against their natural inclination. - And 
this was, of course, connected with the very nature 
of the investigation. For this compels us to travel 
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over a wide field of thought criss-cross in 
every direction. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, p. vii) 
And it is just as clear that for conversation analysts there is great 
premium in elaborating succinct, specific and rigorous descriptions 
of fragments of interaction which exemplify general conversational 
processes. That approach is reminiscent of an exact science, not 
Wittgenstein's philosophy. And, as Wittgenstein makes clear in the 
quotation above, the style of his work is intimately bound up with 
what he has to say about the nature of language. Having said that 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis form a continuous body of 
work, it is clearly incumbent upon me to at least attempt to answer 
that question. 
Finally, even if all this reconciling can be achieved, what does 
that intellectual excercise have to say about the nature of social 
analysis, and does it have any implications for the conduct of social 
research. It may be a disappointment (but I do not think much of a 
surprise) to learn that I believe that it leaves the variety of social 
inquiry much as it is. As mentioned already, the aim of this thesis 
is to offer something in the way of understanding analysis rather 
than propose a new theory, although I do believe that this aim may 
have just as much to offer by way of a contribution to understanding 
what a society is. In terms of this thesis, it seems that the most 
useful way to give an answer to this question is to assess what the 
indifference of ethnomethodology towards conventional sociology means 
in Wittgenstenian terms. This assessment will form the conclusion 
to the thesis. 
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VI. Rule-Following and Wittgenstein's Philosophy 
The question which this thesis does not ask is whether language 
use and social action are guided by rules. Rather, the question posed 
is, in what way does our rule-following constitute such activities? 
It might look as if the first question ought to be answered before 
turning to the second. But a moment's reflection is all it takes to 
see that to know how to ask 'whether', requires knowing 'what'. In 
other words, the principal matter is to provide some account of what 
it is to follow a rule, and, inseparably bound up with that task, 
what is involved in providing that account. I believe the issues 
raised by these questions occupy a central place in all Wittgenstein's 
writings, whether his topic be the foundation of mathematics or the 
role of inner processes in the knowing (and communicating) subject. 
From the elaboration of the rules for a logical syntax based on a 
calculus of truth functions described in the Tractatus, to the concern 
with how we can mean and act in everyday life in the Investigations, 
the concept of rule-following is like a leitmotif in his work. 
At the conclusion of the last section, mention was made of the 
style of his later philosophy. This style contrasts strongly with 
the precision of the Tractatus. And it is clear that the workbook 
approach of the later philosophy is not just an author's caution at 
coming to terms with the deepseated problems he now perceives in his 
earlier work. What it marks is the attempt to conceive of language 
mastery and its analysis in a completely new way, and in particular 
to gain an understanding of the interdependence he sees between a 
form of inquiry and its subject matter. At one level, the recognition 
of this interdependence is not something new. The Tractatus posited 
an internal relationship between a model or theory and what it 
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represents (secured there by the identity of logical form in different 
structural representations). However, Wittgenstein also maintained 
that no theory could represent its own internal relation to what it 
is a model of. This was expressed as the difference between 'saying' 
and 'showing'. In the Tractatus it is put like this: 
2.171 A picture can depict any reality whose form it 
has. A spatial picture can depict anything 
spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. 
2.172 A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial 
form: it displays it. 
(Wittgenstein, 1961) 
Wittgenstein continued to believe this to be a well founded 
intuition. However, whereas in the early philosophy this difference 
was a consequence of the truth-functional picture of the isomorphism 
between language and world, the later philosophy's abandonment of 
that picture necessitated a radical reinterpretation of that intuition. 
The building of that reinterpretation manifests itself most clearly 
in the later philosophy's preoccupation with rule-following. Something 
of crucial importance in this task is Wittgenstein's recognition that 
an analysis of rule-following illuminates crucial features of the 
mastery of language in the actual construction of that analysis. The 
working out of this intellection is, as we shall see, a major theme 
in the Investigations and it is this which involves retaining, although 
completely restructuring the idea that analysis does not 'depict', 
but 'displays' its form of representation. In the later philosophy, 
the form of representation is language, and moreover language as it 
is used in everyday and mundane settings. This is why, in consequence, 
the analysis of rule-following is taken to 'display' the wherewithal 
of language-mastery. 
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For present purposes, the starting-point of Wittgenstein's 
reinterpretation can be seen to hinge on further consideration of a 
passage in The Blue and Brown Books, concerning a distinction made 
there between the 'involvement of' and 'accordance with' rules in a 
simple numerical sequence. In that work, he says: 
We must distinguish between what one might call 
'a process being in accordance with a rule', and 
'a process involving a rule'. 
Take an example. Someone teaches me to square 
cardinal numbers; he writes down the row 
1 2 3 4 
and asks me to square them ... Suppose underneath 
the first row of numbers, I then write: 
1 4 9 16 
What I wrote is in accordance with the general 
rule of squaring; but it is obviously in accordance 
with any number of other rules; and amongst these 
it is not more in accordance with one than with 
another. In the sense in which a rule (is) involved 
in a process,~ rule was involved in this ... 
Supposing, on the other hand, in order to get my 
results I had written down what you may call 'the 
rule of squaring', say algebraically. In this case, 
the rule was involved in a sense in which no other 
rule was. 
We shall say that the rule is involved in the 
understanding, obeying, etc., if, as I should like 
to express it, the symbol of the rule forms part of 
the calculation. (As we are not interested in 
where the processes of thinking, calculating, take 
place, we can for our purposes 
being done entirely on paper. 
with the difference: internal, 
imagine the calculations 
We are not concerned 
external) . 
(Wittgenstein, 1964, p. 13) 
The parenthetical remarks at the end of that quotation are important 
since the question of the reality and conceptual status of inner 
mentation was invariably treated by Wittgenstein as a public phenomenon. 
However, the important matter of current concern is that in the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein comes to see that the idea of the 
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'involvement' of rules is an illusion. The attempt to construe rules 
as somehow immanent in an activity is seen to actually involve the 
investigators' election of a rule or rules for that purpose. The 
idea is summarily dismissed in one of the book's briefest paragraphs: 
My symbolical expression was really a 
mythological description of the use of 
a rule. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 221) 
In other words, Wittgenstein shifts the focus of his investigation 
from the delineation of rules as something underlying our practices, 
to the elective practices themselves. This shift exemplifies one 
very important element of the 'turning round' (see Wittgenstein, 
1968, para. 108) of his examination of language. It is the activities 
of rule use which are seen to hold the key to an understanding of 
language mastery. And one implication of this is that the 'election' 
of a rule is perceived as one of the ways in which rules constitute 
practices. Of course, the turning point itself is a reference to 
the analysis of language presented in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein 
makes clear right at the start that his new ideas can: 
be seen in the right light only by contrast 
wittV~gainst the background of my old way of 
thinking. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, p. viii) 
Accordingly, to explain his views requires some further account of 
the approach to language taken in the early work. His main aim had 
been to expose the fallacy of a metaphysical tendency to 'go beyond' 
language in order to reveal its nature. In the preface to the 
Tractatus, he says: 
The book deals with the problems of philosophy, 
and shows, I believe, that the reason why these 
problems are posed is that the logic of our 
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language is misunderstood. The whole sense of 
the book might be summed up in the following 
words: what can be said at all can be said 
clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must 
pass over in silence. 
Thus, the aim of the book is to draw a limit to 
thought, or rather - not to thought, but to the 
expression of thoughts: for in order to be able 
to draw a limit to thought, we should have to 
find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we 
should have to be able to think what cannot be 
thought. 
It will therefore only be in language that the 
limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other 
side of the limit will simply be nonsense. 
(Wittgenstein, 1961, p. 3) 
A notorious fact about the Tractatus is that by its own criteria 
it is itself nonsenSe, something which is acknowledged explicitly at 
its end (see proposition 6.54). Although the work does not exceed 
the limits of language in the sense specified in the preface, the 
analysis had to employ the supposition of 'simples' as the atomic 
constituents of objects in order to provide what Wittgenstein could 
regard as a secure enough foundation for reference. Propositions 
employing these simples were then able to be concatenated by truth 
functional rules (taken to be immanent or 'involved' though not 
disclosed in language use) which in turn secured sense and meaning. 
So, even for the Tractatus, the analysis of language meant standing 
outside or transcending language, and thus itself had to be 
categorized as a work of nonsense. But, Wittgenstein, believed, 
useful nonsense, a 'ladder' for the understanding which exhibits the 
relationship between language and world, although in so doing saying 
(or attempting to say) something which only properly shows itself in 
the form of the proposition. 
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Nevertheless, this approach to the analysability of language did 
not entail, as it did for Russell and many positivists, that ordinary 
language was characterized by major defects, thereby rendering it 
useless as a vehicle for philosophical analysis and consequently 
something that was only fit for repair by that analysis. On the 
contrary, we are told: 
5.563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday 
language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order. That utterly simple thing, 
which we have to formulate here, is not a 
likeness of the truth, but the truth itself 
in its entirety. 
(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps 
the most concrete that there are.) 
(Wittgenstein, 1961) 
This statement also marks a continuity between the early and the late 
philosophy. What underwent a transformation was why that was seen 
to be so. In place of the attempt to state the nature of the relation 
between language and the world in the manner outlined above, 
Wittgenstein simply asserts the centrality of ordinary usage, what we 
do in language, as constitutive of both what we can know of 'language' 
and 'world'. Whereas in the Tractatus, nonsense was seen as the 
inevitable outcome of trying to state the form of language, in the 
Investigations, the idea that there is a form to language which is 
there (if only ineffably) to show, is viewed as an illusion. 
Before embarking on a detailed examination of how Wittgenstein 
came to see the illusory character of his early work, it is worth 
considering the implications of the matters discussed thus far for 
the distinction made by Harrison and adopted by Phillips, between 
knowledge of language and knowledge of the world. It seems clear on 
the basis of what we have considered already that a presumption has 
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been raised against the consistency of the distinction with the 
approach of the later philosophy. The way in which the rules of 
language are meant to underlie everyday experience has strong 
affinities with the conceptual architecture of the Tractatus where, 
as we saw, the logic of truth functions is taken to assemble the 
. . ( 13) 
sense of propos~t~ons. Of course, there are noteworthy 
differences. As stated earlier, the character of rules and the 
nature of truth are quite distinct. Yet for all that, the ideas 
possess a structural similarity, if only because the language-world 
dichotomy sets the framework for the analysis. The extent of 
Wittgenstein's repudiation of this framework is intimately associated 
with the investigation of rule-following in the later philosophy. 
It is noteworthy that a reader of the Tractatus is not confronted 
by what he or she ordinarily thin~s of as 'nonsense'. This struck 
Wittgenstein as something significant in itself, since he saw that 
he had to tutor his reader to see what was nonsensical about it. 
Whilst Wittgenstein held no brief for the rightness and perspicacity 
of our ordinary or everyday understanding, either in his early or 
late period, he did come to see the need for this tutoring as the 
harbinger of a misconception. His suspicion on this issue can be 
seen to develop from two considerations. The first is that for the 
Tractatus to have meaning for anyone requires the existence of an 
extant mastery of what it is an analysis of. The second is that the 
work does describe, if rather formalistically, important features of 
(14) linguistic competence. That, of course, is not to say that 
Wittgenstein was a stranger to these considerations when the book 
was written. Not only are they obvious in themselves, they also 
encapsulate important linguistic facts which Wittgenstein sought to 
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explain. But in further reflecting upon them, he comes to see that 
it is an illusion that sense and meaning can be secured by truth 
conditions which are totally independent and distinct from the actual 
recognition of such truth in the use of t.he propositions, This, in 
turn, makes him see that the role of extant language mastery in the 
actual construction and understanding of the analysis in the 
Tractatus is of crucial internal importance to the sense which the 
work makes. He comes to see that truth functions do not underlie the 
sense of propositions. Rather, the analysis can be seen as making 
those truth functions perform that role. Closely aligned with this 
insight is another which can be seen to result more particularly from 
the second consideration (viz. that the Tractatus does, in fact, 
describe important features of language use). In dispensing with the 
L\\ 
requirement that there be a single truth functio~form underlying all 
linguistic usage, a real origin of 'nonsense' in the Tractatus is 
exposed. This is the view that the rules of one kind of linguistic 
practice must be taken as supplying the essential rules for all 
practices. 
These reflections are among the principal agents which led to the 
rehabilitation of the analytic importance of cognition, action and 
sociation which the Tractatus had sought to exclude. This, in turn, 
allowed Wittgenstein to come to grips with the tacit commitments in 
the Tractatus: 
... to a host of psychological hypotheses about 
arcane mental processes whose relation to reality 
was mediated by language ... 
(Hacker, 1981, p. 101) 
There, all such considerations had been treated as unknown psychic 
constituents, and although they were taken to have some kind of logical 
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structure more or less resembling that of the proposition, they were 
of no philosophical consequence and could safely be reduced to 
( 1 5) 
propositional relations. Consequently, how language was understood 
was divorced from the concern with its formal strucluL·e and regarded 
as a subsidiary matter of purely psychological concern. As Hacker 
says: 
In the later work this is repudiated. The 
subjects of meaning, understanding and thinking 
are essential to a proper grasp of the nature 
of language. For the relations between meaning 
that p, understanding 'p' and the sense of 'p' 
are internal. Therefore no psychological 
explanation or hypothesis can replace a 
philosophical account of these relations. 
(ibid.) 
This examination of the Tractatus helps us to see still more 
clearly why the distinction between 'involvement' and 'accordance' 
with a rule in The Blue and Brown Books is repudiated in the 
Investigations. The notion of involvement still retained the 
commitment to a a prioristic construal of the relationship between 
the rule and what it ruled; a strict determinacy regarding the rule's 
employment, unconnected with the actual use and meaning a rule could 
have for language masters. We have seen already that the concept of 
'involvement' is regarded as a 'mythological description' of a rule's 
use. Wittgenstein begins the dissolution of its appeal like this: 
Why do I call 'the rule by which he proceeds'? 
- The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes 
his use of words, which we observe; or the rule 
which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one 
which he gives us in reply if we ask him what 
his rule is, - But what if observation does not 
enable us to see any clear rule, and the question 
brings none to light? - For he did indeed give 
me a definition when I asked him what he 
understood by 'N', but he was prepared to 
withdraw and alter it. - So how am I to determine 
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the rule according to which he is playing? He 
does not know it himself. - Or to ask a better 
question: What meaning is the expression 'the 
rule by which he proceeds' supposed to have 
left to it here? 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 82) 
The dissolution goes a long way and raises the question of whether 
Wittgenstein himself may be described as a 'rule sceptic' (see note 
10) . If to be a rule sceptic means taking the view that rules do 
not determine the nature or meaning of linguistic and social practices, 
then it looks as if Wittgenstein is one. However, the reason for 
this is not that he thinks rules are in some way inapposite tools 
for describing linguistic usage, or for that matter an inappropriate 
vehicle for explaining that usage. The Investigations is full of 
examples of such descriptions and explanations. In other words, it 
is not that rules are useless for analytic tasks. Rather, it is 
stopping rule analysis at that point, which fails to come to terms 
with 'the how' of rule use. And that, as Hacker says, mean~ 
ignoring their role in actual communi .:::ation. 
VII. Linguistic Activity and Rule Use in the Later Philosophy 
The development of Wittgenstein's concern with the doing of 
linguistic communication has clear affinities with Garfinkel's 
. ( 16) perspect1ve. But it is also one of the reasons which leads 
Phillips to dub the perspective empiricist, because the 'scepticism' 
about rules seems to leave it with nothing more than the task of 
providing theoretically unconnected and discrete descriptions of 
members' doings. For Phillips, this must mean that the affinity is 
a mere surface resemblance, since Wittgenstein's concept of rule, 
language game and forms of life correspond to the articulation of 
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elements of the rule-licensed procedures underlying linguistic 
practice. But the problem with Phillips's interpretation is finding 
support for it in Wittgenstein's explication of these concepts. 
Consider first his comment:s on the ideo_ of ano_lysing different 
language games: one (a) where orders are given to bring things using 
their ordinary (composite) names (e.g. broom, chair, table, etc.), 
and the other (b) where such orders are given by listing the parts of 
the objects which comprise the whole (e.g. broomstick and brush; legs, 
back and seat; etc.). He then considers what it means to say that 
the second game is an analysed form of the first. 
To say ... that a sentence in (b) is an 'analysed' 
form of one in (a) readily seduces us into thinking 
that the former is the more fundamental form; that 
it alone shows what is meant by the other, and so 
on. For example, we think: If you have only the 
unanalysed form you miss the analysis; but if you 
know the analysed form, that gives you everything. 
- But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is 
lost on you in the latter case as well as the former? 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 63) 
Then consider what can be termed the ontogenetic formulation of 
this conception of linguistic analysis. At the beginning of the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein works out his response to Augustine's 
(17) 
account of language mastery which, in fact, opens the work. 
He imagines some builders whose language consists of the words 'block', 
'pillar', 'slab', where the utterance of these words constitutes an 
order to bring them. Wittgenstein is at pains to emphasize that this 
can be conceived of as 'a complete primitive language' (para. 2). 
The correlate of this point, though, is not to treat such a language 
as the kernel of more sophisticated practices, like the foundation 
stone upon which the rest of language is built. Even if the practice 
of naming is the first thing we learn, it is an analytic conceit to 
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construe all other language use as somehow derived from this capacity. 
The use of language does not need the guarantee or support of such 
'primitive' elements any more than it requires the existence of 
underlying rules, Once again, Wittgenstein seeks to demonstrate how 
the requirements of analysis can so easily, but fallaciously, be 
transmuted into some essential feature of language. What needs to 
be emphasized, instead, is the coeval nature of what can be abstracted 
as a foundation of language mastery, with whatever feature or usage 
of language is to be treated as the core or essence of our mastery. 
But the abstracting, and what is abstracted, are games in language 
and one is not more fundamental than the other. Thus, whether one 
pursues a sophisticated and complex analysis in terms of rules or 
finds the essence of language to consist in the simplicity of 'naming', 
the problem remains the same, viz. viewing the rules of one language 
game as the rules for all games. 
These two considerations exemplify in their respective fashions 
one of Wittgenstein's chief criticisms of the Tractatus. As we have 
seen, its aim was to neutralize the metaphysical tendency to exceed 
the limits of language. However, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein 
sees that what the Tractatus in fact achieves is the replacement of 
that metaphysics with another that closely resembles it. This is 
the supposition of another language that lies behind ordinary 
language, what he terms the super language. 
Thought is surrounded by a halo. - Its essence, 
logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori 
order of the world: that is, the order of 
possibilities, which must be common to both world 
and thought. But this order, it seems, must be 
utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, 
must run through all experience; no empirical 
cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect 
it - It must be of the purest crystal. But this 
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crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but 
as something concrete, indeed, as the most 
concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is. 
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, No. 5.563) 
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, 
profound, essential, in our investigation, 
resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable 
essence of language. That is the order, existing 
between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, 
truth, experience, and so on. This order is a 
super-order between -- so to speak -- super-concepts. 
Whereas, of course, if the words 'language', 
'experience', 'world', have a use, it must be as 
humble a one as that of the words 'table', 'lamp', 
'door'. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 97) 
Of course, Wittgenstein is not saying that a 'super language' cannot 
be constructed. That assertion would fly in the face of the fact 
that he, and others, have achieved just that in various theoretical 
enterprises. Neither is he saying that the understanding of such 
languages is, in some respect, questionable or suspect. To 
articulate that claim would require drawing the bounds of sense in 
a fashion very similar to spirit to the Tractatus and other works 
which have pursued that aim. 
It is also important to realize that Wittgenstein is not seeking 
to invert this earlier conception of the relation between ordinary 
language and its 'analytic' usage. The repudiation of his earlier 
outlook has been taken to entail this inversion. But this is an 
erroneous representation of Wittgenstein's thinking since this would 
merely amount to a reversal of the relation between analysans and 
analysandum, where rules extracted from everyday utterances now had 
to be viewed as the foundation of these more specialized uses. Pole 
(1958) is one of those who regard Wittgenstein as making this claim. 
Cavell argues: 
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--------- -- ----- -----------------
Pole ... implies that Wittgenstein regards 
ordinary language as 'sacrosanct', that he 
speaks in the name of nothing higher than the 
'status quo' and that he 'has forbidden 
philosophers to tamper with (our ordinary 
expressions)' (p. 57). Other philosophers, 
with very different motives from Pole's, have 
received the same impression, and their 
impatience has not been stilled by Wittgenstein's 
having said that: 
... a reform of ordinary language for 
particular purposes, an improvement in 
our terminology designed to prevent 
misunderstandings in practice, is 
perfectly possible. But these are not 
the cases we have to do with. 
(Investigations, para 132) 
(Cavell, 1968, p. 166) 
Wittgenstein does not wish to replace the pivotal role formerly 
given to a 'super language' by merely re-orienting in favour of 
everyday usage. In addition to the analytic replication involved, 
such a re-orientation concretizes the 'prodigious diversity' ( 18 ) of 
everyday language use. The net effect of such a move is simply to 
deem some ordinary usages as the hallmark or the 'core' of what 
ordinary speaking involves. To do that is to simply construct 
another super language out of 'everyday' materials. Something of 
the prodigious diversity is revealed earlier in the Investigations 
when Wittgenstein asks: 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say 
assertion, question, and command? There are 
countless kinds: countless different kinds of 
use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. 
And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given 
once for all; but new types of language, new 
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, 
and others become obsolete and get forgotten ... 
Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring 
into prominence the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or a form of life. 
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It is interesting to compare the multiplicity 
of the tools in language and of the ways they are 
used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and 
sentence, with what logicians have said about the 
structure of language. (Including the author of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 23) 
So, it can be seen that the later philosophy mounts a sustained 
attack on the idea that there is an essential foundation to the 
mastery of language, in all the different guises that idea can take, 
whether it be construed as a logical syntax, set of rules, or some 
core set of everyday linguistic practices supposedly serving as some 
kind of archetypes for the rest. We are told that the investigation: 
... is directed not towards phenomena, but, as 
one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of 
phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, 
of the kind of statement that we make about 
phenomena ... 
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. 
Such an investigation sheds light on our problem 
by clearing misunderstanding away. Misunderstandings 
concerning the use of words, caused, among other 
things, by certain analogies between the forms of 
expression in different regions of language. - Some 
of them can be removed by substituting one form of 
expression for another; this may be called an 
'analysis' of our forms of expression, for the 
process is sometimes like one of taking a thing 
apart. 
(ibid., para. 90) 
The consequence of this perspective is that analysis itself can 
possess the same diversity as the linguistic practices which form the 
topic of analysis. Of course, the criticism of such an outlook is 
obvious and Wittgenstein meets it head on: 
Here we come up against the great question that lies 
behind all these considerations. - For someone might 
object against me: 'You take the easy way out! You 
talk about all sorts of language-games, but have 
nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and 
- 199 -
hence of language, is: what is common to all these 
activities, and what makes them into language or 
parts of language. So you let yourself off the 
very part of the investigation which once gave you 
yourself most headache, the part about the general 
form of propositions and of language. ' 
And this is true. - Instead of producing something 
common to all that we call language, I am saying 
that these phenomena have no one thing in common 
which makes us use the same word for all, - but that 
they are related to one another in many different 
ways. And it is because of this relationship, or 
these relationships, that we call them all 'language'. 
(ibid., para. 65) 
The singularity of some preferred analytical framework (whatever 
'flexibility' may have been built into it by its originators) can 
mislead those employing it into asking questions like: 
'What is language?', 'What is a proposition?' And 
the answer to these questions is to be given once 
and for all; and independently of any future 
experience. 
(ibid., para. 92) 
The singularity of those questions presupposes 'something like a 
final analysis of our forms of language' and thereby reduces the 
diversity of usage which comprises language. One can also put it 
this way. What misleads the investigator is the presumption of an 
isomorphism between analysis as one language game, and the host of 
others which are the object of analysis. For they are related to 
one another in as many different ways as two or more language-games 
can be in ordinary usage. 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein does recognise the importance of making 
comparisons and on the basis of that eliciting common structures 
because that enterprise forms a significant part of most, if not all, 
analytical endeavours. In particular, he wants to avoid appearing 
to discriminate against such analytic practices as these by quibbles 
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about what the concepts of essence and structure might mean in some 
generalized sense. After all, Wittgenstein could hardly remain 
consistent with his emphasis on the diversity of language by seeking 
to render problematic the language-games that can be played with 
these concepts. And it is significant that he acknowledges that: 
... we too in these investigations are trying to 
understand the essence of language - its function 
its structure, - yet this is not what those 
questions (e.g. 'What is language') have in view. 
For they see in the essence, not something that 
already lies open to view and that becomes 
surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that 
lies beneath the surface. Something that lies 
within, which we see when we look into the thing, 
and which an analysis digs out. 
(ibid., para. 92) 
So Wittgenstein is not seeking to outlaw a structural or formal 
analysis of language. Rather, his criticisms are focused upon the 
analytic understanding of what it is to construct an account of 
language in terms of its form or structure. Nor is he attempting to 
divine some 'correct' level of generalization that is to be employed 
by analysts, and beyond which they overstep some invisible boundary 
of warrantability and sense. There are no such boundaries. It is 
a practical, not stipulative, matter whether some generalization 
about language is useful and illuminating. 
Something which is striking in these quotations is the emphasis 
Wittgenstein places on the contingency of language. He tells us that 
it is misguided to think that answers to questions about language 
can be given 'once and for all and independent of any future experience' 
(para. 92), and that 'new language-games come into existence, and 
others become obsolete and get forgotten' (para. 23). Earlier, I 
considered the question of whether Wittgenstein could be considered 
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a 'rule sceptic' in that he took the view that rules do not determine 
the nature or meaning of linguistic and social practices. These 
remarks on the contingency of language support that view, especially 
in the light of Cavell's description of Wittgenstein's understanding 
of language mastery which exhibits, as he says, a terrifyingly simple 
vision of language and society. Cavell expresses it like this: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts and then 
we are expected, and expect others, to be able to 
project them into further contexts. Nothing insures 
that this projection will take place (in particular, 
not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of 
books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will 
make, and understand, the same projections. That on 
the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of 
interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of 
humour and of significance and of fulfillment, of what 
is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a 
rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an 
assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation - all 
the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life'. 
Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest 
upon nothing more, but nothing less than this. It is 
a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult 
as it is (and because it is) terrifying. 
(Cavell, 1968, pp. 160-1) 09 ) 
If Cavell has correctly described Wittgenstein's 'vision' of 
language and community in his late philosophy, it does look on the 
face of it as if rule analysis is at best marginal, if not entirely 
irrelevant to understanding language mastery. Cavell rejects the 
idea that 'projection' (learning and the mastery of language) is a 
matter of grasping rules, and if that is the case, then it does look 
as if rule analysis must not only be futile in terms of purpose, but 
sterile in terms of results. But futility of purpose hardly explains 
Wittgenstein's preoccupation with rules in the later philosophy as 
mentioned before. What his philosophy is directed against is not 
rule analysis as such, but the sterility that accompanies thinking 
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of rules as explanations of language mastery. Yet I have also said 
that the later philosophy is not hostile to an account of language 
in formal or structural terms, and there is little to be gained in 
trying to deny that the point of such accounts is to explain 
features of language mastery. Clearly, these conclusions look as 
if they flatly contradict one another, that is, as though there 
cannot be room for both in Wittgenstein's perspective. 
However, that appearance lasts only until it is remembered that 
Wittgenstein's interest lies in the activities of rule use, not in 
what the rules supposedly stipulate regarding the wherewithal of our 
language mastery. Rule analysis is not seen as delineating how the 
world and words about it make sense in terms of one another (the aim 
of the Tractatus) . Analysing is an activity which exemplifies (shows) 
the sense-making process at work. Thus, if Wittgenstein can be 
termed a rule sceptic as Phillips uses that term, then it is only 
because he is interested in the practicalities of rule use. 
Earlier I argued that the 'saying' and 'showing' distinction 
was retained in the later philosophy, although in a completely 
restructured form. It is becoming clear that rule analysis in the 
later philosophy is seen by Wittgenstein as a display of what 
language mastery is. The analyst sets about describing his or her 
object of inquiry in terms of rules and shows how instances of that 
object (e.g. one of the conversational practices described in 
Chapter II) can be seen to accord with some rule or rules. My view 
of vlittgenstein's argument is that what lt l:S to be seen to accord 
with a rule is a reflexive achievement. This is because 'the 
accordance' is not simply a matter of finding a rule to fit the 
practice, but of seeing the rule and practice in terms of one 
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another; that is, as the accomplishment of that 'fit'. The difficulty 
of grasping this point is perfectly understandable. As we are caught 
up within our mastery of language, the relationship between a rule 
and a practice appears simply to be a matter of finding such a fit, 
in the manner, for example, that Searle formulates the rules of 
promising. For Wittgenstein, that is an important use of our 
language mastery and there is, of course, nothing wrong with it. 
But the one thing such unreflective use fails to explicate is how 
the 'fit' is made. Again, there is nothing wrong with that from the 
everyday standpoint, otherwise it would be akin to measuring a ruler 
just to make sure that it was twelve inches long before we used it. 
. . (20) The regress ~s obv~ous and endless. But if our aim is not just 
to use language but rather to understand its uses, then it is, so to 
speak, the activity of finding such a fit between a rule and a 
practice which is the topic of the investigation. 
It is undoubtedly true that this reflexivity is difficult to 
state clearly since it seems to require the analyst to remove him 
or herself from the 'confines' of everyday usage. In the second and 
third sections of this Chapter I criticized the work of Blum and his 
collaborators for conceiving of reflexivity in this way. So a 
potential, and if true, damning criticism at this point is that my 
interpretation of Wittgenstein seems on the brink of a like 'removal' 
from everyday usage, and, moreover, one shorn of the philosophizing 
and moral engagement which gives Blum's work such depth. In addition, 
it would also appear that my construal of Wittgenstein's thought is 
in danger of making itself remote from what he actually said. For 
the philosophical attempt to distance linguistic analysis from 
everyday usage is taken by him to be one of the chief sources of 
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misunderstanding of language mastery. This appears to be put very 
clearly when he says: 
Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads 
up, - to see that we must stick to the subjects of 
our every-day thinking, and not go astray and 
imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, 
which in turn we are after all quite unable to 
describe with the means at our disposal. We feel 
as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with 
our fingers. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 106) 
However, it is noteworthy that just before this quotation Wittgenstein 
adverts to the way language is misrepresented analytically in these 
terms: 
We predicate of the thingWhat lies in the method 
of representing it. Impressed by the possibility 
of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a 
state of affairs of the highest generality. 
(ibid., para. 104) 
In other words, the misrepresentation is the result of employing our 
extant language mastery in order to construct theories of linguistic 
competence that represent language mastery is a way that makes no 
analytic reference to the fact that we already have to possess it in 
order to understand the analysis (e.g. Searle's marginalization of 
converting 'knowing how' into 'knowing that'). 
This is one of the main criticisms of a theory of language like 
the one suggested by Augustine (see note 18 above), although such 
tacit reliance on extant mastery is also a focal point of Wittgenstein's 
criticism of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein reveals this presupposition 
of an extant linguistic capacity lying behind language in this 
remark on Augustine's theory. 
Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes 
learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive 
definitions that they give him; and he will often 
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have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and 
will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong. 
And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes 
the learning of human language as if the child came 
into a strange country and did not understand the 
language of that country; that is, as if it already 
had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if 
the child could already think, only not yet speak. 
And 'think' would here mean something like 'talk to 
itself'. 
(ibid., para. 32) 
This describes how an unreflexive use of our extant competence can 
employ the very linguistic capacities which it is the aim to 
understand, in order to explain them. It needs emphasizing once 
more that the problem is not the reliance upon extant mastery as 
such. That is inescapable. It is, rather, the tacit employment of 
that mastery which leads the analyst to the belief that we can 
describe and explain language mastery in much the same fashion that 
we might describe and explain some complicated bit of machinery. 
It is noteworthy that this misapprehension can characterize something 
as simple and straightforward as Augustine's theory and something as 
complex and reticulated as the Tractatus. 
So I believe that for Wittgenstein the temptation to 'go astray 
and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties' is something 
engendered by an unreflexive use of, inter alia, rule analysis. The 
work of analysis is done inescapably from within language, but it is 
from the ordinary everyday standpoint that the illusion is fostered 
that it is possible to stand outside language and delineate its 
constituent principles. In the Investigations, we are told that 
'philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday' (para. 
38) and the examples he gives of this tendency often relate to 
philosophical attempts to 'sublime' everyday linguistic certainties 
into 'the relation between name and thing' (ibid.). 
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VIII. Wittgenstein and the Reflexivity of Rules 
Wittgenstein begins his examination of this reflexivity by 
considering a very simple example of rule following which should (if 
anything will) possess a good degree of fixity and definitiveness 
of rule application (such fixity and definitiveness being a 
requirement of Searle's or Phillips's analysis). In the example, 
Wittgenstein suggests how people might be taught a language of colour 
by having the sign and the colour set down in a table, say like 
this: 
R. 13. 
Clearly, we can see how this table could be used as an aid in teaching 
the language and also appealed to in certain cases of dispute. It 
is also possible,Wittgenstein says , to imagine such a table 
. . ( 21) 
representing the role of memory and assoclatlon. So here 
Wittgenstein sets up in the most primitive terms the minimal 
conditions for a connection between language and the mental and 
perceptual faculties, and a table which can be construed as a rule 
for governing the transition from colour marks to a lphabetical signs. 
If a definitive application of rules is going to work anywhere, it 
should work here. But straightaway, Wittgenstein remarks: 
If we call such a table the expression of a 
rule in the language-game, it can be said that 
what we call a rule of a language-game may have 
many different roles in the game. 
(ibid., para. 53 ) 
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That is to say, any formulation of a rule can have many different 
uses. Wittgenstein elaborates: 
The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The 
learner is told it and given practice in applying 
it. - Or it is an instrument of the game i t_se l f _ 
- Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching 
nor in the game itself; nor is it set down in a 
list of rules. One learns the game by watching 
how others play. But we say that it is played 
according to such-and-such rules because an 
observer can read these rules off from the 
practice of the game - like a natural law 
governing the play. -
But how does the observer distinguish in this 
case between players' mistakes and correct play? 
- There are characteristic signs of it in the 
players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour 
characteristic of correcting a slip of the 
tongue. It would be possible to recognise that 
someone was doing so even without knowing his 
language. 
(ibid., para. 54) 
So, even in such a simple case as the colour table, as a rule 
there can be many roles the rule can play. Particularly significant 
for present considerations is the way an observer can formulate rules 
'like a natural law governing the play', and the importance of the 
behaviour of the games practitioners to that endeavour. In the space 
of one paragraph Wittgenstein makes reference to seeing a rule like a 
natural law and seeing someone's behaviour as a guide to whether a 
rule has been followed or abrogated. As philosophical positions 
about language, rule-governance and behaviourism are commonly thought 
of as polar antitheses and yet here they are listed among the possible 
approaches to ascertaining what some rule is and whether some activity 
can be seen in terms of that rule. Major targets at this point in 
the Investigations are the supposition of either mental processes 
or, as we have seen, ostensive definitions underlying and explaining 
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the capacities of language mastery. Their relevance to the issue of 
what it is to follow a rule lies in the fact that both have been 
employed to indicate the wherewithal of language mastery. In so 
doing, both, to use Wittgenstein's word, have been 'sublimed'. That 
is, in order to exhibit each of them as the essence of linguistic 
competence, the role they play in language has been transformed into 
some overarching capacity upon which basis the power to use language 
can be explained. Wittgenstein's discussion of each is meant to 
act like a cautionary tale, not to sublime the concept of rule in 
the same way. 
In the case of ostensive definition, the central problem revolves 
around construing every word as a name so that the learning of 
language can be seen to consist in the instructor's pointing to the 
bearer of the name. Wittgenstein poses two objections to this 
conception of language mastery. The first is the insuperable 
difficulty of trying to retail every word or concept as a name, 
what for example is the word 'that' 
the name of in the ostensive definition 
'that is called ... '? 
(ibid., para. 38) 
The second concerns the required presupposition that the act of 
pointing necessary to ostension has, at one and the same time, to be 
a vital part of language mastery and yet primitive to that mastery. 
Wittgenstein exposes the tensions of this conception in the following 
remark which also takes us on to a consideration of mentation as an 
anchor for our linguistic practices, although, once again (as with 
the notions of rule-governance and behaviourism), it is significant 
that he speaks of them alongside one another. 
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How does it come about that this arrow;)t a 
points? Doesn't it seem to carry in it something 
beside itself? - 'No, not the dead line on paper 
only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that.' 
- That is both true and false. The arrow points 
only in the application that a living being makes 
of it. 
This pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be 
performed only by the soul. 
(ibid., para. 454) 
We can also ask how does the neophyte speaker know to look at the 
end of the finger and beyond it, rather than the shoulder of the 
teacher when he or she ostensively defines something. In the end, we 
would have to fall back on something like, 'the common behaviour of 
mankind (as) the system of reference' (ibid., para 206). However, 
it is significant that this quotation ends, ' ... by means of which 
we interpret an unknown language'. In other words, we would be 
tendering an explanation 'as if the child came into a strange country 
(and) could already think, only not yet speak (where) "think" would 
mean something like "talk to itself".' (see ibid., para 32 above). 
In another of the briefest remarks in the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein says: 
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward 
criteria. 
(para. 580) 
The point of this remark is that it poses a challenge to the awarding 
of some kind of special epistemic privilege to what is inner. The 
reason for this is because it is but a short step from this to the 
view that what we ordinarily mean by 'language; is merely the verbal 
or written accompaniment of some already established language secured 
in the mind. The idea is discussed in terms of an understanding 
which lies behind what we can see and hear. 
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We are trying to get hold of the mental process 
of understanding which seems to be hidden behind 
those coarser and therefore more readily visible 
accompaniments. But we do not succeed; or rather 
it does not get as far as a real attempt. For 
even supposing I had found something that happened 
in all those cases of understanding, - why should 
it be the understanding? And how can the process 
of understanding have been hidden, when I said 
'Now I understand' because I understood? And if 
I say it is hidden - then how do I know what to 
look for? I am in a muddle. 
(ibid., para. 153) 
Something of this 'muddle' can be exhibited by the following 
considerations. Even if this pre-linguistic 'understanding' were 
to exist (in the mind?), its very securedness would make it 
inaccessible to others, quite apart from the difficulty Wittgenstein 
adverts to of knowing 'what to look for' on the subject's own behalf. 
It is important not to misconstrue Wittgenstein's criticisms. He is 
not seeking to repudiate the reality of inner experiences or mental 
processes as such. Rather, the point is that whatever these are, 
they cannot provide a foundation for communication. Furthermore, to 
have knowledge of inner states is something that is made available 
through our mastery of a common language. This is an especially 
difficult corner of Wittgenstein's philosophy. However, if it is 
borne in mind that his interest is not in the aetiology of inner 
experience, but rather what it is to have and know these experiences, 
then some of the difficulty evaporates. In this regard, the following 
quotation is instructive: 
In what sense are my sensations private? - Well, 
only I can know \vhether I am really in pain; 
another person can only surmise it. - In one way 
this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are 
using the word 'to know' as it is normally used 
(and how else are we to use it?), then other people 
very often know when I am in pain. - Yes, but all 
the same not with the certainty with which I know 
myself! - It can't be said of me at all (except 
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perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. 
What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that 
I am in pain. 
(ibid., para. 246} 
As stated already, these targets of criticism are intimately 
bound up with considerations about rules and the way that they can 
be used to account for the mastery of language. The emphasis on 
rule-following in the Investigations, on the roles that a rule can 
play is Wittgenstein's way of providing a brake on the construction 
of a 'mythology' about rules which would merely replicate the 
philosophical tendency to 'sublime' ostension or mentation as the 
foundation of linguistic competence. One of these mythologies is that 
a rule be construed like an inner voice guiding the subject. However, 
Wittgenstein does not want to question the fact that sometimes we feel 
that 'we wait upon the nod (the whisper) of the rule' (ibid., para. 
223). It is possible to feel or imagine something like that, 
... in a sort of arithmetic. Children could 
calculate, each in his own way - as long as they 
listened to their inner voice and obeyed it. 
Calculating in this way would be a sort of 
composing. 
(ibid., para. 233) 
But we are not confined simply to inventing such circumstances. 
Would it not be possible for us, however, to 
calculate as we actually do (all agreeing, and so 
on), and still at every step to have a feeling of 
being guided by the rules as by a spell, feeling 
astonishment at the fact that we agreed? (We 
might give thanks to the Deity for our agreement.) 
(ibid., para. 234) 
Wittgenstein is at pains not to deny the reality of such an experience. 
The question is what are we to make of it; the countersign of some 
interior faculty, or perhaps a dim perception of the immanence of the 
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rules lying at the heart of our use of language? The answer we are 
given is rather different. 
This merely shows what goes to make up what 
we call 'obeying a rule' in everyday life. 
(ibid., para. 235) 
Following a rule is a practice. It is something which is learnt and 
understood communally. Wittgenstein exhibits this communal nature 
of rule-following by means of a question. 
Is what we call 'obeying a rule' something that 
it would be possible for only ~ man to do only 
once in his life? - This is of course a note on 
the grammar of the expression 'to obey a rule'. 
It is not possible that there should have been 
only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. 
It is not possible that there should have been 
only one occasion on which a report was made, an 
order given or understood; and so on. - To obey 
a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to 
play a game of chess, are customs (uses, 
institutions). 
To understand a sentence means to understand a 
language. To understand a language means to be 
master of a technique. 
And hence 'obeying a rule' is a practice. 
And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey 
a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 
'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a 
rule would be the same thing as obeying it. 
(ibid., paras. 199 & 202) 
Given this practicality of rule use, the rules formulated by 
analysis are reflexive simply because the relationship between rules 
and practices is internal and conceptual. That is, what a rule is 
(what it means, what its application is, what its scope, etc.) is 
as reliant upon the existence of the practice as the practice may be 
upon the rule. Rules do not underlie language use simply because 
what it is to follow a rule, like what it is to know (you are in pain, 
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etc.), are a part of what makes up rule-following in everyday life. 
Consequently, where analysis can mislead itself is to try and achieve 
a fixity with a concept like rule, which an investigation into what 
following a rule can be made out t_o be in our langua.ge, shows the 
concept does not, in fact, possess. In one sense, such a development 
or special use of a concept is perfectly proper, or, to put it 
negatively, such inventiveness could hardly be conside~ illegitimate 
from a perspective like Wittgenstein's. Nevertheless, when language 
is, so to speak, turned back onto a study of itself, then such a 
manoeuvre can lead, on the one hand (when things appear to be going 
well analytically), to a misrecognition of the reliance we place on 
our extant competence as something which is really essential in the 
rule, and on the other simply to paradox, when the multiplicity of 
our practices deny the rule the singular role the analyst wishes it 
to play. 
However, even if all this can be seen in the right light, there 
is another analytic 'temptation' which must also be avoided. This 
may be described as an attempt to 'slacken' the determinacy of a 
rule-governed account into something more approximate, where the 
'approximation' supposedly describes how rules are actually employed 
in everyday usage. If the reader casts his or her mind back to 
Chapter One, it will be remembered that Searle suggested that his 
speech act analysis could be seen in this way since 'idealization' 
was a prerequisite of any systematic analysis. But once that argument 
was accepted, we saw how Searle felt able to conceive of rule systems 
of a greater generality and scope: individual speech acts could be 
grouped into classes and these, in turn, formed even more basic 
'illocutionary types'. A successful explanation of language mastery 
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was seen ultimately to depend upon this reduction. The irony of this 
is that the move towards understanding a determinate analysis as an 
approximation, in fact motivates further idealization, when such 
idealization and the problems it qenerated prompted the understanding 
of analysis as an 'approximation' in the first place. Wittgenstein 
is very much aware of this manoeuvre because it is something which he 
indulged in himself in his early work. He puts it like this: 
F.P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me 
that logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know 
exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless 
closely related to what only dawned on me later: 
namely that in philosophy we often compare the use of 
words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, 
but cannot say that someone who is using language 
must be playing such a game. - But if you say that 
our languages only approximate to such calculi, you 
are on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For 
then it may look as if what we were talking about 
were an ideal language. As if our logic were, so to 
speak, a logic for a vac~m. - Whereas logic does not 
treat of language - or of thought - in the sense in 
which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, 
and the most that can be said is that we construct 
ideal languages. But here the word 'ideal' is liable 
to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were 
better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and 
as if it took a logician to shew people what a proper 
sentence looked like ... what lead ... me to think 
that if anyone utters a sentence and means or 
understands it, he is operating a calculus according 
to definite rules. 
(ibid., para. 81) 
Later on in the Investigations at a point where the concept of 
rule-following receives an extended treatment, Wittgenstein explicates 
the problem of construing something and understanding as the upshot 
of such 'definite rules'. The vehicle for this demonstration is another 
of his anthropological thought experiments reminiscent of the 'strange 
country' example above (see para. 32). The aim of this experiment is 
to turn the notion of the ideal (language; set of rules, etc.) on its 
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head. This is done by first imagining a situation in which a game 
(of chess) is conducted by those who have no knowledge of games as 
such, and then imagining a situation in which the rules are translated 
into behaviour we find hard to see in terms of the rules. 
It is, of course, imaginable that two people 
belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games should 
sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a 
game of chess; and even with all the appropriate 
mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it, 
we should say they were playing chess. But now 
imagine a game of chess translated according to 
certain rules into a series of actions which we do 
not ordinarily associate with a game - say into 
yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those 
two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the 
form of chess that we are used to; and this in such 
a way that their procedure is translatable by 
suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we 
still be inclined to say they were playing a game? 
What right would one have to say so? 
(ibid., para. 200) 
In the first case they are not playing chess, but we see that they 
are. In the second case, they are, albeit a translated version (which 
really is no more strange than reading a musical score and then 
hearing it 'translated' into sound by an orchestra) but we find the 
idea very hard to entertain. The contingency of rule-following in 
human activity (here exemplified in the participation in and 
observation of a game), makes the idea of rule-determinacy indefinitely 
problematic. Wittgenstein expresses it thus: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be 
determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer 
. I 
was: if everythiR9~can be made out to accord with the . 
rule then it ca~~ made out to conflict with it. And 
so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
He then describes a species of the misguided idea of analysis as 
approximation. This is the notion that one could interpolate the 
concept of interpretation between the rule and its object. The 
paragraph continues: 
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It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding 
here from the mere fact that in the course of our 
argument we give one interpretation after another; 
as in each one contented us at least for a moment, 
until we thought of yet another standing behind it. 
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping 
a rule which is not an interpretation, but which 
is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' 
and 'going against it' in actual cases. 
Hence there is an inclination to say: every 
according to the rule is an interpretation. 




substitution of one expression of the rule for 
another. 
(ibid., para. 201) 
Here, once again, Wittgenstein is focusing on antithetical and 
yet closely related ways in which we can be misled by an analysis of 
rules. Just because rule determinacy ends in 'paradox', that does not 
mean that we then ought to see every application of a rule as an 
interpretation of it. In the light of the latter part of this remark, 
a question can be raised as to whether the conversation analyst's 
notion of rule orientation is a variant of this misguided idea. As 
was seen in Chapter Two, the rules conversation analysts formulate 
are said to be possessed of a general character and it may now look 
as if the practices of members in orienting- to these rules could be 
just as well described as interpretations of them. If that is the case, 
then here at least is one instance where conversation analysis and 
Wittgenstein's philosophy cannot be seen as consistent one with the 
other. 
However, in that chapter it was emphasized that members are not 
to be viewed as orienting-to rules merely in order to purchase a degree 
of flexibility by, so to speak, loosening the boltsof an analytic 
framework that had been overtightened by a theory like Searle's. 
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This, in essence, is the view put forward by Phillips so that conversation 
analysis can be seen as consistent with mainstream linguistic analysis 
and a contribution to it. If such 'loosening' was the substance of 
the conversation analyst's concept of rule-following, then it appears 
that orientation would be construable as if members 'interpreted' the 
rules. But, as that chapter stated, the generality of the rules 
formulated by ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts are 
oriented-to by members as they work to assemble the sense of utterances 
in particular social settings. That is not the substitution of a rule 
for an interpretation of it: that is rule use. 
Nonetheless, practitioners in that perspective do speak of 
members' interpretive practices and this would presumably include 
interpretation of rules. And there is a clear sense in which 
Wittgenstein's own examples of persons applying a rule differently 
could be spoken of as amounting to different interpretations of a rule. 
If the later philosophy is concerned to outlaw such usage, then it 
seems not only that there is a clear divergence between the perspectives 
on this matter, but also that Wittgenstein's stricture flies in the 
face of ordinary usage. However, I believe that to view matters this 
way is to misunderstand Wittgenstein's point. He is not seeking to 
deny the reality of interpretive practices in the use of rules, but, 
rather, once again, to forestall an analytic construal of them which 
could support the fundamentally mistaken idea that the activities of 
language use rest upon a foundation of determinate rules. That is, if 
one could say that every use of rule was an interpretation, then it 
would be possible to retain the rigid framework intact as these 
'interpretations' could function like shock absorbers to soak up the 
flexibilities of actual usage. 
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In Chapter Two, it was also argued that rule analysis in 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis must be seen as part and 
parcel of a reflexive conception of the relationship between analysis 
and its object. In this Chapter, I have indicated some strikingly 
similar insights about that relationship in Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy. It is clear that the restructuring of the concept of rule 
is one of the main exemplifications of this insight. However, it is 
not the only one and I now want to consider a concept which has been 
used by Wittgenstein in some of the quotations reproduced in the chapter, 
in order to develop this insight still further and provide an opportunity 
to make some more connections with the work of Garfinkel and Sacks. 
. . . (22) The concept ln questlon lS that of grammar. 
IX. The Concept of 'Grammar' and the Work of Analysis 
Wittgenstein speaks of his work in terms of grammatical 
'investigations', 'notes' and 'remarks' (1968, p. 59, note a; paras. 
232 and 574). By this, he means the elicitation of rules in terms of 
the ordinary descriptions, evaluations, explanations and accounts we 
give of words, concepts, activities, fictive worlds, natural phenomena 
and so forth; in fact anything and everything which forms part of the 
human stock of knowledge. Consequently, it has a much broader sense 
than the concept of grammar as it is used conventionally. It has a 
particular relevance to Wittgenstein's understanding of the indivisibility 
of what we know and how we speak. A comparison between the early and 
late philosophy will serve to illustrate something of the scope of the 
concept. The Tractatus was intended as a grammar in this extended 
sense since the structure of language was seen to provide the key to 
the structure of reality. An analysis of the former disclosed the 
- 219 -
nature of the reality of the latter. As we have seen, in the 
Investigations language is still the topic of inquiry and it is still 
the case that the relationship between language and reality is an 
isomorphic one. However, the reason for this is not because language 
must imitate the logical form of the world. Rather, it is because the 
structure of reality is itself a representation of the grammar (in the 
extended sense) of language. This point is made in a very stark and 
summary fashion in the Investigations: 
Essence is expressed by grammar. 
Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, paras. 371 and 373) 
Another way to ascertain the meaning of Wittgenstein's notion of 
grammar is to look at it in terms of the understanding of the task of 
philosophy in his later period. Typically, he can be at his most 
obscure when commenting upon this: 
What is your aim in philosophy? - To shew the 
fly the way out of the fly-bottle. 
(ibid., para. 309) 
The philosopher's job, it seems, is to eradicate misconceptions. 
The results of philosophy are the uncovering of 
one or another piece of plain nonsense and of 
bumps that the understanding has got by running 
its head up against the limits of language. 
(ibid., para. 119) 
This is to be done by giving a perspicuous representation of our grammar, 
that is, to designate the way we look at things; what Wittgenstein calls 
our form of representation. And what this work reveals is that: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that 
we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. 
- Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. 
A perspicuous representation produces just that 
- 220 -
understanding which consists in 'seeeing connexions'. 
Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
intermediate cases. 
(ibid., para. 122) 
Earlier, I remarked on the contingency of Wittgenstein's 
conception of the rules of language and quoted Cavell to the effect 
that nothing guaranteed our making or understanding of utterances and 
activities. What Wittgenstein means by a form of representation can 
tell us more about the nature of this contingency. The first thing 
to note about a form of representation is its inclusivity. In the 
remark immediately above,Wittgenstein continues: 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of 
fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the 
form of account we give, the way we look at things. 
(Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) 
(ibid., para. 122) 
To see this inclusivity in the right way, we first have to ask: 'Given 
that "we do not command a clear view of the use of our words", in what 
sense is a representation going to be "perspicuous"?' Wittgenstein 
appears to be saying two incompatible things about language. I believe 
his answer is that perspicuity will depend upon not attempting to force 
the form of one represenation of reality onto all 'forms'. That, of 
course, presupposes there to be more than one. Wittgenstein's view 
that this is, in fact, the case is based in part on his examination of 
the way analysis can itself force the objects of its inquiry into a 
mirror of its own image. This, as we have seen, is one of the main 
points of the critique of rule analysis. However, the concept of forms 
of representation must also involve a substantive philosophical claim, 
that is, it is a metaphysical claim in its own right. Once again, this 
is best illustrated by comparing the 'early' and 'late' philosophy. 
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The unalterability and uniqueness of the pictorial form in the 
Tractatus is completely absent in the later conception of the form of 
representation. In the later conception, our form of representation, 
the way we look at reality, is seen to be a part of our history. 
Nevertheless, the later philosophy characterizes a form of representation 
as fundamentally arbitrary. Even though such a form may have its roots 
in our historical development, no set of historical circumstances have 
ensured that we see the world in the way that we do. This would merely 
amount to a replication of the unalterability of the Tractatus's concept 
of pictorial form on the stage of human history. The facticity of the 
world cannot be grasped in its entirety either logically or historically. 
Instead, Wittgenstein's attention is focused on something which looks 
much humbler. Certain general assertions which we can make in everyday 
speech (but, interestingly, mostly do not because of their obviousness 
to us) look as if they are about the world in a straightforwardly 
empirical way. However, they are: 
... in fact 'about the net and not about what the 
net describes'. They are a priori, yet they only 
reflect our form of representation, the conceptual 
connections which give sense to the sentences by 
means of which we describe the world. 
(Hacker, 1972, p. 147) 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein says: 
The truth of certain empirical propositions 
belongs to our frame of reference. 
(Wittgenstein, 1969, para. 83) 
But that does not mean that they are necessarily true. Rather, they 
are necessary to a certain way of seeing the world, not absolutely 
necessary to any view of the world whatever. One might say, such 
propositions are contingently necessary. That is, such propositions 
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are necessary to the possibility of understanding, and yet the 
propositions could be (and for others, imagined and encountered, may 
be) other than they are for us. 
An example will help to explain ~'--. LlllS. To relinquish the claim 
that the world has existed for many years would render problematic 
most, if not all, of our empirical knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult 
to imagine exactly how it would, and how much it would, because to take 
away this part of our frame of reference would leave the matter of 
assessment deeply indefinite as well. On a more personal level, to 
seriously doubt whether I have a body is a ground for doubting my sanity 
or my understanding of what I say. Claims such as I have a body, that 
the world existed long before my birth, are part of the core of judgements 
which are interwoven with all the other judgements which we learn in our 
community. Nonetheless, some beliefs in this category of empirical 
knowledge have altered through time. The flatness of the earth, its 
place at the centre of the universe, have been displaced in our cosmology. 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein suggests that these unassailable or 
entrenched empirical sentences can be thought of as a kind of mythology. 
And he compares the role of these sentences to the rules of a game 
which are learned practically rather than by explicit enunciation. He 
describes all this in a telling metaphor. 
It might be imagined that some propositions of 
the form of empirical propositions, were hardened 
and functioned as channels for such empirical 
prepositions as were not hardened but fluid; and 
that this relation altered with time, in that fluid 
propositions became hardened, and hard ones became 
fluid. 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, 
the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I 
distinguish between the movement of the waters on 
the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; 
though there is not a sharp division of the one 
from the other. 
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But if someone were to say 'So logic too is an 
empirical science', he would be wrong. Yet this 
is right: the same proposition may get treated 
at one time as something to test by experience, 
and at another as a rule of testing. 
And the bank of that river consists partly of 
hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to 
an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now 
in one place, now in another, gets washed away 
or deposited. 
(ibid., paras. 96-99) 
For many cornrnentators.on Wittgenstein, the attractiveness of this 
picture depends upon how widely or how narrowly one is prepared to 
construe 'grammar'. Even if the rationale of the argument is 
accepted, namely that we mistake the nature of the grounds of our 
forms of representation by asking factual questions about objects in 
the world, its conclusions seem to take us towards a view of understanding 
which is itself dubious. The problem can be put this way. If one accepts 
what seem to be the implications of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar, 
then one appears to be committed not merely to anthropological relativism 
but, as Hacker puts it, to some form of sociolinguistic solipsism. 
That is, all language will be our language . 
... the grounds in terms of which we can identify 
an alternative conceptual scheme as a conceptual 
scheme will be whisked from under our feet. Not 
only will alternative grammars be incomparable, 
they won't even be identifiable. 
(Hacker, 1972, p. 173) 
One response to this dilemma is the strategy of demarcating between 
information and explanation. Whilst the latter can be seen to be 
dependent upon the grammar of a categorical framework or theory, there 
. (23) is some sense of information for which this ~s not so. Of course, 
the problem, in the light of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, lies in 
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developing and justifying this sense of 'framework-free' information. 
For Hollis (1968), this must commence by observing a truism. We occupy 
a common unified spatia-temporal world. There may be differences in 
perception conditioned by different grammars, but it would be impossible 
to identify a creature as a language-using animal unless we assume 
some basic perceptual commonalities. In turn, for that to be possible, 
it is necessary to assume a degree of common nature if we are going 
to be able to identify perceptual responses for what they are. Such 
an assumption is what makes us able to muster a prima facie 
identification of a language user at all. Then, if one accepts the 
argument so far, the ability to identify rests upon the ability to 
grasp the sense of a (possible) sentence which in turn rests upon the 
ability to discriminate it from other sentences. That ability rests 
upon a common, if unstated, idea of truth which is itself going to be 
dependent upon the 'non-optionality' of laws of logic like non-
contradiction and identity. 
Hacker himself takes the view that Wittgenstein underemphasized 
these factors in his later philosophy because of his eagerness to 
combat the Platonism of his early work. What this underemphasis 
amounts to is that Wittgenstein threw the 'universalist' baby out with 
the 'Platonist' bathwater. As a result, the later philosophy: 
... led him to obscure if not to underestimate the 
universal features of thought and the common 
structural elements of conceptual schemes, and he 
correspondingly overemphasized the arbitrary 
features of our conceptual scheme and the parochial 
implications of the fact that whatever limitations 
we place upon our concept of thought and language, 
it is we who place them upon our concept. 
(Hacker, 1972, pp. 175-6) 
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To conceive of 'grammars' as lacking any stable core of elements and 
principles is, Hacker believes, to claim that there are no restrictions 
on the concept of a language, and, together with that, no general 
necessary conditions of the possibility of conceptualized experience 
of an objective world. However, Hacker is not denying that it is a 
contingent fact of nature that the world contains sufficient regularity 
to be an object of empirical knowledge and human communication. Rather, 
his argument is, given that this is contingently so, it by no means 
follows that the conceptualization of experience is limited by no 
bounds of sense. 
It seems then that even for as sympathetic a commentator as Hacker, 
the concept of grammar in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is too anarchic. 
We have to accept that the diversity of possible grammars are constrained, 
however minimally, by universal forms (of thought) which provide them 
with a common foundation. In terms of this thesis, Hacker's Kantian 
gloss on Wittgenstein's thinking has a familiar ring about it. Hacker's 
worry that the full impact of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar 
eventuates in some form of socio-linguistic solipsism, is very similar 
to the view that Garfinkel's concept of indexicality makes members look 
like 'situational' solipsists. For Phillips, the anchoring of language 
use in a firm foundation of rules avoids this outcome. That solution 
would be unsatisfactory for Hacker as he cannot read Wittgenstein's 
analysis of rule-following in a way that is compatible with such a 
proposal. Nevertheless, if Wittgenstein's analysis is left as it is 
(and it is significant that Hacker does not try and retail his own 
neo-Kantian gloss on the later philosophy as an element of 
Wittgenstein's own thinking), Hacker cannot see a viabl~ way to avoid 
a degree of relativism which is distinguishable from 'socio-linguistic 
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solipsism'. The supposition of a core of rules will not do, but 
there must be some minimal constraints which make possible not only 
the intelligibility, but the very identifiability of alternative 
grammars. Grammar may be arbitrary in most respects, but Hacker, 
nonetheless, feels that Strawson must be right when he says: 
There is a massive central core of human thinking 
which has no history - or none recorded in 
histories of thought; there are categories and 
concepts which, in their most fundamental 
character, change not at all. 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 10) 
It appears then that in addition to their understanding on rules, 
that Wittgenstein and Garfinkel do have as much in common when one 
examines the implications of their respective notions of 'grammar' 
and 'indexicality'. However, what an inspection of this common ground 
reveals is an implicit commitment to a form of relativism so acute 
that it is practically indistinguishable from solipsism. Phillips 
and Hacker suggest, each in their own way, that to overcome this 
problem requires finding the requisite degree of universality either 
in a set of rules or in a changeless core of human thinking. Put 
simply, Wittgenstein and Garfinkel just go too far. Their analyses 
overstep an admittedly almost invisible, but nonetheless, crucially 
important boundary of sense which requires there to be some minimum 
structural similarity in the diversity of linguistic usage, if the 
concept of language and its uses are to remain a coherent idea and 
practice. So, in the end Phillips explicitly, and Hacker mutedly, 
are telling us that despite the importance of the contributions their 
originators have made to the study of language, these concepts can 
only make a fit subject of study for those interested in the pathology 
of the intellect. 
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There are two things of striking significance about this 
unanimity. The first is that the very similar arguments put forward 
by Phillips and Hacker about the relativist problem each perceives 
is answered in a very different way by each of them. As stated 
already, it is clear that Hacker's reading of Wittgenstein makes it 
impossible for him to construe Wittgenstein's analysis of rules in a 
way compatible with Phillips's supposedly 'Wittgenstenian' proposals 
for rule analysis. However, this observation is not a cue for re-opening 
that issue as the reasons for rejecting Phillips's account have been 
aired already. Rather, the observation is meant to direct attention 
to the similarity of the analytic role to be played by 'rules' on the 
one hand, and this 'changeless core' on the other. The second is the 
perception that the upshot of accepting the implications of 'grammar' 
and 'indexicality' would involve embracing some form of solipsism. 
This perception is especially interesting in the light of the fact 
that the problem of solipsism was a major concern of Wittgenstein's 
in the later philosophy. I believe that an examination of his views 
on the subject will allow a rehabilitation of the concepts of 'grammar' 
and 'indexicality' and show the importance each bears to the 
understanding of rule-following. And this rehabilitation will in 
turn also show how the concept of reflexivity is part and parcel of 
understanding what it is to follow a rule. 
X. Rule Following, Solipsism and Private Language 
Solipsism is the doctrine that nothing exists save myself and 
mental states of myself. Wittgenstein's most important argument 
against solipsism in the later philosophy is his argument against 
the possibility of a private language. This is directed towards 
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showing that a conception of language motivated by philosophical 
scepticism about the existence of other minds terminates in 
incoherence. So the argument is negative in the sense that it 
resembles a reductio ad absurdum. Characteristically, Wittgenstein 
does not indicate explicitly the targets of his attack in the 
discussion of the impossibility of a private language, but the 
Tractatus had involved a tacit commitment to such a position. The 
argument is also positive in a sense as well, something which can be 
gleaned from the following consideration. Earlier, I said that one 
way to ascertain the meaning of grammar in Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy was to look at it in terms of his understanding of the task 
of philosophy, and reproduced his obscure comment that his aim was 
'to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'. Some light can now 
be cast upon that obscurity. The fly in the fly-bottle was originally 
conceived of as the solipsist. At the time (circa 1935) he wrotes his 
Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data', he put 
the matter like this: 
The solipsist flutters and flutters in the flyglass, 
strikes against the walls, flutters further. How 
can he be brought to rest? 
(Rhees, ed. 1968) 
It is this hopeless struggle which is to be relieved by the argument 
against a private language, which argument, furthermore, forms an 
integral part of his analysis of the wherewithal of language mastery. 
This is the positive aspect and exhibits Wittgenstein's commitment to 
viewing the concepts of rule, grammar and the private language problem 
as intimately related to one another. 
In discussing the possibility of grounding language mastery in 
ostensive definition or inner mentation, it was shown that Wittgenstein 
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saw the acquisition, possession and exercise of concepts as something 
which involved 'the mastery of a technique' (see Wittgenstein, 1968, 
para 199). Knowing what a word means, possessing a concept expressed 
by a word or an utterance may be accompanied by mental processes such 
as an image, or a feeling of familiarity. But the mastery of language 
is not the sum of such processes, however they might be construed. 
Instead, it is a capacity, which is to say that a person knows what 
a word means when he can use a rule for its employment. Nonetheless, 
as we have seen, language is not 'surrounded' by rules. That idea 
merely eventuates in paradox. However, the problem lies in seeing 
this in the right way and in particular avoiding the temptation of 
providing an alternative anchor in the mind or in outwardly visible 
behaviour, in order to secure a firmness we are inclined to see as a 
necessity for communication because of the regularity and certainty 
of everyday language use. What is emphasised over and over again in 
the later philosophy is that the orderliness of everyday language 
does not require some unshakable foundation, which an analysis will 
reveal. That orderliness lies on the 'surface' of language, it is 
not something hidden beneath which, as Wittgenstein says, requires 
'an analysis to dig it out'. 
So a very important irony which the argument against a private 
language exposes is that the tradition of philosophical scepticism, 
which finds one of its strongest expressions in solipsism, is a mirror 
image of the idea that if language is to be possible, it must be 
grounded in an unshakable foundation of the reality of rules, or 
mental states, behaviour, or the thesis of extensionality. If fact, 
Wittgenstein had seen this at the time of the Tractatus. 
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5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its 
implications are followed out strictly, 
coincides with pure realism. The self of 
solipsism shrinks to a point without 
extension, and there remains the reality 
co-ordinated with it. 
(Wittgenstein, 1961) 
The reason for this is that the 'self' in the Tractatus represented 
the constant form of all experienc~ the unspeakable, unanalysable 
elements of the ego. 
5.362 The subject does not belong to the world: 
rather, it is a limit of the world. 
(ibid.) 
Solipsism is the attempt to say what is transcendental silence. But 
in the later philosophy, the fly's affliction is not the struggle of 
trying to articulate that which must remain silent. The way to show 
the fly the way out of the fly-bottle lies in showing how the self 
and reality in fact 'coincide' in the community of practical activity 
and sociation. It is the community which supplies the certainty and 
regularity which makes communication possible. And it is, moreover, 
that certainty and regularity which provide the motivation and the 
resources for the construction of analyses which attempt to reveal the 
certainties of everyday usage as the upshot of rules; the outward 
expression of inner awareness; as something determinable behaviouristically, 
or as something traceable via a purely extensional semantics. These 
all require different 'therapies', but they have a common aim. 
Wittgenstein describes it thus: 
It is not our aim to refine or complete the system 
of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of 
ways. 
For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete 
clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical 
problems should completely disappear. 
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The real discovery is the one that makes me 
capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want 
to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so 
that is no longer tormented by questions which 
bring itself in question. - Instead, we now 
demonstrate a method, by examples and the series 
of Pxamples can be broken of. - Problems are 
solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single 
problem. 
Thc;e is not ~ philosophical method, though there 
are indeed methods, like different therapies. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 133) 
If philosophy is seen to provide the key to rPality, then as 
Wittgenstein says, it is difficult to 'stop doing it'. The reason 
for this is that if it appears to unearth the essence of things, then 
the philosophical impulse to account for this revelatory quality of 
the discipline constantly exercises a desire to analyse its subject 
matter. This can eventuate in such a radical dismemberment of the 
subject matter that the result is to bring 'itself into question'. 
A clear example of this impulse in this thesis, according to Searle, 
was Quine's analysis of language which, in rendering problematic the 
use of criteria employed in everyday linguistic usage, eventually 
made analysis itself something indeterminate. It has been argued here, 
though, that Searle's work displays a milder form of this obsession; 
exemplified by the analysis of indirect speech which really only served 
to maintain his original thesis of rule determinacy. In their 
respective fashions, and to different degrees, Quine and Searle indulge 
the same philosophical error. Instead of trying to understand the 
certainty and regularity of the everyday world (what Garfinkel refers 
to as its obstinate familiarity) as something provided by the practices 
of the members of that world, an analysis is sought which can itself 
provide a foundation for that certainty and regularity. Philosophical 
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analysis, as a result, becomes a concrete determinant of practice. 
Consequently, it can never be 'given peace' as it has effectively 
taken on the role of constant and universal actuation of those 
practices. 
One of the claims which threads through Wittgenstein's discussion 
is that if that role for analysis is entertained, it, in turn, breeds 
a scepticism which in its most acute form can only be remedied by a 
commitment to solipsism. And there is evidence for this view in an 
analysis like Quine's which is not unlike a return journey from the 
inner recesses of certainty, with the goal of the journey being the 
provision of a proper foundation for communication by means of criteria 
which will operate in an extensionally clear manner. As Searle says, 
in Quine's analysis the intuitions of the native speaker have become 
totally alienated from him. And what those intuitions comprise, is 
the knowledge of the practices of a linguistic community. 
However, it is just as important not to fall into another trap 
in avoiding this alienation of the speaker from the community. 
Recognition of the importance of a linguistic community to what it is 
to speak and understand makes it possible to indulge in another sort 
of error. This has been mentioned already when speaking about the 
concept of a form of representation in discussing Wittgenstein's 
idea of grammar. There it was said that even though the later 
philosophy characterizes a form of representation as something which 
is fundamentally arbitrary, and even though such a form may have its 
roots in our history and culture, neither ensures that we see the world 
in the way we do. To assume that a historical or cultural or any 
other sociological analysis could perform this role would merely amount 
to a replication of the unalterability of the Tractatus's concept of 
pictorial form on the stage of human history and society. 
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Wittgenstein recognised this as an inherent danger of his later 
philosophy, given its commitment to understanding language as a social 
phenomenon. In fact, such significance is attached to this danger 
that solipsism is not rejected in quite the unequivocal way that his 
overall philosophical commitments leacl one to expect. Consequently, 
it is extremely important to understand what his argument against the 
idea of a private language does not say. For although Wittgenstein 
does not find any way to assert the argument for a private language 
by means that are other than self-contradictory, he is not content 
to let matters rest there. The reason for this is that merely pointing 
out contradictions does nothing to illuminate why the argument is so 
attractive. 
According to Wittgenstein, a major source of the argument's appeal 
is based in its idea that the point of language is to convey what is 
going on in the mind of the speaker. Communication consists of an 
endless bulletin from each speaker about what is going on 'inside' his 
or her mincl.r The epistemic certainty which is supposedly afforded by 
the individual ego manifests itself in this almost boorish emphasis 
to tell others about the contents of one's own mind. In an explication 
of the notion of telling, Wittgenstein shows how this reifies the 
concept of mind . 
... But how is telling done? Whan are we said to 
tell anything? - What is the language game of telling? 
I should like to say: you regard it too much as a 
matter of course that one can tell anything to 
anyone. That is to say: we are so much accustomed 
to communication through language, in conversation, 
that it looks to us as if the whole point of 
communication lay in this: someone else grasps 
the sense of my words - which is something mental: 
he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he 
then does something further with it as well, that 
is no part of the immediate purpose of language. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 363) 
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However, this explication has an aim which goes beyond its immediate 
purpose. Its underlying rationale is to show how the use of a concept 
like rule can replicate such reification when the earlier philosophy's 
emphasis on the idea of logical form is replr1ced with the socio-logical 
emphasis on 'forms of life'. As we have seen, it is crucial to 
Wittgenstein that the indefiniteness of rules is not repaired by a 
like determinism in the analytic use of them. 
It is in the light of these considerations that one can begin to 
unravel the reasons why Wittgenstein in his private language argument 
does not attack the idea of the imaginary soliloquist. Instead, the 
attitude is directed at a speaker whose concepts are essentially 
unshareable rather than contingently unshared. What this means is 
that to infer that the language of a socially isolated individual is 
inconceivable because language is a social phenomenon is an error. 
The conclusion does not follow, notwithstanding Wittgenstein's 
commitment to the idea that language use is an activity which is 
integral to communal life. Given the commitments of the later 
philosophy, the pressing question is why is he hostile to this 
inference? The reason, I believe, is closely connected with another 
inference which can easily be made and which nevertheless is also one 
that Wittgenstein does not make. Wittgenstein does not explore what 
would have to be involved in trying to teach another person the meaning 
of the terms of one's private language. This paucity of argument stands 
in contrast to the great deal of attention which he devotes to spelling 
out the problems inherent in certain conceptions of rule following. 
And this may be why it has been presumed that Wittgenstein is really 
saying that an unteachable language is logically impossible. However, 
this is not an inference Wittgenstein makes. The fact that we must 
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learn languaqe in order to be 'recognisable as a language-using 
animal', as Hollis puts it, is something that he is willing to accept. 
But only on the understanding that it is a contingent fact about our 
constitution .. 
It is only when matters are put this way that the necessity of 
community to communication can be seen in the right way. An 
examination of the following quotation will explain this more fully: 
'What would it be like if human beings shewed no 
outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? 
Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use 
of the word "tooth-ache".' -Well, let's assume 
the child is a genius and itself invents a name for 
the sensation! - But then, of course, he couldn't 
make himself understood when he used the word. - So 
does he understand the name, without being able to 
explain its meaning to anyone? - But what does it 
mean to say that he has 'named his pain'? - How has 
he done this naming of pain,! And whatever he did, 
what was its purpose? - When one says 'He gave a 
name to his sensation' one forgets that a great 
deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed 
if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And 
when we speak of someone's having given a name to 
pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the 
grammar of the word 'pain'; it shews the post where 
the new word is stationed. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 257) 
On first reading this paragraph, it does look as if Wittgenstein is 
saying that a child genius's invention of a name for a sensation of 
tooth-ache is simply not possible. But on a closer reading, it becomes 
clear that Wittgenstein is saying that if language-use is a social fact, 
that does not exhaust the possibility that a child genius should 
invent a name for his sensation. When he says 'it would be impossible 
to teach a child the use of the word tooth-ache, the impossibility is 
grammatical. That does not make his invention of a name impossible. 
The point is that in his community where 'human beings showed no 
outward sign of pain ... ', the name would lack purpose in the language< 
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As Wittgenstein made clear in his discussion of Augustine' theory 
(see above), a great deal of stage-setting is presupposed 'if the 
mere act of naming is to make sense'. Well, in this possible 
community it may well be that the props for naming are there in all 
other respects. And if that is so, that it is only 'pain' that has 
'no outward sign', then isn't this child not unlike a figure like 
Freud who in our culture objectified the 'unconscious' for us in an 
entirely new way. 
On the other hand, it may be that 'naming' is unintelligible, 
perhaps,as Hacker says, even unidentifiable to his linguistic community. 
However, to then say, 'therefore his meaning pain is impossible', may 
be to forget that 'possibility' and 'impossibility' have their grammar 
too. And for this to be understood in the right way, it is important 
to remember that: 
Grammar does not tell us how language must be 
constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in 
order to have such and such an effect on human 
beings. It only describes and in no way explains 
the use of signs. 
The rules of grammar may be called 'arbitrary', if 
that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is 
nothing but that of the language. If someone says 
'If our language had not this grammar, it could not 
express these facts' - it should be asked what 
'could' means here. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, paras. 496/7) 
In rejecting the implication that such naming is impossible per se, 
Wittgenstein avoids replacing the determinism of the early philosophy's 
concept of logical form with a functionally identical determinism of 
social forms. Yet, in maintaining that the impossibility is grammatical, 
he does not have to seek reliance upon universal categories as features 
of any conceivable language. Consequently, he does not derogate from 
the proposition that 'Grammar tells us what kind of object anything 
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is' (1968, para. 373), by locating some changeless core of human 
thinking. And this is how he can maintain that linguistic practice 
shapes the possibilities of objects without reifying the practices 
of t.hat. rommnnity ns the 'n.1.les', 'core', 'essence', and so on, of 
what it is to speak, understand and know. 
The certainty and regularity of everyday usage is, in Wittgenstein's 
view, inherent in the practices of members of the linguistic community. 
To treat those practices as requiring some anchor beyond the fact of 
those practices only results in a reification of the analytic practices 
elected by the investigator. This explains how analysis can look as 
if it delineates the real constituents of the possibility of speech 
and social action generally, and yet it is the analysis itself which 
requires the existence of 'univ~als', be they in the guise of a 
determinate set of rules or a changeless core of human thinking. In 
other words, this kind of analysis provides the rationale for its own 
reification. It is not seen as an instance of the practices it 
investigates. Rather, what it delineates is taken as the foundation 
of those practices. As noted earlier, when discussing Wittgenstein's 
view of the task of philosophy, this means that the discipline can 
never be given peace since it effectively takes on the role of 
actuating the practices of the linguistic community. 
Having explicated something more of Wittgenstein's concept of 
grammar through this discussion of his views on solipsism and the 
private language argument, it is clear that there are strong affinities 
between his views awl those of Garfinkel and Sacks. Wnat I have 
described as the charge of situational solipsism levelled against them 
is not really concerned with finding a level of unshakeable epistemic 
and semantic certainty for language users, as the charge suggests. 
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Time and again, both authors make it clear that members have no need 
for such foundations since their practices construct in a thoroughly 
practical and ongoing manner all such support they need. If the 
charge was COLLectly laid, then the certainty and regularity of 
everyday language use could only be something puzzling and miraculous 
for ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts. They accept the 
fact of such certainty and regularity without hesitation. What 
interests them is its production. The emphasis on the specifics of 
interaction in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis is not 
motivated by scepticism, but rather by a concern to describe the ways 
members make sense of the world. In other words, their focus is not 
a result of viewing some particular situation of current interaction 
as the only forum where meanings can make sense. That would require 
boundaries to be drawn around the concept of 'a situation', that, if 
it did not make the concept altogether unemployable, would certainly 
conflict with the view of meaning which is displayed in the 
prosecution of ethnomethodological and conversation analytic inquiries. 
XI. The Communal and the Systematic 
However, if this continuity can be found, then, as mentioned 
earlier, it only brings us before the problem of reconciling the 
unsystematicity of Wittgenstein's writings with the highly systematic 
inquiries undertaken by conversation analysts in particular. Phillips 
provided the appearance of such a reconciliation by suggesting that 
Wittgenstein's concepts of 'language-games' and 'forms of life' could 
be seen in terms of interstitial systems of ruled devices which were 
analysable systematically. But, obviously, since his views on 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy have been r~jected here, it 'c not 
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possible to advance an argument of that kind at all. And it has also 
been argued in these pages that a portrayal of language in these terms 
is reliant upon the constructive powers of language which can involve 
concretizing elements in the system as Ute real constituents of speech 
and interaction. 
It is tempting to construe this concretizing in terms of the 
misuse of metaphor. That is, a systematic account of linguistic 
usage can only be a picture of something, not the thing itself. In 
this way, the systematicity of analysis is seen as a model, which 
only those who are crude and unreflexive insist portrays the real 
constituents of language use. From this point of view, understanding 
analysis involves being sophisticated enough to realize that any 
analysis is 'just another account'. And it has to be said that this 
somewhat jaded perception of the matter does square with the recognition 
that analysis is an instance of what it describes; even if the democracy 
of that perception is only shared amongst a few. I believe the incipient 
nihilism in this outlook is the target of Blum et al's attack, reported 
in the opening pages of this Chapter and which, together with the focus 
on systematic empirical investigation, leads to dubbing the perspective 
as merely another form of positivism. The importance of a critique 
like Blum's is his recognition that the nihilism is prompted by the 
disappointment of the expectation that analysis could 'dig out' the 
underlying constituents of language mastery. 
As remarked upon earlier, it is noteworthy that Blum's notion of 
theorizing, which produces reflexive understanding, is a task remote 
from everyday activities. Blum and his collaborators argue that the 
rationality of any systematic form of inquiry means that the reflexivity 
derived from that investigation is merely a product of its own 
scientific methods. As a result, such inquiry 'itself becomes a 
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metaphor for the rational-legal development of thought . . . typified 
in the reflexivity of the rational-legal agent' (Blum, 1974, p. 227: 
see above). In consequence, it is only an analysis which 'provides 
fer the world which would produce the topic of analysis as an 
j_nteresting problem', which can get beyond terminating its inquiries 
by the 'formulation of parameters such as rule', and thereby exhibit 
the 'grounds of clarity or language as they become disclosed through 
any method or speech ... ' that can truly be called reflexive (ibid., 
pp. 45 and 46: see above). For Blum then, the idea of the reflexivity 
of rule analysis canvassed in this thesis is at best ironic, at worst 
a contradiction in terms. But the power of Blum's reasoning lies in 
the way the practitioners of 'rational-legal' modes of analysis must, 
so to speak, necessarily sup with the positivist devil. This is 
surprising in the light of his recognition of the importance of 
personal commitment to analytic activity since this implies that no 
method either safeguards the prosecution of reflexive inquiry or 
entails a commitment to positivism. 
Thus, what is required if a systematic approach is to be reconciled 
with a reflexive understanding is some alternative to these construals 
of the analyst's task. I believe Wittgenstein does offer such an 
alternative and moreover, one that the work of Garfinkel and Sacks can 
be seen to be consistent with. To fully explicate this alternative, 
it is first worth examining the idea of an explanatory device as a 
metaphor or model. Here the idea is that the analyst employs a 
linguistic device to picture a process that can thereby be rendered 
intelligible to our understanding. They are ... as if ... pictures, 
e.g. 'think of the brain as a digital computer ... think of the mind 
as a computer programme'. Such devices are undoubtedly very helpful 
and sometimes, as with this particular example, capable of being 
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highly misleading. Sometimes, though, it is difficult to tell 
whether such a metaphor is actually being offered or whether in fact 
what is on offer is a real portrayal of the actual constituents of 
the object 1n question. But behltld Utat difference lies something 
that can be even more puzzling. That is to be able to distinguish 
what the difference is between an analytic description or explanation 
as 'literal' or 'metaphoric'. 
Consider, as an example, something discussed at length here which 
will therefore have the virtue of familiarity, namely Searle's principal 
thesis which opened Chapter One. It was, of course, that: 
1) ... speaking a language is engagi~in a rule-governed 
form of behaviour. 
For that substitute: 
2) ... speaking a language is as if the speaker 
engaged in a rule-governed form of behaviour. 
It is indubitable that something is being said in the first statement 
which is not being said in the second (and vice versa) . But beyond 
saying that speech act theory in the second perhaps models speech 
competence whereas in the first it actually delineates its constituents. 
I would find it hard to say what difference it would make to the way 
Searle's theory is to be understood. In Chapter One, because Searle 
says the first, remarks about idealization notwithstanding, I criticized 
it on that basis. My point, though, is that if the theory had been 
explicitly constructed in an 'as if' manner, I cannot see how that, in 
and of itself, would blunt any of the criticism made there. 
We have seen that at the time of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had 
seen that no theory could represent its own internal relationship to 
what is was a model of. The later philosophy concurred in this view 
that analysis does not depict but, rather, displays its form of 
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representation. In the early philosophy, this insight is consequential 
upon a truth functional picture of the isomorphism between language 
and world. But the later philosophy's abandonment of that isomorphism, 
it will be remembered, required a radical reinterpretat-ion of that 
insight. The kernel of this reinterpretation lies in Wittgenstein's 
recognition that the difference between model and reality is one that 
is internal to the language-games we can employ. This is why he 
stresses that: 
Our clear and simple language-games are not 
preparatory studies for a future regularization 
of language - as it were first approximations, 
ignoring friction and air-resistance. The 
language-games are rather set up as objects of 
comparison which are meant to throw light on 
the facts of our language by way not only of 
similarities, but also of dissimilarities. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 130) 
Here, quite clearly, something like Searle's concept of idealization 
is seen by Wittgenstein as a stratagem for impliedly adverting to the 
'real' status of the analyst's model, in just the sort of fashion that 
actually transpires in Searle's theory and the later additions to it. 
But for Wittgenstein, the object of analysis is one language-game, 
its analysis, another, and the relation of each to the other is one 
simply of objects of comparison. In this sense, then, we are always 
dealing in models, and, if that is so, then we can just as well say 
we are always dealing with the reality of the games we play in 
language. For Wittgenstein, the crucial thing to avoid is a dogmatism 
about correspondence, because that concretizes the very reality of our 
constructive use of language. He continues: 
For we can avoid ineptness in our assertions only 
by presenting the model as what it is, as an 
object of comparison - as, so to speak, a 
measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to 
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So, 
which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism 
into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.) 
(ibid., para. 131) 
this l.S not counsel that we must, perforce, live in a world 
of shadows because our language gets between us and reality. Rather, 
what is real is the language-games we play. Consequently, the firmness 
and concreteness of the everyday world, its regularity and certainty, 
does not need to be supported either by a structure of determinate 
rules or a changeless core of concepts. And to question the reality 
of these abstractions is not to countenance a form of relativism 
indistinguishable from solipsism, but simply to acknowledge that 
rules and universals are made sense of practically, rather than followed 
and employed as though they themselves determined their meaning and 
sense. 
Accordingly, to concede the located and contextualized character 
of accounting for phenomena, does not mean having to dispense with the 
employment of general categories or universal terms. Neither is their 
actual use rendered 'indefinitely problematic', except that is for 
someone who wishes to construe their existence as testifying to a use 
of them which is unconnected with the actual features of the way we 
use them. Yet the reification involved in 'seeing a law in the way 
a rule is used', or 'of predicating of the thing what lies in the 
method of representing it', is integral to our use of language. It 
follows that if the aim of analysis is not to try and better that 
usage by substituting an improved language, then an analysis of 
language-mastery will inevitably involve some element of reification 
of the object analysed. In other words, if this reification cannot 
be avoided by manoeuvres such as the substitution of a logically 
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correct language, then it must be dealt with in another way. In one 
of the more oracular pronouncements toward the beginning of Investigations, 
Wittgenstein summarizes his outlook on the relationship between language, 
its analysis and the problem of reification. 
The problems ari.sing through a misinterpretation 
of our forms of language have the character of 
depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots 
are as deep in us as the forms of our language 
and their significance is as great as the 
importance of our language. - Let us ask 
ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to 
be deep? (And that is what the depth of 
philosophy is. ) 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 111) 
This remark deserves an especially careful explication and 
commentary since it cannot be said that its meaning and point lies on 
its face. The depth of our misinterpretation of language arises (inter 
alia) in giving an analysis of its use and meaning. But the activity 
of analysing is integral to our for~of life, and the means of analysis 
(methodology) comprise important language-games within those forms. 
Hence, the problems which they generate (looked at here in terms of the 
concept of rule) display something of the importance of our language. 
That importance is not confined to just providing us with a means of 
communication. For, as the notion of grammar and the notion of forms 
of life advert, what we can speak and know is bound up with that as 
well. The difficulty here, as one might expect, is to try and say 
this in the right way. That is, a way which will not either try to 
determine or confine possible meanings or the contents of possible 
knowledge, and yet try and illuminate how a way of talking is (a way 
of) knowing. In reading the following quotation, it is worth bearing 
in mind the telling metaphor in On Certainty (paras. 96 to 99) about 
the river of knowledge (see above) . 
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Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, 
say) over the question whether a rule has been 
obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over 
it, for example. That is part of the framework 
on which the working of our language is based 
(for example, in giving descriptions). 
'So you are saying that human agreement decides 
what is true and what is false?' - It is what 
human beings say that is true and false; and 
they agree in the language they use. This is 
not agreement in opinions, but in form of life. 
If language is to be a means of communication, 
there must be agreement not only in definitions 
but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. 
This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. 
- It is one thing to describe methods of 
measurement, and another to obtain and state 
results of measurement. But what we call 
'measuring' is partly determined by a certain 
constancy in results of measurement. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, paras. 240/1/2) 
I take the implications of Wittgenstein's remarks for the activity 
of analysis to be these. If analysis is rightly understood, then 
generalization, abstraction and systematization can be employed to 
illuminate features of language mastery without themselves becoming 
reified into something underlying that mastery. In other words, what 
was amiss with Searle's employment of those analytic tools was his 
failure to perceive the reflexivity of their analytic usage, something 
manifested in his marginalization of the issue of converting 'knowing 
how' into 'knowing that'. Yet this failure did not negat~ an 
appreciation of the nature of our language mastery when examining his 
theory, because its misinterpretation of our forms of language 
nevertheless displayed the character of our language mastery. That is, 
despite the failure of his principal thesis (viz. that speaking a 
language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour) , speech act 
analysis showed through that failure salient elements of that mastery. 
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This was perhaps clearest when examining his analysis of indirect 
speech where the quiddity of ordinary usage played tricks upon the 
attempt to delineate how an 'indirect' speech act could be meant and 
understood. But, as we saw, that captious subtlety uf u~dinary usage 
could equally well undermine the attempt to conform that a 'direct' 
promise, such as 'I promise to pay you five pounds', had an unequivocal 
and unitary meaning. 
This showing of the nature of language mastery through an 
appreciation of the problems with Searle's theory in turn illuminates 
how we are to understand the analysis provided by Garfinkel, Sacks 
and other ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts. In one 
crucially important sense they do not present an alternative analysis 
at all, if by that one meant that. t.heir rule systems, abstracted 
conversational devices, and so forth, specified the 'right' components 
of language mastery. This is why, when Phillips suggested that 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis should be shorn one from 
the other, he got matters entirely wrong. For, if his proposals were 
the right way forward, his recognition of the reflexivity of rule 
analysis would have amounted to no more than Garfinkel's acute 
observation concerning the way the indexicality of language eventuates 
in the conditions of systematic analysis being cited: 
... such that in that particular case the terms 
of the demonstration can be relaxed and 
nevertheless the demonstration be counted as 
an adequate one. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 6: see above) 
All reflexivity amounts to here is a face-saving formula to reconcile 
the requirements of a determinate analytic structure with the actual 
flexibilities of language use. When Blum spoke of the rationality of 
the rational-legal agent (Blum, 1974, p. 227, see above), it is 
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construals such as this that he had in mind. So, Phillips's 
recognition that any system of rules still has to be applied bv 
members, is there principally as a face-saving formula for a structure 
of determ_inate rules in much the same IIJarllle.L a.s Searle's analysis of 
indirectives. 
Blum et al. acknowledge the great influence of the writings of 
Garfinkel (Blum; McHugh; Raffel & Foss, 1974, p. 22: see above), but, 
as noted, cannot see how his insights are brought to light in the 
analytic practices of other ethnomethodologists and conversation 
analysts. In other words, the work of these practitioners contains 
nothing more than either another variant of ·the impoverished conception 
of reflexivity of the rational-legal agent, or that jaded perception 
spoken of a few pages earlier which says of any analysis that it is 
'just another account'. And, as they so acutely observe, these 
positions are in so many respects mirror images of one another; the 
commitment to positivism being merely transformed into the nihilism 
of jilted expectations at its lack of explanatory success. 
Conclusions about how practitioners of these disciplines regard 
their own work have been drawn in Chapter Two of this thesis. However, 
it could transpire that Blum et al are entirely right with respect to 
how practitioners of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis in 
fact regard their work. Nonetheless, the point and significance of 
understanding rule analysis in the right way is not something which 
can be settled by assessing how many practising ethnomethodologists 
and conversation analysts understand their own analytic practice in 
a reflexive fa=hicn. The argument presented here presumes that they 
do, but if that is wrong, then all I say is that their work can be 
so regarded, and moreover, if it is, then it is consistent with the 
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understanding of analysis found in the writings of Garfinkel and Sacks. 
To put it more strongly than this, though, would erode the significance 
of Garfinkel's insight that analysis involves the substitution of 
objective for indexical expressions: a substitution that nonetheless 
'remains programma tic in every particular case' (Garfinkel, 196 7, p. 6) 
This is why, in that already mentioned crucially important sense, 
Chapter Two does not represent an alternative to the analysis of 
speech and social competence presented in Chapter One. Ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis do not specify the 'right' components of 
language mastery in contradistinction to those elicited by speech act 
theory. Recognising the reflexivity of rule analysis does not consist 
in revealing the true constituent rules of speech and social interaction 
but, rather, in reminding the analyst and reader of what they know and 
do as language masters. This difference has been aptly distinguished 
in a way which is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's conception of the 
work of the philosopher (see Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 127) 
... we find it all the more curious that while 
it is possible to get a sense of the vast 
interpretive and improvisational skills from 
reading accounts of conversation analysis; it 
is not possible to get more than just a sense . 
... that this is what cor.versation analysis 
has come to ... that it provides a way of talking 
that is especially powerful in calling up our 
competences in order to understand the 
descriptions that hint at a sense of what those 
competences are. Actually, we would not complain 
unduly if that is what it turned out to be in the 
end. We would have grounds for complaint however 
if it pretended to be something else than a 
collection of elegant reminders. 
(Williams and Chambers, 1978, pp. 25-6) 
The conception of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
disclosed in that quotation describes how a systematic analysis of 
membership can be reconciled with a reflexive conception of analysis. 
- 249 -
The value of systematic analysis lies in 'calling up our competences'. 
In this way, the value of systematic analysis is retained for the 
purposes Searle made reference to, but it is understanding its 
relationship with ordinary speaking practices which provides a way 
of saying, 'what those competences are'. 
XII Rule Analysis and Social Analysis: An Indifferent Conclusion 
Even if my arguments are sound, what does the intellectual 
exercise that has occupied these pages have to say about sociology? 
As I said earlier, I am going to state the implications for sociological 
work that arise from this thesis via a discussion of the concept of 
ethnomethodological indifference. This concept has been received by 
sociologists as more or less a snub to the value and integrity of 
their endeavours. In return, the writings of Garfinkel, Sacks and 
other ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts has been dismissed 
as merely a precocious variety of microsociology. As we have seen, 
this has generated views about the notion of 'indexicality' which are 
not only philosophicalijdubious, but also unwarrantably restrictive 
as to the forms a social science can take. 
Such debate as there has been, on paper and in seminar rooms, has 
often generated more heat than light, and had the consequence of 
keeping many sociologists in a state of some ignorance about what 
Garfinkel and Sacks actually have to say. I believe this to be 
regrettable because I think they have something to offer about the 
understanding of sociological analysis which is important for our 
understanding of society. As this thesis has been written in order 
to come to grips with the depth of their thought, I want to conclude 
by stating, as clearly and simply as I can, the understanding of 
u 
sociology which writing(has imparted to me. 
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The best place to start is with what Garfinkel and Sacks say about 
this indifference. It is noteworthy that their treatment of the 
concept is to be found under this heading: Ethnomethodology's Interests 
in Formal Structures of Practical Actions. We are told: 
Ethnomethodology's interests, like those of 
constructive analysis, insistently focus on the 
formal structures of everyday activities. 
However, the two understand formal structures 
differently and in incompatible ways. 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 345) 
This 'difference' and the resultant incompatibility do not lie either 
with respect to the possibility or warrantability of gen~al 
formulations, structural descriptions or the right 'level' of analysis. 
Rather, they concern the understanding of how general formulations 
concerning structural features of a(ny) society count as valid 
descriptions of and valid knowledge about that society or societies. 
Accounts of formal structures are enabled to be done, we are told, 
'via sociologists' mastery of natural language', and ethnomethodological 
studies of formal structures are directed to the linguistic means which 
enable such formal structures to be described. Garfinkel and Sacks 
emphasize that the reader should not misconstrue their interest as one 
which might be seen merely as some adjunct to the task of analysing 
actual social structures, that is, as if their work was a sociology 
of sociology's research interests and methods. 
Our work does not stand in any modifying, 
elaborating, contributing, foundation-building 
relationship to professional sociological 
reasoning ... 
(ibid.) 
Neither, they stress, is their 'indifference' directed at those orders 
of tasks, or sociology singled out as a special object of study. There 
is no sense in which sociological practice is some especially 'faulted' 
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or 'problematic' order of knowledge which makes it especially worthy 
of attention. What is interesting about sociology from the 
ethnomethodological standpoint is its methods for making the world 
rational and reportable. In this respect, it is no more noteworthy 
than: 
... the practices of legal reasoning, 
conversational reasoning, divinational 
reasoning, psychiatric reasoning, and the 
rest. 
(ibid.' p. 346) 
It is equally important not to construe ethnomethodology's interest 
in the mastery of natural language as involving a claim that its topic 
of study concerns more basic social practices than those which might 
be located by concepts such as class, race, culture, gender and so 
forth. If this was the right way to view matters, it would be tempting 
to regard such concepts as 'reifications' of these more basic practices. 
However, in terms of Garfinkel and Sacks's own claims about the nature 
of language use, such a claim is without merit. One might as well say 
that the concept 'broom' reifies the objects 'brush' and 'handle'. As 
we have seen, Wittgenstein pointed out that this idea is not only 
essentialist and reductivist, it also ignores the fact that it is the 
way a concept is used which makes it reificatory. And this is closely 
connected with one of the most persistent themes in his later philosophy, 
namely that the discovery of some 'basic' practice or feature of 
language by an analyst, has its source in the elective practices of 
the analyst. Consequently, there is no sense in which the indifference 
is motivated by ethnomethodology's perception that it is a more 'basic' 
social science, on analogy, say, with the place attributed to physics 
:in t.he nat.ura l sciences- Indeed, its indifference is directed at such 
claims. 
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Despite the plethora of sociological perspectives, theories and 
methods, there have been persistent claims that there could be one 
particular form of 'adequate' and 'correct' sociological knowledge. 
Ethnomethodology has been heard as ~dying that the multitude of 
sociological approaches is without hope of remedy, and, moreover, 
that it is indifferent to such a hope. Ethnomethodology is seen to 
hold a position of thoroughgoing relativism, a view which is then 
tied to the solipsistic construals of the concept of indexicality 
spoken of before. The result of this perception is that some 
practitioners feel able to ignore the corpus of ethnomethodological 
and conversation analytic writings on what they feel to be philosophical 
grounds, while others, like Phillips, feel able to cull bits of it here 
and there to fit in with some preferred 'mainstream' of academic work. 
On this issue, some points have been mistakenly run together and 
others misconstrued. To begin with, there is no ethnomethodological 
argument saying that the variety of sociological perspectives are 
irresolvable into a single unified theory. They may, as they stand, 
possess incompatible understandings of, say, the nature of social 
action, but there is, for instance, no reason why a choice could not 
be exercised in building such a theory. In fact, theory building in 
the natural as well as the social sciences often contains incompatibilities 
of this kind, and often they seem more fruitful than damaging to the 
progress of scientific understanding. Ethnomethodology holds no brief 
for legislating the boundaries of 'legitimate' social knowledge in 
this sense at all (it is indifferent to that aim), whether this 
eventuates in a pluralistic or monistic conception of theory and method 
in sociology. In fact, anything but indifference to this sort of 
legitimating exercise would conflict with the understanding of 
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language and social life in ethnomethodological and conversation 
analytic work. 
However, Garfinkel and Sacks's perspective is seen to question 
the prospects of some unified and general Lh~ury of society in another 
way. This concerns their claims about the substitution of objective 
for indexical expressions. Now, theorizing does precisely this kind 
of work: indeed, there would be little point to it unless it did so. 
But as we have seen, for Garfinkel and Sacks this substitution is an 
ongoing practical achievement, which makes every member a theorist. 
Consequently, whilst the prospects of a single unified sociological 
theory cannot be ruled out, what Garfinkel and Sacks claim is that the 
very way of understanding that theory would rob much of the point of 
the intellectual advance its singularity supposedly offered us. Thus 
they do not question the possibility of a unified theory of society 
as such, but rather the way in which societal knowledge is construed 
in such theorizing. 
It is worthwhile putting this point in the obverse. It has also 
been assumed that the ethnomethodological critique of the practices 
of 'constructive sociology' involved a claim that ethnomethodological 
practice was the only way to pursue a valid social science. For 
every sociological theory, method, topic, interest ... substitute 
ethnomethodology. If this was the instruction to be garnered from 
what Garfinkel and Sacks say, bearing mind that there is nothing 
special about sociological reasoning as compared to 'legal reasoning 
divinational reasoning ... and the rest', we would merely be confronted 
with the case of a study that had swallowed its subject matter. 
Ethnomethodology involves no claim of this kind at all; it is, to use 
that word again, indifferent to it. Consequently, the critique of 
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the practices of constructive sociology only adverts to the fact that 
sociology constructs a picture of society from the theory and methods 
employed to find and organize its data into an account, 
.... ·that rne1kes phenomena obser_-vab le-re_t.>u.r. table, 
that is, account-able phenomena. 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 342) 
Now, the point of that insight is not to foreclose on the possible 
ways of seeing the social world. As Wittgenstein says, even if we can 
find fault, those ways of seeing 'are as deep in us as the forms of 
our language'. And that makes them important to understanding what 
a society is ... what our society is like. With this in mind, it is 
clear that ethnomethodology could never stand as an alternative, a 
better approach to understanding society than conventional sociology. 
In fact, I believe the word ethno-methodology is itself a caution 
against thinking in that way. Rather, its value for sociology is 
that it can serve as a powerful reminder of what is involved in 
sociological theorizing. Those reminders may dent some aspirations 
for social science, but it is implicit in the arguments of this thesis 
that only good can come of that. For little in the way of understanding 
something so complex and indefinite, yet so powerful as society, is to 
be gained if the mode of study tries to stand beyond the practices 
which are not only its subject matter, but the very possibility of 
its intelligibility. 
I believe this is one of the reasons why Wittgenstein talks of the 
depth of philosophy being like a grammatical joke, since this is a way 
of reminding the philosopher not to 'sublime' the understanding of his 
subject. In this thesis I have tried to explicate that quality for 
social analysis by examining the reflexivity of rule analysis. This 
has allowed us to see that when Garfinkel and Sacks speak of 
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'constructive' sociology, that is not to say that their accounts of 
social phenomena are any less constructed, any less ~ portrayal, 
rather than the portrayal of the constituents of some social phenomenon. 
Perhaps one reason for the variety ot soclologlcal approaches is a 
continual dissatisfaction with the 'fit' between some account ~na 
those it 'accounts for'. This is not a failure to be remedied, as 
the reason for it lies in the identity between the accounting 
practices of the analyst and the practices the analyst studies. 
The variety of approaches to studying social phenomena, including 
ethnomethodolo~' and conversation analysis, can hardly be expected to 
be less than the variety of social life the discipline confronts as 
its subject matter. That is not a corillllitment to relativism in the 
sense that would rob systematic analysis of its purpose or sociological 
analysis of its sense. It does no more by way of counselling the 
prohibition of, say, an understanding of contemporary society in terms 
of class or gender, than the arguments of th1& thesis could legitimate 
some particular form of analysis as the only right way in which society 
is to be understood. Rather, it suggests looking at social analysis, 
however it is done, as being an instance of what it describes, in 
the sense that it is productive of the phenomena it reports. 
The indifference of ethnomethodology is directed toward studies 
of social phenomena that do not involve a recognition of this insight 
in their researches. There is no hostility, much less incompatibility 
between that insight and the work of the sociologist. Such reflexivity 
can only serve to deepen the understanding of social processes in 




1. See Blum, 1974; and Blum, McHugh, Raffel and Foss, 1974. 
2. Reme~Jer that Searls says his method is one, 
... of constructing idealized models ... 
analogous to the sort of theory construction 
that goes on in monst sciences, e.g. the 
construction of economic models, or accounts 
of the solar system which treat planets as 
points. Without abstraction and idealization 
there is no systematization. 
(1969, p. 56) 
3. See Jarvie, (1972~ for proposals of this sort and for an explanation 
of how those proposals are indebted to the work of Sir Karl Popper. 
4. I heard this term used by them at a conference at the University 
of Sheffield in July 1978. 
5. For an explication of this concept, Phillips refers to P. Berger 
and T. Luckmann, (1966). Cf. the use Streeck makes of this concept 
in his paper discussed in Chapter One. 
6. Phillips, in fact, argues that idealist subjectivism and empiricist 
materialism are different expressions of the same epistemology 
because both ignore the social dimension of meaning and knowledge. 
7. Cf. Karl Marx and F. Engels (1974, p. 47) who use this metaphor 
in their famous remark on the inversion of material and ideal 
factors in the consciousness of agents in certain social formations. 
8. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein expresses it thus: 
'How am I able to obey a rule?' - if this is not 
a question about causes, t.hen it is about the 
justification for my following the rule in the 
way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications, I have 
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then 
I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'. 
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(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions 
for the sake not of their content, but of their 
form. Our requirement is an architectural one; 
the definition a kind of ornamental coping that 
supports nothing.) 
(19G8, para. 217) 
9. The metaphor of a fibre running through all language use appears 
at the end of Wittgenstein's introduction of the concepts of 
language game and family resemblance in the Philosophical 
Investigations. The passage offers one of the clearest outlines 
of Wittgenstein's conception of language in the later philosophy. 
See Wittgenstein, 1968, paras. 65-67 where he says: 
... the strength of the thread does not reside 
in the fact that some one fibre runs through its 
whole length, but in the overlapping of many 
fibres. 
But if one wished to say: 'There is something 
common ... ' One might as well say: 'Something 
runs through the whole thread - namely .the 
continuous overlapping of those fibres'. 
10. The notion of rule scepticism is coined by H.L.A. Hart in The 
Concept of Law, 1961, p. 132ff. 
11. As Phillips notes, such problems are usually explored in terms 
of the features of natural objects. The problem can be extended 
to the comprehension of natural numbers. For example, if 
membership of a set of three figure mathematical objects must not 
include as a constituent the number 3, the empiricist's learner 
cannot, of course, have a rule to that effect but must discard 
potential incumbents possessing that number by the perception 
'3' stimulating the operation 'non inclusion of the candidate'. 
Clearly though, one of the problems of this kind of account of 
meaning is that the exclusionary operation itself presupposes 
the learner's recognition of that which the analysis seeks to 
exclude. 
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12. The Greek for 'heap' is soros; a reminder that the problem has 
a history that extends back beyond the preoccupations of 
twentieth-century analytic philosophy. The sorites is a chain 
syllncyi.sm (e.g. a cat is a quac1rupeL1, a quadruped is an animal, 
an animal is a substance: therefore a cat is a substance) which 
leads by gradual steps to semantic indefiniteness or absurdity. 
It is based on exploiting the absence of precise, especially 
numerical limits to the application of terms (e.g; 10,000 lumps 
of coal a heap; 9,999 lumps of coal = a heap; 1 lump 
of coal = a heap.) 
13. As mentioned, Phillips sees his analysis to be an extension of 
the work of Bernard Harrison (197~) which is explicitly directed 
toward unifying the work of Wittgenstein and Chomsky. In a 
powerful article on the private language argument in Wittgenstein's 
philosophy, Saul Kripke says: 
... the Investigations is hostile to any 
attempt to analyse language by uncovering a 
hidden deep structure. In this last respect, 
modern transformational linguistics since 
Noam Chomsky, has been closer to the Tractatus 
than the Investigations. 
(1981, p. 305, n. 43) 
14. As Kripke says: 
The simplest, most basic idea of the Tractatus 
can hardly be dismissed: a declarative sentence 
gets its meaning by virtue of its truth conditions, 
by virtue of its correspondence to facts that must 
obtain if it is true. 
(1981, p. 273) 
The problem was Wittgenstein's complete generalization of this 
idea, which is dubious even with respect to decleratives. The 
later philosophy's emphasis on usage completely altered the 
approach of finding some factor 'by virtue of' which some 
sentence or class of sentences possessed meaning. 
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15. In the Tractatus, we are told: 
5.542 It is clear, however, that 'A believes 
that p', 'A has the thought p' and 'A 
says p' are of the form '"p" says p' : 
and this does not involve a correlation 
of a fact with an object, but rather 
the correlation of facts by means of 
the correlation of their objects. 
5.5421 This shows too that there is no such 
thing as the soul - the subject, etc. 
- as it is conceived in the superficial 
psychology of the present day. 
(Wittgenstein, 1961) 
16. Wittgenstein quotes, with approval, Goethe's disavowal of 
St John's gospel. 
Language - I want to say - is a refinement, 
im Anfang war die Tat ('in the beginning was 
the deed'). 
(Wittgenstein, 1976, p. 420) 
17. In the Confessions I.8., Augustine says: 
When they (my elders) named some object, and 
accordingly moved toward something, I saw this 
and I grasped what the thing was called by the 
sound they uttered when they meant to point it 
out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily 
movements, as it were the natural language of 
all peoples: the expression of the face, the 
play of the eyes, the movement of other parts 
of the body, and the tone of voice which 
expresses our state of mind in seeking, having 
rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I 
heard words repeatedly used in their proper 
places in various sentences, I gradually learnt 
to understand what objects they signified; and 
after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, 
I used them to express my own desires. 
(cited by Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 1) 
18. Wittgenstein says: 
We remain unconscious of the prodigious 
diversity of all the every-day language-games 
because the clothing of our language makes 
everything look alike. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 224) 
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19. In a footnote to this passage, Cavell says: 
What 'learning' and 'teaching' are, here is, or 
ought to be, seriously problematic. We say a 
word and the child repeats it. What is 
;repeating' here? All we know is that the child 
makes a sound which we accept. (How does the 
child recognise acceptance? Has he learned what 
that is?) 
Compare this with the views of Augustine (see above footnote 17). 
20. And the regress does not just concern an endless supply of 
rulers. As Wittgenstein says: 
There is one thing of which one can say 
neither that it is one metre long, nor that it 
is not one metre long, and that is the standard 
metre in Paris ... 
(Wittgenstein, 1068, para. 50) 
21. After making this point, he adds in parentheses: 
We do not usually carry out the order 'Bring me 
a red flower' by looking up the colour red in a 
table of colours and then bringing a flower of 
the colour that we find in the table; but when 
it is a question of choosing or mixing a particular 
shade of red, we do sometimes make use of a sample 
or a table. 
(Wittgenstein, 1968, para. 53) 
22. The concept of grammar in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is 
discussed by Specht (1969, Chapter VI) and Hacker (1972, Chapter VI). 
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